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Albert Ando passed away over two years ago, but his long-standing co-operation with the
Economic Research Department of the Bank of Italy is still producing tangible fruits today, as this
article testifies. The tools of quantitative analysis that he taught to so many young economists and
helped apply to concrete problems are still in use; the scores of economists at the Bank who have
had the privilege of absorbing some of Albert’s knowledge and passion use these assets in their
daily work.
I first met Albert Ando at MIT in the fall term of the 1962-63 academic year. He
collaborated with Paul Samuelson on the graduate course in Advanced Monetary Theory. Some
years later I asked him to help in building the Bank of Italy’s new quarterly model of the Italian
economy, which had also benefited, in its earlier stages, from the advice of Franco Modigliani. The
model was eventually finalized in the mid-1980’s and, with regular updating, remains in constant
use.
Albert’s work with the econometric model constituted the bulk of his activities here at the
Bank, but his contribution to our economic research was by no means limited to the model alone.
He took part in reshaping the Survey of Household Income and Wealth which the Economic
Research Department had started in the 1960’s. He helped organize and develop a major research
project on saving behavior. He developed tools for the design of policies to steer and stabilize “real”
economies, i.e. economies that can only be represented by large-scale, complex models – tools that
demanded intensive and efficient use of computers, another area in which Albert’s stimulus was
essential. And he set up the microsimulation model of households’ behavior, whose main features
are described in the article published here. More generally, Albert was indefatigable in stimulating
and directing research, and unstinting in offering his knowledge and wisdom; more than one
generation of young and less young economists of the Bank of Italy benefited from his advice and
example.
In publishing one of his last works, I wish to remember Albert Ando as an inspiring
professor and a long-time friend of mine, one of the most imaginative economists of the late
twentieth century, a tireless and dedicated adviser of the Bank of Italy, a distinguished member of
the academic community who realized what challenges face policymakers, and the possessor of an
inquiring, investigative mind who was attracted by major intellectual pursuits as well as daily policy
problems.
Antonio Fazio
Governor of the Bank of ItalyA MICRO SIMULATION MODEL OF DEMOGRAPHIC DEVELOPMENT AND
HOUSEHOLDS’ ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR IN ITALY
by Albert Ando
 and Sergio Nicoletti-Altimari
(*)
Abstract
The relationship between the demographic structure and the saving rate of a society is
the reflection of the aggregation of the behaviour of heterogeneous households, differing
from one another in the type of living arrangements and in the characteristics of their
members. In order to contribute to the understanding of this relationship, we construct a
dynamic micro model capable of simulating the demographic development of a population,
including the creation, destruction, dimension and various other important characteristics of
households and their members. The demographic model is then combined with a
specification of the processes generating income, social security wealth, retirement and
consumption behaviour of households, and applied to a data set derived from survey data on
the Italian household sector.
Simulations of the model are used to study the evolution of aggregate income, saving
and asset accumulation over the period 1994-2100. If fertility and mortality assumptions of
recent official projections are adopted and marriage and divorce rates maintained at current
levels, the dramatic ageing of the population and the marked decline in the share of
population living in traditional households would lead, other things being equal, to a
substantial decline in the aggregate saving rate. However, the reduction in the number of
children per household and, above all, the decline in the ratio of social security wealth of
households to disposable income as the effects of the recently introduced reforms begin to be
felt act as offsetting factors. As a result, the aggregate saving rate increases over the initial 30
years of the simulation and moderately decreases thereafter, stabilizing slightly above the
original level. Implications of changes in a number of key assumptions regarding the
demographic evolution, productivity growth and individual behavioural responses are also
analyzed.
JEL classification: D12, D31, D91, E21, H55, J10, J26.
Keywords: Demographic developments, family structure, consumption, saving, social
security, micro simulation model.
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I. Introduction and main conclusions
1
I.1 Demographic structure of the population and the aggregate saving rate
In the European countries and Japan, the birth rate has declined dramatically during the
past several decades, accompanied by a continuous decline in mortality. This trend has so far
led to a noticeable decline in the population of children in these countries, but there is no
question that it will eventually lead to large shifts in the age structure of the adult population.
The ratio of older, presumably retired, persons to younger, working adults will increase to
unprecedented levels, with a number of potentially serious consequences. In public
discussion, two points are most often emphasized.
First, as stressed by the life cycle model of Modigliani and Brumberg, the ageing of the
adult population reduces the aggregate saving rate in the society, since the ratio of the retired,
presumably dissaving, population to the working, presumably saving, population increases.
One must be careful to remember that this well-known proposition applies to the comparison
of two or more steady-state growth paths, and it neglects dynamic adjustment processes.
Later in this section, we will illustrate how large and long-lasting these dynamic adjustment
processes can be. A decline in the growth rate of the population, however, also reduces the
ratio of investment to output needed to maintain any specific capital-output ratio, given the
same rate of technical progress. The requirement, therefore, is not that the saving rate should
                                                          
1  A number of people have helped and made important contributions at various stages of this project.
Luigi Cannari has provided a crucial input for the construction of the model of demographic evolution
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Ignazio Visco for stimulating and helpful discussions over many years.
Finally, we are very grateful to Ruth Antonelli, Juliette Cuvry and Monica Arellano for excellent assistance
in finalising this manuscript.
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Bank.10
remain stable when the rate of population growth declines. Both the saving rate and the ratio
of investment to output would decline when population growth declines, but the behaviour of
the two must be such that equilibrium between them is maintained at full employment with
the interest rate remaining within a reasonable range and the external borrowing is not
exploding.
A second concern often voiced in public debates relates to the impact of the ageing of a
population on public finances. In most societies, the working population contributes taxes to
the government, while the retired population must be provided with pensions and other
support from the government. The ageing of the population will therefore undermine the
stability of the government budget and its debt position unless significant adjustments are
made to tax and transfer policies.
These considerations have induced economists to devote their attention to the
economic consequences of the changing demographic structure of the population. Such
studies typically involve three components: a description of the dependence of an
individual’s behaviour on his/her demographic characteristics; a dynamic model of the
demographic structure of the society; and a procedure for combining these two components
of the model to project various aggregate measures of interest into future periods for analysts
and policy-makers. As soon as we attempt a detailed description of the dependence of the
economic behaviour of an individual on his/her demographic characteristics, however, it
becomes obvious that the latter depends not only on age but also on the nature of the family
to which the individual belongs, and on the role he/she plays in the family. Indeed, for
economic decisions, in most cases it is more natural to consider a family or a household
rather than an individual as the decision-making unit. A group of persons living individually
exhibits a very different pattern of consumption and saving from a group of similar persons
living together as a family. Powerful economies of scale are involved here, together with
possible adjustments of the planning horizon when a group of persons rather than individuals
plan their lives on a joint basis.
A family is, however, a much more complex entity than an individual.  Its distribution
must necessarily be multi-dimensional, involving not only the age of the head of the
household, but also the age of the spouse, the number, age and sex of the children and other11
dependants and their relation to one another. Other acquired characteristics of members, such
as education and working status, as well as living arrangements are also of great importance.
When we look at these characteristics of families since the 1950s in developed
countries, we recognize that a great deal more than the age distribution has changed fairly
dramatically over time, partly as a consequence of the lower fertility and mortality rates, but
also for a number of other reasons. Among the more important ones are the delayed start of
the childbearing period, the decrease in the number of marriages, the postponement of
marriage, the increased incidence of divorce and separation, the increase in the number of
children outside marriage, the increase in the number of single persons living alone or in
single-parent families and the decline in the number of families containing more than one
generation.
Changes in the demographic pattern can exert a large and profound influence on the
economic life of the society, but the dynamic process involved in the working of this causal
structure can be quite slow. For this reason, it can be quite misleading to rely on the
comparative steady-state propositions cited above when we are interested in analyzing the
short- to medium-term responses of economic variables to changes in demographic patterns.
To illustrate this point, let us consider the case in which the fertility and mortality rates have
been constant for a long enough period of time that the demographic structure of the society
has become stabilized and all segments of the population are growing at a constant rate.
Suppose further that at a particular point in time the fertility rate declines sharply once and
for all and remains at the new, lower rate thereafter.
If we assume that individuals enter the labour force at age 20, then for 20 years after
the fertility declines, the relative size of the working age population and the older, retired
population will remain unchanged. The only effect of the fertility decline is the reduction in
the number of dependant children, which would (likely) induce their parents to decrease
consumption. The aggregate saving rate for the society, therefore, is likely to increase during
this period.  Assuming further that individuals begin to retire at age 65, during the next 45
years the number of working age population relative to the number of retired persons must
decline, inducing the aggregate saving-income ratio to fall during this period.
Finally, during the next 30 years, that is, 65 to 95 years after the initial decline in the
fertility rate, the number of older, retired people decreases, and the aggregate saving rate12
recovers slightly.  When the adjustment processes are completed, the weights of population
will have shifted from the younger group to the older group. Since the older group maintains
a much higher asset-income ratio than the younger group, the aggregate asset-income ratio
rises as a result of the lower fertility rate, but not as much as the reciprocal of the growth rate
of population. The saving-income ratio is the product of the rate of growth of assets and the
asset income ratio. Its final equilibrium value, therefore, must be smaller than its initial value
but not by as much as the decline in the growth rate of the population, confirming the
proposition associated with the simple life cycle theory. It is important to recognize,
however, that the saving-income ratio does not necessarily arrive at its final new equilibrium
value monotonically. In the example that we have outlined above, it actually rises for a
while, and only at the end declines rapidly to arrive at the new, lower value. The prediction
of a falling saving-income ratio for the l990s and beyond in Japan associated with the
dramatic fall in the fertility rate was due to the neglect of the dynamic adjustment process.
  For the purpose of organizing our discussion on the effects of dynamic changes in the
distribution of age and other family characteristics for the population on the aggregate saving
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t S  and  t Y  are, respectively, the aggregate savings and the disposable income of the
household sector,  ) , ( f a wt  is the weight of families with characteristics  ) , ( f a  (i.e., the total
number of families defined by the age of the head aand their demographic characteristics
f ), and  ) , ( f a yt  and  ) , ( f a st represent the mean value of disposable income and savings of
the group of families  ) , ( f a . Since (1) is an identity, we can see that the aggregate saving-
income ratio can change as a result of changes in the micro saving-income ratio of individual
groups, of the distribution of income among groups, or of shifts of weights among groups.
A number of studies have attempted to document the effects of changes in the
composition of the population on aggregate saving on the basis of equation (1). Gokhale,
Kotlikoff and Sabelhouse (1994) have found that the recent decline in the saving-income
ratio in the U.S. can be attributed to a shift of resources from younger families to older13
households and to an increase in the consumption-income ratio of these older households,
due in large part to a rise in medical costs. In a detailed study, J. P. Cordoba (1996) classified
households by a variety of characteristics including household type, age, sex and the
educational level of the head of the household, the number of earners and family size. While
the saving rate of most groups remained reasonably stable between the 1960s and the late
1980s, the aggregate saving-income ratio declined significantly in the same period, because
the distribution of families shifted dramatically from high saving groups (especially two-
parent families) to low saving groups (single individuals and one-parent families). The
former went from roughly 80% of total families in 1961 to only 60% in 1984-90. When
corrected for these weight shifts, the saving-income ratio in 1984-90 is nearly the same as in
1960-61, although it is still lower than in 1972-73. Both studies have found little or no effect
on the aggregate saving rate of the U.S. resulting from the change in the age structure of the
population in the period since 1960. This last result is not surprising, because during this
period the proportion of the working age population in the total population did not decline. If
anything, it increased.
In Japan, studies found that, while single individuals living alone or in single-parent
families are rare, families which contain young, working adults as dependants are quite
common and contribute a disproportionately large share of saving (Ando, Yamashita and
Murayama (1986); Ando (1996), Ando, Guiso and Terlizzese (1994), Hayashi, Ando, and
Ferris (1989)).  Equally important, older individuals in Japan appear to dissave less than in
other countries, partly because the labour force participation rate of older males is very high,
and partly because a large majority of older individuals tend to merge into the families of
their children, thus taking advantage of the economy of scale associated with larger families.
Thus, while the distribution of families by their characteristics in Japan is quite different
from that observed in the U. S., the basic principle that some types of families save a much
larger proportion of their income than other families holds, and changes in this distribution
change the aggregate saving rate even if the saving rate of specific groups remains stable.
Unlike Japan, in Italy older individuals retire relatively early and tend to maintain
independent households.  On the other hand, Italy shares with Japan the family pattern in
which most young, working adults live with their parents until marriage. This type of family
again contributes a disproportionately large share of saving to society (Ando, Guiso and14
Terlizzese (1994)).  In Section II of this paper, we document that the declining proportion of
families containing adult dependants accounts for about 40% of the decline in the aggregate
saving ratio that took place in Italy between 1980 and 1995.
I.2.   A micro simulation model of demographic developments and households’ economic
behaviour
All empirical studies recognize, however, that shifts in the weights in equation (1) are
generally accompanied by changes in the distribution of income and in the saving-income
ratios of the various groups of the population. To understand fully the implications of
demographic changes for the aggregate saving rate and to be able to predict the quantitative
effects of the former on the latter, therefore, a fully-fledged model integrating the
demographic characteristics and the economic behaviour of households is required. In terms
of equation (1) above, we need (a) a detailed demographic model describing the movement
of ) , ( f a wt  over time, (b) a model of income generation expressing the value of  ) , ( f a yt as a
function of age a and family characteristics f in year t, (c) a model of a household’s savings
behaviour capable of predicting the value of the saving-income ratio  ) , ( ) , ( f a y f a s t t  for all
a and f for all t, and (d) an operational description of the aggregation process parallel to
equation (1). This monograph reports on the result of our first attempt to build such a model
for the Italian economy.
A schematic overview of the resulting micro model is depicted in Figure I.1 at the end
of this section, in which the model has been divided into three main blocks. The first block
describes the basic demographic dynamics. It consists of individuals’ encounters with the
main demographic events in life such as birth, marriage, divorce and death, leaving the
parent family or merging with other households. The frequency with which households
encounter these events and their responses are determined largely by probability distributions
derived from observed demographic patterns. Their status within households and the
characteristics of the households are changed every year according to these events.  In earlier
models constructed for the United States and for Japan, individual households were grouped
into small, relatively homogeneous groups classified by the type of families (single male or
female with or without children, married couples with or without children, etc.), the age of
the head and the age of the spouse (if any), and the number of children. The mean values of15
variables for these groups and the weights associated with them served as the basic unit of
our modeling. In this model for Italy, we work directly with individual households. To do so,
we must transform the original stratified sample of households into an artificial proportional
sample through a resampling procedure described in Section III.
In a second block, a number of important socio-economic characteristics of
individuals, such as their education, their participation in the labour force, their employment
status, their sector and occupational status, are initially assigned to new households and then
updated accordingly to a set of transition probabilities. These transition probabilities are
again estimated from patterns observed in the demographic data, and we have observed as far
as possible the dependence of these probabilities on a number of factors. At any given
period, therefore, individuals are indexed by their age, sex, role in the family, education,
labour force status, sector and type of activity and other important characteristics.
In the third block, we specify the dependence of the process generating labour income
for each household on its socio-economic characteristics.  A set of rules governing the
transfer of wealth among households and individuals is also specified here, but it should be
noted that in the actual operation of the model the transfer of wealth is closely integrated
with changes in the status of individuals and families. The total available resources
(including expected earnings over remaining working years, accumulated assets and expected
social security wealth) for a family at any point during its life-cycle are then specified and
computed. This, in turn, enables us to describe the consumption-saving and retirement
decisions in the tradition of the life-cycle hypothesis. Once saving for households is
generated in this way, net worth for each household is updated in the usual way.
The final result of this exercise is a dynamic micro simulation model in which
individuals and households are heterogeneous over a relatively large number of
characteristics whose change over time is fully described. Since these characteristics play an
important role in shaping the economic behaviour of households and individuals, recognizing
the heterogeneity of households over these characteristics enables us to analyze a number of
problems that cannot be dealt with in the framework of a model containing a single
representative agent, or one containing relatively few types of agents.
Besides the rich heterogeneity of the structure and behaviour of households, the second
feature of the model that we would like to emphasize is its close link with available micro16
data. The parameters of the model were estimated (and its dynamic behaviour was calibrated)
using the data set generated by several waves of surveys of Italian households conducted by
the Bank of Italy. Since we need to treat each observation in the survey data as though it
were a single household, while the survey is based on a stratified sampling design, we have
used a resampling procedure to generate a very large proportional sample of households. In
the process, we have made a number of proportional adjustments to insure that the
distribution of demographic and social characteristics closely matches the corresponding
distribution of the Italian population, and that the aggregate economic variables generated
from our sample are consistent with the National Accounts data.
There are several reasons that make the Italian household sector an ideal laboratory for
our purposes. First of all, as the analysis of available data will show below (Section II), the
structure of Italian households is extremely important in determining their economic
behaviour, with different households exhibiting very different saving behaviour over their
life. Very tight relations among the members of households, coupled with the imperfect
working of the labour market and of the credit and insurance markets are probably the main
reasons for the central role played by households in determining the economic behaviour of
individuals. While demographic changes are exerting a marked impact on the composition of
households, economic decisions continue to depend strongly on the characteristics of
households. Second, while some of the demographic changes mentioned above are common
to many developed countries, the scale of changes has been especially large in Italy. In
particular, the fertility rate has reached the lowest level in the world, bringing the growth of
the population to a halt, and life expectancy has lengthened relatively more than in other
European countries. Net migration, which could have counteracted these developments, has
been relatively small. Projections indicate that the process of ageing will proceed at a much
higher pace than in other countries (with the possible exception of Japan). These conditions
have accentuated the contribution of demographic factors to changes in the aggregate
economic behaviour of the Italian household sector, and they provide an opportunity for a
sharper test for the superiority of a model that allows for heterogeneity among households.
Furthermore, demographic changes coupled with pressures coming from a huge and
ever-increasing public debt have led the Italian government to introduce a number of reforms
to the Italian social security system in the 1990s. A major reform in 1995, which brought17
about the adoption of a contribution-based system and the gradual reduction of many
different existing schemes in favour of a single one, is likely to have a major impact on
aggregate saving in Italy. A comprehensive analysis of the possible implications of this
change of regime is nearly impossible owing to the heterogeneity of existing schemes for
different categories of workers and the complexity of the transition to the new regime, unless
the framework for the analysis explicitly allows for different behaviour among individual
households associated with their demographic and socio-economic characteristics. The
model outlined above should constitute such a framework, and we present the result of an
analysis of this regime change at the end of the paper.
I.3. Results of the simulations of the micro model
A number of simulations of the complete model have been performed, all covering the
period 1994-2100. Our benchmark simulation assumes an unchanged growth of per-capita
productivity in the Italian economy (2% per year) and utilizes the fertility and mortality rates
of the main variant of recent official demographic forecasts, which predicts a substantial
decline in the total population by 2050 and a dramatic decline thereafter. This is
accompanied by a deep change in the age structure of the population (the fraction of those
aged 65 or over rises from 17% in 1995 to more than 30% in 2050), a continual shrinking of
the average family size, a marked decline in the proportion of the population living in
traditional families and an increase of the proportion of people living alone.
Other things being equal, these changes would lead to a remarkable decline in the
aggregate saving rate. The most striking result of this benchmark simulation, however, is that
the aggregate saving rate increases up to year 2030 and then decreases slowly thereafter,
stabilizing about 2 percentage  points above the initial level.  Three factors exert strong
counteracting pressure on the saving rate: the decline in the number of children per
household; the decline in the unemployment rate for young people (assumed in the
benchmark simulation) which increases the proportion of high-saving non-nuclear
households in the population; and the gradual decline in the ratio of social security wealth of
households to disposable income as the effects of the recently introduced reforms begin to be
felt. After a while, when the population begins to decline more rapidly, this last effect
eventually becomes the dominant factor. The new social security regime is a contribution-18
based, pay-as-you-go system with an internal rate of return equal to the rate of growth of
GDP, which therefore immediately “internalizes” the decline in the population in the form of
lower future benefits. Estimated parameters of the model are such that the increased saving
of relatively young households, which react to the reduction in future benefits both by
accumulating more and by working longer years, partly compensates the effect produced by
the increase in the weight of elderly households, so that the aggregate saving rate eventually
rises.
Of course, these results depend on a number of parameters and assumptions that are
subject to great uncertainty. We have therefore carried out several different simulations to
check the sensitivity of the results with respect to the key parameters or assumptions.
A first set of simulations deals with the assumptions on fertility, mortality and
productivity growth. Increases in fertility rates do not have a marked effect in the medium
term, since the main demographic changes foreseen for Italy in the next 30 years are already
under way. Over a longer time horizon the increase of the weight of the working age
population relative to the benchmark case leads, as expected, to a higher saving rate; this
effect is partly mitigated by the smaller decrease in the ratio of social security wealth to
income compared with the benchmark case.
The benchmark simulation results imply the persistence of a relatively high saving rate
in the Italian economy, even against a background of declining population and income
growth. Two key factors contribute to this result: the assumed relatively high growth of per-
capita productivity and the mechanism through which changes in social security wealth
offset the impact of ageing on aggregate saving. A productivity slowdown can exert dramatic
effects on the aggregate saving rate. Even relatively small declines in productivity growth
can lead to substantial declines in the aggregate saving rate. In the extreme case, in which
productivity growth is set to generate a rate of growth of aggregate labour income close to
zero, the saving rate shrinks almost to zero at the end of the simulation period.
Changes in some key parameters that govern the response of individuals to the
changing social security system can have a significant impact. The uncertainty regarding the
measure of social security wealth used in our model (as opposed to the measure perceived by
households) and the parameters governing behavioural responses to it (which have been
estimated during a period of major changes in the system) is especially serious. This led us to19
perform a simulation in which the parameters of the saving choices are re-estimated on the
assumption that, during the period of the calculation, households believe that only a part of
the measured social security wealth is their real assets. In this case, the counter-effect from
the social security system in the simulation we describe above is much weaker and the
aggregate saving rate is lowered by almost 3 points with respect to the benchmark at the end
of the simulation period.
When we change the rules of the social security system to incentivate a later
retirement, two counter-effects come into play in the model. On the one hand, the need to
accumulate assets for retirement during working years is reduced, generating a negative
effect on savings. On the other hand, the increase in the proportion of the working population
exerts a positive effect on saving. The net effect is that the saving rate remains very close to
that of the benchmark simulation throughout the simulation period.
I.4. Other applications, limits and possible extensions
While the micro simulation model has been developed primarily for studying the
implications of the rapidly changing Italian demographic structure for aggregate saving,
potentially it can be used to analyze a number of other important issues. We have already
suggested that the model can be used for an analysis of alternative designs of the social
security system as it permits a fairly detailed description of the institutional features of the
system and of the characteristics of the participants and their evolution over time.
The second potential application of this model is for studying the effects of the
personal tax and transfer system on the distribution of personal income. Since in this model
we can generate the earned income and net worth for all families, it is clear that we can
generate the distribution of income before and after taxes and transfers, provided that in the
model we describe in detail the rules governing them.  By comparing the distribution of
income before and after taxes and transfers, we can analyze how these affect the distribution.
It is also clear, however, that our model must be extended in two directions for such an
analysis to be fully satisfactory.
First, as we describe in detail in Section V below, our behavioural equation describing
an individual’s earnings from labour can account for some 45% of the variance of the
logarithm of income. When working with cross section data, this result must be considered20
an indication that our equation is as successful as can be expected in explaining the earned
income of individuals. However, it is also true that it leaves a very large part of income
distribution unexplained, especially extreme values or tails of the distribution.  For a study of
income distribution, tails of the distribution are important and cannot be neglected. On the
other hand, it is unlikely that we can improve the explanatory power of our equation by
adjusting or elaborating the specification of the deterministic part of the explanatory
equation. It is therefore essential that we supplement the specification reported in this paper
by modeling explicitly the stochastic process generating the residual term of the income
equation for the purpose of studying income distribution. It is also useful to model the
stochastic process that generates the residual term of the equation generating consumption
since this term has an important impact on the accumulation of net worth and hence on future
income stream. Work on this extension is currently under way.
2
Second, in all simulations reported in this paper we take the labour force participation
decision (both the decision whether or not to participate as well as the number of hours
workers wish to work) as simple functions of the demographic and socio-economic
characteristics of individuals. That is, we have ignored the response of the labour force
participation decisions on the wage rate.  This issue must be investigated and our description
of labour force participation decisions by individuals must be based on the result of a more
careful empirical analysis.
Finally, it should be taken into account that in this study we proceed within a partial
equilibrium framework. In particular, the real wage rate and the real rate of interest are also
taken as exogenous.  Ultimately, the dependence of the real wage rate on the demand and
supply of labour must be recognized, and through it, the relationship between labour
productivity and the real wage rate. We should also remember that the real rate of interest
must be consistent with the efficiency conditions of production and the saving decision of the
household sector.
3
                                                          
2  Simulations reported in this paper have been carried out using programs written in STATA. At the
current stage of development, our programs are too slow to implement stochastic simulations involving a large
number of replications. In order to incorporate a stochastic process generating the residual terms in some of our
equations, we are currently rewriting our programs in FORTRAN.  This will allow us to incorporate stochastic
processes generating the residual terms of equations in our model and perform stochastic simulations.
3  One way of handling this issue satisfactorily is to link the present model with a macro-econometric
model, such as that maintained and operated by the Research Department of the Bank of Italy.  Once the
FORTRAN version of our model is operating, we believe such a link is well within our reach.21
I. 5.   Related literature on the subject
As detailed data on individual households have become more readily available and our
ability to work with these large data sets on computers rapidly improved, more frequent
attempts have been made to build dynamic micro-simulation models of household behaviour.
As a comprehensive review of such models is outside the scope of this study, we confine
ourselves to listing several studies that are closest to ours in design. Comprehensive reviews
can be found in Harding (1996) and Zaidi and Rake (2001). Pioneering attempts to construct
dynamic micro-simulation models are those by Orcutt (1957) and Orcutt et al. (1976), which
led to the creation of the DYNASIM model for the United States. In the last two decades, a
large number of dynamic micro-simulation models have been built for a number of
countries.
4 Broadly speaking, they can be divided into two categories: dynamic cohort
models and dynamic population models. While the former work with means of variables for
cohorts of individuals, the latter (to which our model belongs) use individual observations
and project their characteristics in the future. Most existing models normally contain a
description of the demographic evolution (of individuals or cohorts of individuals), of social
and economic attainments (labour market participation, employment status, etc.), of the
income generating process, and often a fairly detailed description of the tax/benefit and
social security systems. These models have been and are successfully used to study a number
of important policy issues, such as the distributional effects of fiscal policies, the effects of
ageing on fiscal budgets or the consequences of reforms to the social security systems.
With respect to these existing models, we believe that the main value added of our
model is to introduce a detailed modeling of households’ consumption and saving decisions,
which is grounded in the life-cycle theory, and their relation to household characteristics.
Ando (1996) and Cordoba (l996) report studies parallel to the present one using data sets for
Japan and for the United States. Their studies are very similar to this one except that they
worked with cohort means of variables rather than with observations of variables for
individual households. For Italy, M. Baldini (1997) presents a dynamic cohort model
                                                          
4  Some examples are DYNASIM-2 and CORSIM for the US, DYNAMOD and the Harding models for
Australia, LIFEMOD for the UK, DESTINIE for France,  MOSART for Norway. For an overview of these and
other micro-simulation models see Harding (1996) and Zaidi and Rake (2001). An ambitious project is22
describing the life cycle of a sample of four thousands individuals that is also drawn from the
Bank of Italy Survey of Households’ Income and Wealth.
I.6. Organization of the study
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II gives a brief survey of
the main demographic changes under way in Italy and describes the dependence of economic
behaviour, especially the pattern of savings by families, on their demographic and socio-
economic characteristics visible in the raw data. Section III presents the dynamic model of
demographic development. Section IV describes the mechanism generating the other
characteristics of individuals that are needed to determine their economic behaviour,
including the labour force participation status of working age individuals.
Section V presents the generation of the main economic variables of the simulation
model and individual choices, include the prediction of households’ total available resources,
their saving and retirement decisions. This section also describes the rules governing the
transfer of wealth among households. Section VI summarizes the main simulation results
regarding demographic changes and the aggregate saving pattern that we may anticipate for
the period between 1993 and 2100.
 Finally, the Appendix describes the data set generated by the Bank of Italy Survey of
Households’ Income and Wealth and the modifications we have applied to this data set so
that it can serve as the basis for the analysis reported in this paper.
                                                                                                                                                                                  
EUROMOD (see Sutherland, ed., 2001) which is the first attempt to construct an integrated pan-European
micro-simulation model.Section I – Charts and Tables
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II Demographic characteristics and the saving behaviour of Italian households
II.1 Introduction
This Section is mainly descriptive. The intention is, on the one hand, to give a broad,
synthetic picture of the structure of the Italian population and households and, on the other,
to describe the link between the observed characteristics of households and their saving
behaviour with the help of available micro data. This is organized as follows.
In Section II.2 we give a brief overview of the main demographic changes that have
occurred in Italy in the recent past, providing some comparisons with the experience of other
countries. The necessarily brief and incomplete investigation reveals that the main processes
that are contributing to the deep changes in the structure of the Italian population are
common to many other developed countries. However, some important differences can be
seen in the intensity of some of these processes. In particular, the process of ageing of the
population has been particularly pronounced and is likely to continue at a faster pace than in
other developed countries.  The degree of instability of living arrangements due to divorce
and separation is increasing but is still much lower than observed in other developed
countries. The reduction in the average number of members has been remarkable. Moreover,
the structure of the Italian family presents some peculiarities. In particular, one of the main
distinctive characteristics is that young people tend to live with their original families for a
prolonged period and in a far greater proportion than in other developed countries, while
cohabitation and living as singles when young are very limited phenomena.
In Section II.3 we briefly present the micro data that will be used in the next chapters to
develop our micro simulation model.
In Section II.4 we use the micro data to describe the links existing between the
demographic structure of Italian households and their saving behaviour.
5 We find that
different types of households exhibit very different patterns of saving behaviour over their
life. Also, an important contribution to the aggregate Italian saving rate comes from
households in which several generations coexist and contribute to family expenditure and
consumption. Most of these family units consist of couples or single parents living with adult
                                                          
5  A more formal, econometrically based analysis is conducted later in Section V.25
children, many of whom are working. Both saving and retirement decisions of parents are
strongly affected by the presence and characteristics of younger individuals.
Looking at the micro data from an historical perspective we find that changes in the
demographic characteristics of households, and especially changes in the weight of different
types of households, help to explain, at least in part, the reduction in the personal saving rate
in Italy between the 1980’s and the 1990’s. Most of the decline is due, however, to an
increase in the average propensity to consume across all groups considered.
The overall picture indicates that, in studying the saving behaviour of Italian
households and projecting its possible evolution, it is important to take into account a broad
range of demographic features and family characteristics.
II.2 Demographic evolution of the Italian population and the structure of the Italian
family
II.2.1 Fertility, mortality and net migration: the evolution of total population and its age
structure
Fertility and mortality rates
The decline in the number of new births in European countries reflects the secular
tendency of the decline of total fertility rates (TFR; see Table II.1). In all countries the total
fertility rate is below the rate needed to replace the existing population. The decline has been
more pronounced in countries where the fertility rate was higher, with the result that today
the degree of dispersion among the European countries is lower than it was 30 years ago. The
Italian fertility rate was already below the average in 1960 and is today the lowest in Europe,
with only 1.2 children per woman. The decline in the total fertility rate is the consequence of
both the decrease in the desired number of children per woman and of the delay in the start of
reproductive life. To disentangle data from this latter effect we also report the trend in
fertility rates of successive cohorts of women born between 1930 and 1960. Even if the
qualitative conclusions do not change, it is clear that the tendency towards a decline in the
cohorts’ specific fertility rates is milder than that of the total period fertility rates. In Italy, the
TFR for the same period is well below that of the cohort rate. This is the consequence of the
dramatic increase in the average age of the mother when the first child is born (from 25.5 to
27.5 in the ten years from 1983 to 1993).26
Table II.2 reports the movement of life expectancy at birth and at various ages in the
period from 1960 to 1995 for selected EU countries. The increase in life expectancy at all
ages is a phenomenon common to all developed countries, and Italy is not an exception. It
should be noted, however, that Italy presents a life expectancy at old ages that is above the
average of the EU15 countries.
Total population
Fertility, mortality and net migration from other countries determine the dynamics of
population. Table II.3 shows the trend in the total population for some selected countries and
for the average of the EU15 between 1960 and 1995. From the 1980s, Italy’s demographic
dynamics tended to diverge from those of its European partners, resulting in an almost
stagnant population. Only in the 1990s do we observe a degree of recovery, albeit at a
remarkably lower rate than in the rest of the EU. Table II.4 presents a breakdown of the rate
of growth of the total population in the component due to the natural balance and that due to
net migration: in all the European countries there is a marked decline in the rate of natural
growth, which is partially offset by an increase in net migration. The decline in the natural
increase between the 1970s and the 1990s in Italy is extremely large, while the contribution
due to net migration is smaller than in other countries. Together with Germany, Italy is the
only country in which the increase in the total population in the 1990s is entirely due to
migration.
Population structure by age
The decline in fertility rates, the increase in life expectancy and the relatively limited
effect of net migration have already had a big impact on the age structure of the population
(Table II.5). A synthetic comparison with other European countries is presented in Table II.8,
which shows the dependency index of young people (the population aged up to 19 over the
population aged 20 to 59) and of old people (the population aged 60 or more over the
population aged 20 to 59). Italy has an old age dependency ratio of 39.5%, which is above
the European average (37.1%), and a dependency ratio of young people of 38.2%, which is
similarly well below the European average (43.1%).
Projections of the total population and its age structure
Table II.6 presents the expected variations in the total population by age groups in
selected EU countries and for the average of the EU15 in the main variant projection27
prepared by Eurostat (1996).
6 Italy is the only country for which a decline in the total
population is expected before 2020, with 1.8 million fewer young people and 3.8 million
more old people. The demographic conditions are then expected to worsen even further
between 2020 and 2050. The old age dependency ratio is expected to be one of the highest in
Europe (Table II.9).
Figure II.1 presents the projected age structure of the Italian population according to
three variants of the Istat (1997) projections. Even under the more optimistic scenario of high
fertility and sustained net migration (1.76 children per woman and an average of 76 thousand
net flows of immigrants per year), the proportion of the population aged 65 or over is
predicted to increase from the present 17% to 30% in 2050.
II.2.2 Marriage, separation and divorce rates
Parallel to the decline in fertility rates and rise in the average age at the first birth, Italy,
like other Western countries, has witnessed a continuous decline in the number of marriages
per number of inhabitants (from the record high of 7.9 per thousand at the beginning of the
1960s to 4.9 in 1995) and an increase in the average age at the first marriage (Tables II.8 and
II.9). Separations and divorces have also increased steadily, especially in the more recent
period (the rate of dissolution of marriages has risen from 97.9 per thousand marriages in
1985 to 158.4 per thousand in 1995). Only slightly more than half of all legal separations
actually end in divorce.
7 In Italy, however, marriage instability does not reach the level it has
in other Western countries: the rate of divorce in 1995 was only 0.5 per thousand inhabitants
as opposed to 2.9 in the United Kingdom, 2.5 in Germany, and 2 in France. If one considers,
probably more correctly, the rate of legal separation, the picture does not change
substantially, with an Italian rate of 1 per thousand inhabitants.
8 Similarly, cohabitation and
                                                          
6 The main variant of the Eurostat projection is based on the assumption of a moderate increase in
fertility rates (up to 1.65 children per woman), a moderate increase in life expectancy at birth (up to 80 years for
men and 85 for women in 2050) and a reduction in flows of net migration of 20% from 1995 to 2020 and
stabilization thereafter.
7  This is due to a number of factors, among which the most important are the fear of having to go
through another round of legal proceedings and changing previous agreements, the limited propensity to re-
marry and, last but not least, the desire to maintain the right to pension benefits for the survivors.
8  With the rise in cohabitation in most countries the issue of the dissolution of unions is becoming more
complex as the true number of separations is not captured. In Italy, as in other southern European countries,
cohabitation still seems to be somewhat rarer than in northern Europe. See Kiernan (1996) for an international
comparison.28
extra-marital births are rare phenomena in Italy if compared with other countries, even if they
seem to be in rapid expansion, especially in large urban areas.
9
II.2.3 Family types and family size
The history of the structure of the Italian family in the post-war period has been
characterized, as in many other industrialized countries, by the progressive emergence of the
“nuclear family” (a family with only one nucleus) and the progressive disappearance
(especially in the north of Italy) of “multiple” families related to the agricultural society of
the pre-war period.
10 Today, the predominant family structure is that of one couple (68.5% of
the total number of families in 1995). However, like other developed countries and as a
consequence of some of the phenomena described above, some important changes are under
way. Table II.10 shows the evolution of the proportions of principal household types in Italy
in the recent past, according to various sources. The most evident trends are: (i) the decrease
in the proportion of couples with children and an increase in those without children (from
56% and 17.3%, respectively, in 1971 to 47.7% and 20.8% in 1995); (ii) the sharp rise in the
proportion of households formed by a single person (from 12.9% in 1971 to 20.5% in 1995);
and (iii) the mild increase in the proportion of single-parent households (from 7.1% in 1983
to 8.1% in 1995).
While this evolution is in line with what is observed in other countries, some
differences emerge. In particular, the increase in the proportion of singles appears to have
been less pronounced than in other countries, especially at young ages.
11 This is mainly
because the increase in the average age at the first marriage has been matched by a prolonged
stay within the original family, a phenomenon that is typically Italian. Table II.11 shows the
composition of individuals aged 18 to 39 according to official statistics: in 1995 only about
                                                          
9  According to official statistics (Istat, 1997) families composed of non-married couples represented
only about 2% of the total number of family couples in 1994. Only a small percentage of marriages are
preceded by cohabitation (8% in 1994 as opposed to 3.5% in 1983) and extra-marital births represented about
7-8% of the total number of births in 1994. There are, however, many reasons to believe that these figures are
underestimates of actual figures (see Zanatta (1997).
10  The structure of Italian families still varies very markedly according to geographical area (the southern
versus the central and northern regions and urban versus non-urban areas). For a detailed discussion see Golini
(1988) and Barbagli (1988). More recent changes in the Italian family structure are described in Barbagli and
Saraceno (1997) and Saraceno (1998).29
4% of the total were living as singles and more than 45% lived in their original family.
According to Istat (1997), more recently there has been an increase in this phenomenon: the
proportion of young individuals aged between 18 and 34 living with their parents increased
from 51.8% in 1990 to 58.5% in 1996 (Istat, 1997). Among the causes of this behaviour, the
most important seem to be the prolonged period of education, the difficulty of finding a
home or of obtaining a mortgage, the uncertainties of the labour market and the difficulty of
finding a job, especially more recently . The increased proportion of young individuals living
with their parents in the recent past has paralleled the rise in the unemployment rate among
young people.
The gradual disappearance of “multiple” families, together with the increase in the
number of couples without children, of singles and of single parents, has caused a continuous
reduction in the average size of households. Table II.12 shows the remarkable increase over
time of the percentage of families composed of one or two persons and the gradual
disappearance of large families with five or more components. The average number of family
members has declined continuously from 4.0 in 1951 to 2.8 in 1995.
II.3. The micro data set
In order to analyze the relation between the structure of households and their economic
behaviour we need, of course, household survey data.
The basic source of data for this purpose and for the development of the micro
simulation model in the following sections is the Survey of Household Income and Wealth
(SHIW), the household survey sponsored by the Bank of Italy. In this section we only give a
very brief overview of the Survey and describe some modifications that we have made to the
original survey data for the purpose of building our model. A detailed description of the data
can be found in the Appendix.
The main purpose of the SHIW is to collect data on household consumption, income
and wealth.
12
                                                                                                                                                                                  
11  Attanasio et al. report an increase in the proportion of singles in the United Kingdom from 16% in
1968 to 27% in 1996. In the U.S. the proportion of singles increased from 17.1% in 1970 to 24.6% in 1990 (see
J.P. Cordoba (1997)).
12 In particular, the SHIW is the only reliable source for the analysis of household income and wealth in
Italy. These data are not available in the Italian survey of consumer expenditure run by Istat, the Italian public30
The unit of observation is the family, which is defined as including all persons residing
in the same dwelling who are related by blood, marriage or affection. For each family
member detailed information is also given on his/her age, sex, education, employment status,
sector of work and other social characteristics. Data on consumption expenditure is collected
separately as durable and non-durable components: further disaggregation is not available.
More detailed information is available on income: net income receipts are collected for each
income earner in the family, divided by type of income (dependant payroll employment, self-
employment, pension benefits and other transfers, interest income, etc.). Information on
taxes is not collected. Information on households’ real estate is very detailed and, since 1987,
fairly detailed information on financial assets and liabilities holdings has also been collected.
We made a careful comparison of the survey data with the National Accounts (NA)
data for the households and individual firms sector,
13 in order to assess the comparability
between the two sources of data.
14 We found that NA income is underestimated by 25% to
35% by survey data (depending on the survey), while the underestimation of consumption
expenditure ranges between 35 and 40%. The underestimation of income is particularly
severe for some categories, especially for the self-employed and for interest receipts.
Since the main purpose of our analysis is to give a description of the behaviour of
families so as to provide an insight into the aggregate behaviour of the Italian economy, we
have decided to take the extreme position of re-proportioning the survey data on income (by
type of income) and consumption to exactly match the corresponding NA figures for the
household sector. In so doing we have been careful to maintain, as far as possible, the
distribution of the variables observed in the data of the original surveys.
15
                                                                                                                                                                                  
statistical agency. The latter provides, however, far more detailed statistics on household consumption
expenditures.
13 This is the institutional sector that most closely matches the sort of data collected in the surveys.
Individual firms are defined as firms employing fewer than 15 employees.
14 As explained in the Appendix, the comparison between the survey data and the NA aggregates requires
a number of assumptions, some of which are necessarily arbitrary. In particular, it is often necessary to make a
slight change to the definition of the NA aggregates of reference or the survey measures in order to obtain a
common base of comparison between the two sources. In addition, the comparison is made more difficult in
Italy by the uncertainty surrounding the size of the total population. For a similar exercise on the SHIW surveys
up to 1989, see Brandolini (1993).
15  Again, the full details are given in the Appendix. The re-proportioning procedure entails a series of
assumptions that are needed, in particular, to re-allocate personal taxes to the various types of income (the
breakdown is not given in the National Accounts) and to attribute tax evasion to the different incomes.31
For households’ financial wealth, which severely underestimates the corresponding
figure of the National Financial Accounts, we have adopted the adjustment developed by
Cannari and D’Alessio (1993). This is a non-proportional adjustment obtained by matching
the survey data, for a series of defining characteristics of households, with data of clients in
the banking system. After this adjustment, the total value of financial wealth held by the
households covered by the survey represents almost 90% of the corresponding total
obtainable from the flow-of-funds statistics. Using this reconstructed level of financial assets
we have corrected disposable income (re-proportioned to the NA figures) to take account of
the effect of inflation (“Hicksian correction”).
The final result of the adjustments on the average consumption over income ratio can
be viewed in Table II.13, where we have pooled together all the surveys between 1987 and
1995. The adjustment to NA figures increases the average propensity to consume by 9
percentage points (consumption is more underestimated than income, as already mentioned),
while the adjustment for inflation increases it by 6.3 points. The age pattern of the average
propensity to consume remains relatively flat for old age classes, as in the original survey
data. This pattern is explored in more detail in the next section.
II.4. Household characteristics and savings in Italy: an overview of the data
II.4.1. Household types and the age pattern of savings
After a preliminary investigation, we have defined five types of households that seem
to be relevant for the analysis of saving behaviour. We first distinguish families (i.e.,
households formed by one couple alone and/or with other members) from single-parent
households and singles. Families and single-parent households are further split into nuclear
and non-nuclear households. Nuclear households are defined as households composed of a
couple or a single head with or without dependant children; non-nuclear households are
defined as residuals and therefore include all households in which different generations
coexist and share income and expenditure.
16 The five types of households are therefore:
                                                          
16  This definition therefore also includes, but should not be confused with, the multiple families typical of
the agricultural society of the past, which have now almost disappeared, as we have already mentioned. As we
shall see, non-nuclear households are mostly made up of families or single-parent households with adult
working children, who are not married and have not yet formed a new household.32
Nuclear families: These are the closest to a traditional family living arrangement. They
are composed of a head (male or female) and a spouse or partner,
17 and they may or may not
have young dependants. Young dependants are defined as any children under 18 (own
offspring of the head and/or spouse/partner or not) or any adult child not working.
Non-nuclear families: These are defined as all residual families. They therefore also
include all families in which adult children (older than 18) work.
Nuclear single-head households: These are households composed of one head (male or
female), young dependants (defined as above) and no spouse or partner.
Non-nuclear single-head households: These are defined as all residual single-head
households.
Singles: These are the simplest types of households, composed of just one person
(male or female) living alone.
Table II.14a presents the distribution by age of income, consumption saving rates and
other selected variables from the SHIW for all households and for different household types,
while Table II.14b shows the breakdown by age and sex.
18 Clearly, it should be kept in mind
that cross-section data can be misleading as a single household can belong to different
groups or types of households over its life. A more rigorous statistical analysis will be
presented in Section VI. Nevertheless, some features of the simple descriptive statistics
deserve attention.
The breakdown by type of household reveals that the saving pattern of the different
types differs greatly. Nuclear families save very little up to age 40 and present a relatively
flat saving rate thereafter. Nuclear single-head households continuously dissave through their
life. Singles present a relatively U-shaped saving profile by age. But perhaps the most
interesting feature of Tables II.14a and II.14b is that non-nuclear households (both families
and single-head households) tend to show much higher income and lower consumption-to-
income ratio than nuclear families during their whole life and especially at old age. It should
be noted that these households represent a considerable proportion of the total number of
                                                          
17  Note that we have not made any distinction between married and unmarried couples. A preliminary
investigation has shown that the behaviour of unmarried couples does not appear to diverge substantially from
that of married couples of the same age group. Furthermore, as we have already seen, unmarried couples still
represent a small minority.
18  The table has been obtained by pooling all five surveys from 1987 to 1995. In addition, the figures
refer to the data re-proportioned to the National Accounts data and are expressed at 1995 prices.33
households, especially in the age group 50 to 60 (47%) and 60 to 70 (33%), and that their
saving rate at that age (when most of the saving is done) is about 10 percentage points higher
than for traditional nuclear families. The contribution of non-nuclear households to aggregate
saving can be appreciated by looking at Table II.16: while accounting for one-fourth of the
total number of families, they contribute to almost two-thirds of the total saving of the Italian
household sector. It would be tempting to say that the Italian saving rate is high (by
international standards) because of the presence of these households.
On the assets side, households headed by old people tend to have larger asset-income
ratios, as is also found in many surveys of other countries.
19 Again, a clear difference
between nuclear and non-nuclear households can be observed. On average, the asset-income
ratio is much lower for non-nuclear households at old ages. This is to be expected, since
these households are formed by young and old generations living together and contributing to
the household income: their income is high, on average, compared with their accumulated
assets. Singles are the only group for which the asset-income ratio shows some sign of
decline after age 70.
20 This might be an indication of a lower bequest motive for saving in
this group.
21 Nuclear single-head households continuously dissave across their life but, in
spite of this, they possess on average a substantial amount of assets. As observed by Ando
(1996), this is the consequence of a complex process of movement in and out of the group, in
which households headed by a woman (representing the vast majority of such households, as
can be gathered from Table II.14b) are created by divorce or widowhood. In general, the
older the newly created household, the larger its starting net worth. At the same time,
existing female-headed single-parent households disappear because of remarriages if they are
relatively young, or through merging into younger households, especially if the former are
older and their net worth is small.
Households headed by females save less than male-headed households in almost all
age groups. This is a consequence of the fact that these households are, on average, relatively
                                                          
19  For example, see Quadrini and Rios-Rull (1997) for the U.S., Ando and Moro (1995) and Ando (1996)
for Japan.
20  However, since we are not adjusting the level of assets for the cohort-specific productivity level,
caution must be used in interpreting the figures over different age groups. On this issue, see Ando, Guiso and
Terlizzese (1994).
21  Clearly, however, many old people living alone might have children and leave bequests. The
possibility of inter-vivos transfers might further complicate the analysis. See Cox (1992) and Guiso and Jappelli
(1995).34
poorer and a greater proportion of them consists of nuclear single-parent households and
singles (especially at old ages) – that is, by groups with very low saving rates.
In Tables II.14a and II.14b we also report the ratio for consumption over total
resources. Total resources are defined as the sum of assets, expected lifetime income and
expected gross social security wealth (the details of the construction of this variable will be
given in Section V). According to the life-cycle hypothesis, the consumption/total resources
ratio should increase smoothly as individuals age and increase at faster rates as they become
old. This pattern is clearly present for nuclear households and single persons. For non-
nuclear households, however, the ratio peaks in the age group 50-60 and then stops or even
decreases at later ages. The presence of young working individuals in these families (their
total resources and their consumption choices) becomes relatively more important as the
head of the household ages.
Looking at the life pattern of saving for the total number of households in Tables II.14a
and II.14b, one could argue that there is not much evidence of a life-cycle pattern of saving
behaviour. However, as pointed out by Modigliani and Jappelli (1998), the saving rates
computed on microeconomic data are based on a concept of disposable income that does not
take into account the presence of pension arrangements. In particular, the traditional
definition concept of income, which we have adopted, treats contributions to social security
as personal taxes and pension benefits as transfers. Alternatively, one could consider social
security contributions as (mandatory) saving and pension benefits as drawings from the
pension wealth accumulated up to retirement. We have reported the age pattern of the saving
rate computed using this alternative definition in Table II.15. In particular, following
Modigliani and Japelli we define ‘total saving’ as the difference between earned income (i.e.,
earnings plus capital income, but with the exclusion of pensions) and consumption, while
‘private saving’ (also reported in Table II.15 for comparison) is defined as the difference
between disposable income (as traditionally defined) and consumption. It is obvious from the
tables that the difference between these two measures is quite dramatic especially in old age
classes, reflecting the very high social security contributions levied by the Italian pension
system and the fact that pension benefits represent an extremely large part of the disposable35
income of Italian households after retirement.
22 Total saving is negative for households
headed by individuals aged over 60s for most household types. Nevertheless, large
differences are still visible across different types of households and it is worth noting that
non-nuclear families still show substantial saving rates even when the alternative (total
saving) definition is adopted.
In the rest of this work we will continue to refer to the traditional definition of
disposable income (and therefore of saving) while keeping in mind, however, the
implications of the pension arrangements and referring to the alternative definition when
needed.
II.4.2. Family size and the number of income earners
Differences in household types are clearly related to the number of components and of
income earners present in the household (non-nuclear households tend to have a larger
number of both). The relation between household size and saving is illustrated in Table II.17.
Apparently, for households headed by relatively old people (from age 50 onward) one might
be tempted to argue that the relation between family size and saving is positive, with larger
households consuming relatively less of their income. It is clear, however, that the crucial
variable here is the number of income earners: for a given number of earners the
consumption-income ratio increases with family size, as expected. It is worth noting that
households with only one income earner do very little saving, even at ages at which most
saving is usually made.
II.4.3 Non-nuclear households
II.4.3.1 Young working individuals living with their parents
Non-nuclear households are mainly composed of households whose head is aged
between 50 and 70 and in which at least one working child is present.
23 As we have already
said, children in Italy tend to live with their parents for a longer time and in a much greater
proportion than in other industrialized countries. According to the SHIW (see Table II.18, in
which various aspects of the phenomenon are reported) the proportion of young individuals
                                                          
22  We address the issue of the impact of social security provisions on the consumption-saving choices of
households in some detail in Sections V and VI.
23  Non-nuclear households with young working children represent 64% of the total number of non-
nuclear households. This percentage reaches 75.7% in the 50-70 age group.36
living with their parents (on average in the period between 1987 and 1995) is as high as 85%
up to age 25 then declines to 47% between age 25 and 30 and is still about 20% in the 30-35
age group. A large proportion of these individuals are working (45% in the 20-25 age group
and over 60% in older age groups) and a considerable percentage is unemployed (almost
20% in the 20-30 age group).
Among the possible economic causes of this behaviour one certainly seems to be the
possibility of saving more, especially with a view to buying a house.
24 The young individuals
can take advantage of the economies of scale generated by living at home, partially
compressing their housing consumption (and that of their parents) in order to save more.
Table II.19 reports an (admittedly rough) measure of the implicit saving of young working
individuals staying at home. Column A shows income, consumption and the saving rate of
pure nuclear families whose head is aged between 55 and 65. Column B does the same for
families of the same age group having one, and only one, young working child aged between
25 and 30. Column C reports the figures for a young individual aged between 25 and 30
living alone. Finally, column  D presents the sum of columns  A and C and represents a
fictitious family comparable with that in column  B. The saving-to-income ratio of the
extended family in column B is 0.22 while that of the fictitious family in column D is 0.032.
The qualitative result does not change if we further restrict the sample to compare more
similar couples in the 55-65 age group.
Another important economic reason for the prolonged presence of young individuals in
their parents’ house is the income and job uncertainty that characterize the labour market for
young individuals, especially in the most recent past. As shown in Table II.18, the proportion
of young individuals living at home is high in areas where the unemployment rate for the
young is high, and has increased the most in areas where the unemployment rate has risen the
most (notably in the centre of Italy).
                                                          
24  For a discussion of this issue, see Ando, Guiso and Terlizzese (1994). The need to accumulate
substantial assets to buy a house is related to the conditions of the Italian credit market. As Guiso, Jappelli and
Terlizzese (1994) show, down-payments are very large in Italy compared with other countries (often well above
50%) and the cost of mortgages is higher. Analyzing the 1991 SHIW, Guiso and Jappelli (1996) report that only
10.2% of the households have mortgage debt and, on average, outstanding housing liabilities represent only
2.4% of the gross value of the house. They also report that the saving time for houses (defined as age at
acquisition less 25) was around 10 years, substantially above the experience of other countries (2-3 years in the
U.S., for example).37
II.4.3.2  Older individuals merged with younger families
The phenomenon of old people merging with their children appears to be relatively less
important. Only around 6% of the individuals aged between 50 and 65 live with their
children; the percentage then rises to 20% in the 76-80 age group and to 34.5% for people
over 80 years of age (see Table  II.20). These figures are far below those reported, for
example, by Ando (1996) for Japan, another country where family ties are close.
Table II.21 repeats the previous simple exercise done for young working individuals.
The qualitative effect of the presence of an older person living with a younger household is
the same as that of the young working individual; i.e., households with the addition of the
old person save significantly more than the fictitious household obtained by summing the
nuclear household and the old person living alone. It may also be observed that the old
person living with the younger household seems to be poorer than the corresponding old
person living alone (the difference of the income in columns B and A as opposed to the
income in column C). As in the Japanese case, this fact therefore helps to explain the relative
little dissaving that we observe at old ages: relatively poorer old people tend to merge with
younger households so that the remaining households are relatively wealthy and high saving.
II.4.4 Young dependants
The relation between saving and the number of young (non-working) dependants
present in the household is shown in Table  II.22. As one would expect, the higher the
number of young dependants, the lower the saving in any given age group. However, this
does not necessarily imply that households with more young dependants will actually
accumulate less during their life-time: the pattern of the consumption/total resources ratio by
number of young dependants is in fact fairly flat after age 40, and it becomes even negatively
sloped at older ages (and this still holds true when we control for the number of income
earners in the family). The apparent contradiction between a declining saving rate out of
current income and a stable or increasing saving rate out of total resources can be resolved by
looking at the retirement behaviour of the head of the household. Table  II.23 shows the
proportion of heads of household who are already retired and the planned retirement age
(collected in the SHIW for each working individual) of the head in relation to the number of
income earners. The retirement age is clearly strongly positively correlated with the number38
of young dependants present in the family, a phenomenon that tends to increase the total
resources available relative to the consumption needs of the households.
25
II.4.5 An alternative definition of the head of the household
It is clear from the above discussion that a potential problem in evaluating the lifetime
saving pattern for Italian households is that many of them are made up of several generations
living together. In these circumstances, it is unclear which is the relevant “age of the
household” to be considered when analyzing the life pattern of saving. Following tradition,
we have identified the age of the household with the age of the head. In the SHIW the latter
is identified during the interviews as the person who is “mainly responsible for economic
decisions”. A possibly more objective way of proceeding might be to define the head of the
household as the person earning the highest income.
26 It seems worth checking whether this
alternative definition would change the broad picture outlined above. On average in the
SHIW covering the period from 1987 to 1995, 8.9% of all households would have a different
head if the alternative definition were adopted (see Table II.24). In almost half of the cases
the new head would be the partner of the original head, and most of these cases occur in non-
nuclear households. In Table II.25 we report the pattern of the ratios of consumption and net
worth over income by age and family type when the head is redefined as the main income
earner in the household. As can be seen easily by comparing these figures with those of
Table II.14, the pattern is very similar to that observed using the original definition.
II.4.6 Demographic changes and the decline of the saving rate in the households sector
The past 20 years have witnessed a substantial decline in the aggregate saving rate of
the private sector in Italy. The National Accounts record a drop in the personal saving rate of
more than 6 percentage points (from 20.4% in 1980-81 to 14.1% in 1994-95) in a 15 year
period. In this section we try to assess whether the changes in the demographic
characteristics of Italian households that we have outlined above help to explain the observed
reduction in the private saving rate. To this end, we use the Historical Database of the SHIW.
                                                          
25  This issue will be further discussed in Section V, where we show that the age difference between the
head and the young dependants is also an important factor.
26  This is the case, for example, for the National Survey of Family Income and Expenditure in Japan
analyzed by Ando (1996).39
In this data set the original SHIW data have been adjusted to enhance their comparability
over time (see D’Alessio, 1998).
27  On the other hand, income and consumption in this data
set are not rescaled to match the corresponding National Accounts data. It also excludes
interest received from the definition of income because the necessary information is not
available before 1987. For these reasons, an analysis based on the Historical Database is not
easily comparable with results reported in other parts of this paper.  In spite of this, the
Historical Database of the SHIW shows a historical pattern of the saving rate similar to that
derived from the National Accounts, with a fall in the implied aggregate saving rate of more
than 4 percentage points (from 27% in 1980-81 to 22.7% in 1995). Following the
methodology of Bosworth et al (1991) applied by Cannari (1994) to the case of Italy,
28 the
importance of demographic changes can be assessed using two successive cross-section data
sets. In a given year t the sample can divided into Gh groups according to a classificatory
variable h. The economy-wide average propensity to save in period t is given by:
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it’  and setting t’ =  1980-81 and t  =  1993-95, we can estimate the economy-wide
propensity to save that we would have observed had the total weight of the different groups
with respect to variable h remained at the values observed on average in the 1980-81 surveys
and had the propensity to save of the different groups been that observed on average in the
1993-95 surveys. This gives us the hypothetical propensity to save in 1993-95 if the
distribution of the population and of income with respect to variable h had remained the
same as in 1980-81.
Table II.26 (column A) shows the results obtained by splitting the sample according to
a number of household characteristics; column B reports the difference between the
                                                          
27  In particular, weights attached to households have been re-proportioned for each survey using an
iterative method to match the distribution of some socio-demographic characteristics of the population provided
by official statistics (sex, age, region of residence, demographic dimension of town of residence, labour force
characteristics). In addition, data for income components, consumption and wealth have been re-calculated
using homogeneous criteria over the different surveys. See D’Alessio (1998).40
estimated average propensity to save and the observed value in 1993-95. As shown in the
table, demographic changes alone cannot fully explain the decline in the saving rate, and in
this sense the results found by Cannari (1994) are confirmed. However, it is interesting to
note that the change in the weights of different household types (using the definition outlined
in the previous paragraphs) is the most significant factor among those considered, accounting
for a reduction of 1.7 points in the aggregate saving rate and 40% of the total decline. The
contribution made by the change in the age distribution of the population is very small (0.3),
while that of changes in the number of children and income earners in the family is nil.
As is well known, this methodology is based on the assumption that changes in the
demographic structure do not affect the propensity to save of any population group, an
assumption that is not necessarily valid.
29 In Table II.27 we decompose the contribution to
aggregate saving and to the change in the aggregate saving rate in the two sub-periods for the
different family types in the basic components of equation 1. Across all groups, in addition to
changes in weights, we can see that changes in the propensity to save have not been
negligible; in fact, they have been particularly marked for some household types. It is
noticeable that two-thirds of the total change in the ratio of aggregate saving to income
across the two sub-periods is accounted for by non-nuclear families, whose contribution to
aggregate saving has declined from 0.11 to 0.08. Changes in the relative weights and
propensity to save of other groups have been far less significant.
                                                                                                                                                                                  
28  Cannari (1994) uses the original SHIW data and his analysis ends in 1989; he does not consider the
evolution of family types, a variable of interest to us.
29  A number of arguments against this assumption have been put forward in the literature. For example, a
decline in the fertility rate might weaken the bequest motive for saving. In models with endogenous fertility
there might exist complex relations between saving behaviour and decisions to have children (see Becker
(1991) and Cigno and Rosati (1993), among others). A higher instability of living arrangements caused by an
increase in the divorce rate might reduce the incentive to save (Cubeddu and Rios-Rull, 1997).Section II - Charts and Tables














Table II.1: Total and cohort-specific fertility rates
(source: Eurostat 1996)
1960 1994  change 1930 1940 1950 (*) 1960 (*)
France 2.73 1.65 -1.08 2.64 2.41 2.11 2.07
Germany 2.37 1.26 -1.11 2.17 1.98 1.72 1.63
Italy 2.41 1.22 -1.19 2.29 2.14 1.90 1.63
U.K. 2.72 1.74 -0.98 2.35 2.36 2.03 1.94
Spain 2.86 1.22 -1.64 2.59 2.59 2.19 1.69
EU15 2.59 1.45 -1.14 1.96 1.80
Total fertility rate Cohort fertility rate
(*) Estimated.
Table II.2: Life expectancy at various ages in 1995
(source: Eurostat 1996)
Males Females
60 75 60 75
France 19.7 9.9 25.0 12.7
Germany 18.2 8.8 22.5 11.0
Italy 19.0 9.4 23.4 11.5
U.K. 18.3 8.8 23.3 11.4
Spain 19.4 9.4 23.9 11.6
EU15 18.5 9.0 23.0 11.3Table II.3: Total population
(In millions at the beginning of the year; source: Eurostat 1996)
1960 1970 1980 1990 1995
France 45.5 50.5 53.7 56.6 58
Germany 72.5 78.3 78.2 79.1 81.5
Italy 50.0 53.7 56.4 56.7 57.3
U.K. 52.2 55.5 56.3 57.5 58.5
Spain 30.3 33.6 37.2 38.8 39.2
EU15 314.8 340.0 354.6 363.7 371.6
Table II.4: Annual rate of change of total population
(per 1,000 inhabitants; source: Eurostat 1996)
Natural balance Net migration Total balance
70-'74 90-'94 70-'74 90-'94 70-'74 90-'94
France 5.8 3.7 2.2 1.3 8.0 5.0
Germany -0.7 -1.0 2.2 7.0 1.6 6.0
Italy 6.7 0.1 -0.8 1.9 5.9 2.0
U.K. 3.0 2.3 -6.0 1.2 2.4 3.6
Spain 11.1 1.4 -0.9 0.5 10.2 1.9
EU15 4.5 1.4 0.6 2.9 5.0 4.3
Table II.5: Resident population by age
(as a percentage of total population; source: Istat)
Censuses Current survey
Age class 1971 1981 1991 1996
TOTAL:       <5 8.2 6.0 4.9 4.8
5-14 16.3 15.5 11.0 10.1
15-19 7.1 8.3 7.6 6.1
20-39 27.9 27.4 30.1 30.9
40-59 23.9 25.4 25.3 25.6
60-74 12.7 12.7 14.4 15.8
75+ 3.9 4.7 6.7 6.7
total (thousands) 54137 56557 56778 57333
MALES:      <5 8.6 6.3 5.1 5.1
5-14 17.0 16.3 11.6 10.6
15-19 7.4 8.7 8.0 6.4
20-39 28.6 28.2 31.3 32.1
40-59 23.6 25.4 25.6 26.0
60-74 11.8 11.6 13.4 14.8
75+ 3.0 3.5 5.0 5.0
total (thousands) 26476 27506 27558 27817
FEMALES:  <5 7.8 5.6 4.6 4.5
5-14 15.5 14.7 10.4 9.6
15-19 6.8 7.9 7.2 5.8
20-39 27.3 26.7 29.1 29.6
40-59 24.2 25.5 25.1 25.3
60-74 13.7 13.7 15.4 16.8
75+ 4.7 5.9 8.2 8.4
total (thousands) 27661 29051 29220 29516Table II.6: Expected change in total population from 1995, by age class
(in thousands; source: Eurostat 1996)
Year Age class Total
0-19 20-59 60-79 80+
France 2020 -1021 603 4002 1229 4811
2050 -2269 -2470 4950 3831 4043
Germany 2020 -1612 -1902 4934 1700 3131
2050 -3778 -10377 5023 1617 -4450
Italy 2020 -1763 -2790 2293 1534 -726
2050 -3842 -9749 2167 3441 -7982
U.K. 2020 -1527 483 2947 643 2546
2050 -2551 -3468 3551 3292 823
Spain 2020 -1668 416 1402 980 1127
2050 -3345 -4704 3064 2546 -2444
EU15 2020 -8704 -2820 20562 7456 16495
2050 -17844 -33917 24782 22380 -4600
Table II.7: Dependency ratio in year 1995 and projections to 2020 and 2050
(per cent; source: Eurostat 1996)
Young Old Total
1995 2020 2050 1995 2020 2050 1995 2020 2050
France 48.6 44.4 44.8 37.1 52.9 70.8 85.7 97.3 115.7
Germany 37.3 35.3 37.5 35.8 52.0 64.0 73.1 87.3 101.5
Italy 38.2 35.8 37.7 39.5 56.2 81.5 77.7 92.0 119.2
U.K. 46.7 41.3 43.4 37.8 48.4 66.7 84.5 89.7 110.1
Spain 46.0 37.4 38.9 37.9 48.2 82.5 83.9 85.6 121.4
EU15 43.1 39.4 41.2 37.1 51.4 71.8 80.2 80.2 113.0
Notes: Young dependency ratio: population aged up to 19 over population aged 20 to 59. Old dependency ratio:
population aged 60 or more over population aged 20 to 59
Table II.8: Number of marriages, separations and divorces
(absolute values; source: Istat)
Years Marriages Separations Divorces
Abs. value per 1,000 inhab.
1951 328255 6.9 5196
1961 397461 7.9 6032
1971 404464 7.5 19338 17134
1981 316953 5.6 30899 12606
1991 312061 5.5 44920 27350
1992 312348 5.5 45754 26997
1993 302230 5.1 48198 23863
1994 291607 5.1 51445 27510
1995 283025 4.9 52323 27038Table II.9: Distribution of first marriages by age
(percentage values; source: Istat)
Males Females
Age class 1984 1994 1984 1994
16-19 1.6 0.7 16.5 5.9
20-24 32.5 15.0 51.8 36.7
25-29 45.1 48.9 23.6 40.9
30-34 14.5 25.8 5.4 12.8
35-44 5.1 8.4 2.1 3.2
45+ 1.2 1.2 0.6 0.5
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Table II.10: Principal household types
(percentage values; source: Istat)
1971 1983 1987 1995-1996
Single persons 12.9 13.0 18.4 20.5
Couples with children 56.0 57.3 53.3 47.7
Couples without children 17.3 18.3 19.1 20.8
Single parents with children 8.0 7.1 7.7 8.1
Other 5.8 4.3 1.5 2.9
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Table II.11: Individuals aged 18 to 39, composition by sex and role in family






Other 2.2 4.1Table II.12: Distribution of households by number of components
(years 1951-96; percentage values; source: Istat)
Current
Censuses surveys
Components 1951 1961 1971 1981 1991 1995-1996
1 9.5 10.6 12.9 17.9 20.6 20.5
2 17.4 19.6 22.0 23.6 24.7 26.3
3 20.7 22.4 22.4 22.1 22.2 23.2
4 19.0 20.4 21.2 21.5 21.2 21.8
5 13.3 12.6 11.8 9.5 7.9 6.5
6 8.4 7.0 5.3 3.4 2.4 1.7 (*)
7+ 11.7 7.4 4.4 2.0 1.0
Total (thousand) 11814.0 13747.0 15981.0 18632.0 19909.0 20855.0
Mean number 4.0 3.6 3.4 3.0 2.8 2.8
(*) 6 or more members
Table II.13: Comparison between original SHIW and SHIW adjusted to National
Accounts
(1987-1989-1991-1993-1995 SHIW data)
Original  Adjusted to N.A
survey data
C/Y C/Y C/Y* A/Y* W/Y*
Totals: 0.742 0.834 0.898 1.776 5.191
by age groups:
<30 0.816 0.996 1.023 0.628 3.461
31-40 0.785 0.947 0.980 0.813 3.670
41-50 0.756 0.880 0.926 1.200 4.675
51-60 0.716 0.803 0.863 1.727 5.457
61-70 0.702 0.732 0.822 2.842 6.496
71-80 0.723 0.726 0.838 3.558 7.076
>80 0.733 0.690 0.820 4.358 7.500
Legend: C: total consumption expenditures
Y: total disposable income
Y*: inflation-adjusted total disposable income
A: total financial assets (adj. for non-reporting and under-reporting)
W: total assets (adj. for non-reporting and under-reporting)Table II.14a: Selected economic variables by family type and age
(1987-1989-1991-1993-1995 SHIW data at 1995 prices - thousands lira)
Family type Age class
<30 31-40 41-50 51-60 61-70 71-80 >80
All families:
Consumption 53475.1 58309.0 63925.0 61837.5 44044.5 31117.2 26787.4
Income 52281.6 59876.0 68831.7 72099.3 53598.1 37121.7 32722.6
Cons./inc. 1.023 0.974 0.929 0.858 0.822 0.838 0.819
Ass./inc. 3.464 3.681 4.705 5.451 6.501 7.077 7.515
Cons./tot. res. 0.023 0.028 0.037 0.043 0.042 0.047 0.058
Weight (*) 0.064 0.179 0.217 0.213 0.187 0.106 0.034
Families:
nuclear: Consumption 54539.2 59365.4 64408.0 59323.4 43580.6 34221.7 31793.1
Income 51867.7 60991.7 68380.1 66683.4 49985.5 39379.2 37550.0
Cons./inc. 1.052 0.973 0.942 0.890 0.872 0.869 0.847
Ass./inc. 2.777 3.660 4.951 6.208 7.148 7.520 8.423
Cons./tot. res. 0.023 0.027 0.035 0.042 0.046 0.053 0.061
Weight (**) 0.706 0.797 0.662 0.427 0.410 0.377 0.252
non-nuclear: Consumption 65622.4 61911.7 74561.7 73812.7 66014.4 55792.1 54072.9
Income 73653.0 68498.7 83781.7 89579.8 87252.6 82952.7 74511.4
Cons./inc. 0.891 0.904 0.890 0.824 0.757 0.673 0.726
Ass./inc. 2.617 3.547 4.151 4.724 5.442 6.715 6.404
Cons./tot. res. 0.024 0.030 0.040 0.044 0.040 0.031 0.039
Weight (**) 0.029 0.045 0.186 0.377 0.228 0.091 0.047
Single-head households:
nuclear: Consumption 34960.5 39956.3 40755.0 42426.4 28807.5 22479.1 28221.6
Income 31279.2 33622.4 39785.0 41997.3 29040.2 20547.2 27858.3
Cons./inc. 1.118 1.188 1.024 1.010 0.992 1.094 1.013
Ass./inc. 2.493 3.654 4.808 7.903 9.265 5.596 8.045
Cons./tot. res. 0.024 0.035 0.037 0.038 0.033 0.048 0.063
Weight (**) 0.020 0.031 0.040 0.029 0.023 0.019 0.015
non-nuclear: Consumption 55736.3 58448.8 51792.3 53078.5 47498.1 42642.1 37353.2
Income 68102.1 64034.8 56770.5 65394.6 59608.6 51620.2 55422.6
Cons./inc. 0.8184 0.9128 0.9123 0.8117 0.7968 0.8261 0.6740
Ass./inc. 6.5824 4.4013 4.0961 5.0728 5.2802 5.6255 6.2322
Cons./tot. res. 0.0241 0.0301 0.0395 0.0411 0.0372 0.0376 0.0426
Weight (**) 0.092 0.048 0.064 0.090 0.101 0.084 0.131
Singles:
Consumption 47334.0 52647.0 51693.9 34411.8 23833.1 21335.9 19674.5
Income 43374.5 51379.7 57606.2 35334.5 27455.2 23393.1 21764.1
Cons./inc. 1.091 1.025 0.897 0.974 0.868 0.912 0.904
Ass./inc. 4.668 3.507 4.542 6.284 8.530 7.375 7.879
Cons./tot. res. 0.024 0.028 0.039 0.045 0.045 0.060 0.073
Weight (**) 0.153 0.079 0.048 0.077 0.238 0.430 0.555
(*) proportion with respect to the total number of families
(**) proportion with respect to the total number of families in the same age class
Notes: Survey data re-proportioned to National Accounts. Disposable income is inflation adjustedTable II.14b: Selected economic variables by family type and age
(1987-1989-1991-1993-1995 SHIW data at 1995 prices)
MALES Age class
<31 31-40 41-50 51-60 61-70 71-80 >80
Total C/Y 1.027 0.965 0.924 0.852 0.806 0.806 0.812
A/Y 3.21 3.64 4.75 5.43 6.62 7.32 8.01
w(*) 0.815 0.876 0.868 0.851 0.692 0.563 0.399
Families:
nuclear C/Y 1.057 0.969 0.941 0.888 0.871 0.866 0.848
A/Y 2.85 3.63 4.97 6.14 7.14 7.56 8.44
w(*) 0.639 0.752 0.641 0.414 0.396 0.363 0.250
non-nuclear C/Y 0.884 0.910 0.890 0.824 0.756 0.676 0.722
A/Y 2.58 3.24 4.19 4.72 5.41 6.79 6.46
w(*) 0.026 0.040 0.173 0.364 0.221 0.087 0.046
Single-head hhld.
nuclear C/Y 1.123 1.013 0.916 0.939 0.819 1.059 1.228
A/Y 0.62 3.52 3.49 8.63 9.87 5.12 7.97
w(*) 0.001 0.002 0.005 0.008 0.004 0.004 0.004
non-nuclear C/Y 0.816 0.881 0.782 0.744 0.766 0.787 0.677
A/Y 4.45 4.68 4.10 5.61 5.44 5.91 8.48
w(*) 0.063 0.029 0.022 0.030 0.020 0.025 0.025
Singles C/Y 1.074 1.019 0.901 0.943 0.673 0.842 0.895
A/Y 4.97 3.48 4.63 6.34 13.26 8.55 8.41
w(*) 0.085 0.054 0.028 0.035 0.051 0.083 0.075
FEMALES Age class
<31 31-40 41-50 51-60 61-70 71-80 >80
Total C/Y 0.999 1.049 0.968 0.904 0.886 0.909 0.825
A/Y 4.79 4.02 4.31 5.64 6.01 6.53 7.03
w(*) 0.185 0.124 0.132 0.149 0.308 0.437 0.601
Families:
nuclear C/Y 0.997 1.052 0.969 0.929 0.904 0.964 0.710
A/Y 2.12 4.11 4.41 8.23 7.25 6.32 7.19
w(*) 0.067 0.045 0.022 0.013 0.014 0.013 0.002
non-nuclear C/Y 0.976 0.853 0.896 0.823 0.770 0.576 0.995
A/Y 3.070 6.305 3.635 4.779 6.832 4.780 1.905
w(*) 0.003 0.005 0.013 0.013 0.007 0.004 0.001
Single-head hhld.
nuclear C/Y 1.117 1.205 1.044 1.055 1.053 1.108 0.976
A/Y 2.625 3.667 5.039 7.443 9.053 5.788 8.059
w(*) 0.019 0.029 0.035 0.021 0.019 0.014 0.011
non-nuclear C/Y 0.824 0.972 0.986 0.857 0.806 0.847 0.673
A/Y 11.397 3.879 4.092 4.712 5.234 5.477 5.664
w(*) 0.029 0.019 0.042 0.060 0.081 0.059 0.106
Singles C/Y 1.126 1.041 0.890 1.013 0.964 0.933 0.906
A/Y 4.048 3.571 4.358 6.217 6.211 7.023 7.787
w(*) 0.068 0.025 0.021 0.042 0.187 0.347 0.481
(*) proportion with respect to the total number of families in the same age class
Notes: see legend in Table II.13; Survey data re-proportioned to National Accounts. Disposable income is inflation
adjusted.Table II.15: Total and private savings by family type and age
(1987-1989-1991-1993-1995 SHIW data at 1995 prices – thousands of lira)
Family type Age class
<30 31-40 41-50 51-60 61-70 71-80 >80
All families:
Earned income 60697.04 69395.40 78013.07 70806.85 35260.34 18096.88 14953.38
Total saving 7221.98 11086.45 14088.10 8969.37 -8784.13 -13020.33 -11834.06
Total saving rate 0.12 0.16 0.18 0.13 -0.25 -0.72 -0.79
Disp. income 52281.64 59875.99 68831.71 72099.33 53598.06 37121.69 32722.65
Private saving -1193.42 1567.04 4906.74 10261.85 9553.59 6004.49 5935.20
Priv. saving rate -0.02 0.03 0.07 0.14 0.18 0.16 0.18
Families:
nuclear: Earned income 60601.37 71035.36 78915.89 67702.24 31100.44 18716.37 17745.87
Total saving 6062.13 11669.93 14507.92 8378.87 -12480.16 -15505.30 -14047.26
Total saving rate 0.10 0.16 0.18 0.12 -0.40 -0.83 -0.79
Disp. income 51867.67 60991.67 68380.09 66683.43 49985.50 39379.25 37550.02
Private saving -2671.57 1626.23 3972.12 7360.05 6404.90 5157.58 5756.89
Priv. saving rate -0.05 0.03 0.06 0.11 0.13 0.13 0.15
non-nuclear: Earned income 80526.86 76608.71 92336.68 88781.05 68969.47 62238.29 52731.12
Total saving 14904.47 14697.04 17774.99 14968.39 2955.06 6446.21 -1341.74
Total saving rate 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.17 0.04 0.10 -0.03
Disp. income 73653.04 68498.69 83781.66 89579.80 87252.59 82952.68 74511.38
Private saving 8030.65 6587.02 9219.98 15767.13 21238.18 27160.60 20438.52
Priv. saving rate 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.18 0.24 0.33 0.27
Single-head households:
nuclear: Earned income 36879.11 36998.69 38821.05 31526.81 10393.34 3659.89 11112.61
Total saving 1918.62 -2957.58 -1934.00 -10899.54 -18414.20 -18819.26 -17108.99
Total saving rate 0.05 -0.08 -0.05 -0.35 -1.77 -5.14 -1.54
Disp. income 31279.16 33622.38 39784.99 41997.25 29040.20 20547.20 27858.25
Private saving -3681.33 -6333.89 -970.06 -429.10 232.67 -1931.95 -363.36
Priv. saving rate -0.12 -0.19 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 -0.09 -0.01
non-nuclear: Earned income 74995.23 70791.94 60344.44 59195.30 41933.95 34139.54 39458.78
Total saving 19258.88 12343.18 8552.10 6116.75 -5564.11 -8502.53 2105.63
Total saving rate 0.26 0.17 0.14 0.10 -0.13 -0.25 0.05
Disp. income 68102.09 64034.79 56770.51 65394.62 59608.59 51620.21 55422.63
Private saving 12365.75 5586.03 4978.17 12316.08 12110.53 8978.15 18069.48
Priv. saving rate 0.18 0.09 0.09 0.19 0.20 0.17 0.33
Singles: Earned income 51898.90 60483.69 66472.52 27907.74 9757.92 5764.84 4803.34
Total saving 4564.89 7836.68 14778.62 -6504.09 -14075.15 -15571.11 -14871.14
Total saving rate 0.09 0.13 0.22 -0.23 -1.44 -2.70 -3.10
Disp. income 43374.52 51379.73 57606.16 35334.46 27455.20 23393.10 21764.12
Private saving -3959.48 -1267.28 5912.26 922.63 3622.14 2057.15 2089.64
Priv. saving rate -0.09 -0.02 0.10 0.03 0.13 0.09 0.10
Notes: Earned income is equal to disposable income plus social security contributions less pension benefits
           Total saving: earned income less consumption. Private saving: disposable income less consumption
Survey data re-proportioned to National Accounts.Table II.16: Contributions to the aggregate saving rate by type of household
(1987-1989-1991-1993-1995 SHIW data at 1995 prices; ratios)
Family type
Families:
nuclear weight A 0.541
relative income B 1.010
total weight C=A*B 0.546
saving rate D 0.065
contribution E=C*D 0.035
non-nuclear weight A 0.179
relative income B 1.475
total weight C=A*B 0.264
saving rate D 0.186
contribution F=C*D 0.049
Single-head hhld.
nuclear weight A 0.028
relative income B 0.600
total weight C=A*B 0.017
saving rate D -0.054
contribution G=C*D -0.001
non-nuclear weight A 0.080
relative income B 1.031
total weight C=A*B 0.083
saving rate D 0.171
contribution H=C*D 0.014
Singles weight A 0.172
relative income B 0.525
total weight C=A*B 0.090
saving rate D 0.064
contribution I=C*D 0.006
Total saving rate E+F+G+H+I 0.104
Legend:  A: proportion of households in the category with respect to the total number of households
B:  ratio of average income with respect to average overall income.
Notes: Survey data re-proportioned to National Accounts.Table II.17: Consumption - income ratio and family size
(1987-1989-1991-1993-1995 SHIW data at 1995 prices)
Age class
Number of <31 31-40 41-50 51-60 61-70 71-80 >80
components
1 1.091 1.025 0.897 0.974 0.868 0.912 0.904
2 1.013 0.906 0.922 0.856 0.856 0.867 0.820
3 1.021 0.939 0.919 0.870 0.801 0.711 0.758
4 0.980 1.014 0.941 0.850 0.794 0.687 0.685
5> 1.061 1.027 0.925 0.832 0.754 0.803 0.517
Number of
income earners
1 1.151 1.077 1.033 0.979 0.915 0.913 0.914
2 1.038 0.973 0.946 0.903 0.858 0.865 0.827
3 1.053 0.982 0.939 0.882 0.816 0.777 0.758
4 1.048 1.001 0.944 0.869 0.799 0.742 0.717
5> 0.965 0.992 0.949 0.851 0.780 0.713 0.656
Number of Number of components
i n c o m e  e a r n e r s 1234567 8 >
1 0.936 0.982 1.038 1.056 1.108 1.073 1.130 1.094
2 - 0.853 0.873 0.917 0.827 0.993 1.109 1.014
3 - - 0.788 0.815 0.865 0.895 0.969 0.893
4 - - - 0.722 0.740 0.857 0.913 0.951
5> ---- 0 . 6 4 3 0 . 7 5 2 0 . 9 2 7 0 . 5 4 7
Table II.18: Young individuals living with their parents, by age
(as a percentage of total number of individuals; 1987-1989-1991-1993-1995 SHIW data)
Age class <21 21-25 26-30 31-35
(%) 99.76 85.40 46.84 19.77
of which:
working 5.28 44.63 62.75 69.65
unemployed 5.81 19.31 18.29 15.12
Percentage of families with at least 1 young dependant over 19
1989 1991 1993 1995
All 14.35 15.21 16.13 16.58
North 9.56 10.93 10.76 10.70
Centre 13.17 12.77 15.96 19.65
South 22.88 22.92 24.51 23.53
Percentage of families with at least 1 young dependant unemployed
1989 1991 1993 1995
All 10.60 8.98 10.55 9.18
North 5.99 5.26 5.75 4.24
Centre 8.99 6.88 9.95 10.99
South 19.08 15.67 18.29 15.42
Mean age of young dependant over 19
1989 1991 1993 1995
All 24.27 24.34 24.48 24.84
North 23.51 23.05 24.12 24.32
Centre 23.99 25.23 24.01 24.39
South 24.88 24.92 24.89 25.40Table II.19: Implicit saving of young individuals living with their parents
(1987-1989-1991-1993-1995 SHIW data at 1995 prices – thousands of lira)
AB C D
All nuclear couples All couples aged 55 to 65 Young singles (A+C)
aged 55 to 65 with only 1 young working  aged 25 to 30
dependant aged 25 to 30
Income 59628 91904 45774 105402
Consumption 52644 71799 49372 102016
Saving rate 0.117 0.219 -0.079 0.032
No. of obs. 3951 1304 314
AB C D
Couples aged 55 to 65 Couples aged 55 to 65 Young singles (A+C)
with 0 dependants with only 1 young working  aged 25 to 30
dependant aged 25 to 30
Income 53597 84046 45774 99371
Consumption 45738 65639 49371 95109
Saving rate 0.147 0.219 -0.079 0.043
No. of obs. 1879 616 314
Notes: Survey data re-proportioned to National Accounts.
Table II.20: Number of individuals living with younger households, by age
(as a percentage of total number of individuals; 1987-1989-1991-1993-1995 SHIW data)
Age class 51-55 56-60 61-65 66-70 71-75 76-80 >80
(%) 6.35 5.89 6.73 8.20 13.08 19.90 34.47
Table II.21: Implicit saving of old individuals living with younger households
(1987-1989-1991-1993-1995 SHIW data at 1995  prices – thousands of lira)
AB C D
All nuclear couples All couples aged 40 to 60 Singles aged (A+C)
aged 40 to 60 with only 1 parent dependant more than 65
aged 65 or more
Income 68024 79646 23749 91773
Consumption 62736 67241 21495 84231
Saving rate 0.078 0.156 0.095 0.082
No. of obs. 9602 594 3326Table II.22: Propensity to consume by number of young dependants and age class
(1987-1989-1991-1993-1995 SHIW data at 1995 prices)
Age class
No. of young <31 31-40 41-50 51-60 61-70
dependants
Consumption-income ratio
0 0.994 0.918 0.894 0.818 0.809
1 1.047 0.946 0.912 0.872 0.867
2 1.028 1.017 0.953 0.919 0.837
3 1.318 1.056 0.911 0.863 0.847
4 1.181 1.212 1.079 1.027 0.947
5> 1.872 1.138 1.048 0.971 1.004
Consumption-total resources ratio
0 0.023 0.026 0.039 0.044 0.043
1 0.023 0.026 0.036 0.042 0.041
2 0.025 0.029 0.036 0.043 0.039
3 0.031 0.031 0.035 0.045 0.038
4 0.025 0.037 0.037 0.040 0.030
5> 0.027 0.040 0.041 0.031 0.023
Table II.23: Expected retirement age and number of young dependants
(1989-1991-1993-1995 SHIW data)
Age of the head
46-50 51-55 56-60 61-65
% heads planned age % heads planned age % heads planned age % heads planned age
retired of retirement retired of retirement retired of retirement retired of retirement
All families
No. young dep. 0 7.89 58.17 29.09 60.12 59.83 61.90 82.31 64.52
1 9.65 58.92 18.88 60.47 44.03 62.09 74.14 64.38
2 5.18 59.81 15.29 60.90 38.25 62.72 66.12 64.48
3 8.08 60.33 14.34 62.10 23.57 62.89 46.53 65.33
4> 6.02 61.62 13.68 62.18 30.64 63.95 62.10 65.04
Families w. 1 inc. earn.
No. young dep. 0 8.64 59.05 35.32 60.31 62.59 62.82 85.51 64.70
1 14.09 59.13 24.79 61.21 48.32 61.89 76.86 64.26
2 4.13 60.09 18.40 61.38 37.01 62.74 53.83 64.55
3 6.75 60.36 9.50 62.10 24.75 62.30 55.76 65.64
4> 6.46 60.75 18.70 61.60 25.51 63.20 75.06 64.53
All Families
No. young dep. 0 7.46 59.26 24.62 60.39 56.25 62.03 82.11 64.51
over age 19 1 6.90 59.43 16.34 60.71 42.23 62.36 71.97 64.26
2 7.01 59.80 16.96 61.50 35.04 62.58 60.55 65.09
3> 19.70 60.59 15.99 62.67 31.96 63.12 41.14 65.18
All Families
No. young dep. 0 6.86 59.20 22.63 60.43 53.40 62.07 80.06 64.44
unemployed 1 9.37 59.45 17.27 61.19 41.22 62.72 77.16 64.74
2> 10.75 60.87 17.07 61.59 40.35 62.40 58.32 65.26
Families  with young dep. >0
No. young dep. 1 6.47 59.57 16.66 60.67 39.61 62.31 67.19 64.20
unemployed 2 9.37 59.45 17.27 61.19 41.22 62.72 77.16 64.74
3> 10.75 60.87 17.07 61.59 40.35 62.40 58.32 65.26Table II.24: Households whose head is not the main income earner, by age and family
type (as a percentage of total number of households in the same category)
(1987-1989-1991-1993-1995 SHIW data)
Age class
<31 31-40 41-50 51-60 61-70 71-80 >80
Nuclear couples 10.94 9.26 5.85 6.35 4.14 3.27 1.01
Non-nucl. couples 26.01 16.02 12.52 17.96 20.83 26.42 22.58
Non-nucl. single-head 29.21 21.78 22.58 23.34 27.91 22.85 17.48
Total (*) 8.91
Main income earner is:
 the partner 4.27
other member 4.64
(*) Percentage with respect to the total number of households
Table II.25: Consumption-income and asset-income ratios by age and family type
(head of household = main income earner)
(1987-1989-1991-1993-1995 SHIW data at 1995 prices)
Age class
Family type <31 31-40 41-50 51-60 61-70 71-80 >80
All types C/Y 0.953 0.907 0.901 0.856 0.887 0.939 0.993
A/Y 3.218 3.588 4.700 5.593 6.857 7.346 7.770
Families:
nuclear C/Y 0.977 0.919 0.923 0.904 0.932 0.964 1.014
A/Y 2.792 3.603 5.022 6.353 7.238 7.658 8.544
non-nuclear C/Y 0.825 0.845 0.849 0.815 0.799 0.759 0.923
A/Y 3.355 3.417 4.170 4.842 5.999 7.652 7.635
Single-head of hous.
nuclear C/Y 1.047 1.164 1.001 1.017 1.046 1.142 0.993
A/Y 2.383 3.576 4.767 7.993 9.261 5.590 7.992
non-nuclear C/Y 0.809 0.846 0.866 0.814 0.853 0.892 0.879
A/Y 4.282 4.588 4.439 5.706 6.072 6.583 8.001Table II.26: Effects of demographic characteristics on the change in the average
propensity to consume between 1980-81 and 1993-95
(SHIW: historical archive; original (non-reproportioned) survey data)
Estimated average saving rate in 1993-95 at
Classificatory variable used  1980-81 weights (a) and difference with respect
to define 1980-81 weights to present (b)
(a) (b)
Age of the head 23.0 0.3
Household type 24.4 1.7
Household size 24.0 1.3
Number of children 22.7 0.0
Number of income earners 22.7 0.0
Estimated average saving rate in 1993-95 at 
1980-81 weights and relative income (a) and
difference with respect to present (b) 
(a) (b)
Age of the head 22.7 0.0
Household type 23.3 0.5
Household size 23.1 0.4
Number of children 22.2 -0.5
Number of income earners 21.8 -0.9Table II.27: Contributions to the aggregate saving rate by type of household
(SHIW: historical archive; original (non-reproportioned) survey data)
Family type 1980-81 1993-95 ∆
Families:
nuclear weight 0.568 0.529 -0.039
relative income 0.966 1.039 0.073
total weight 0.549 0.550 0.001
saving rate 0.213 0.197 -0.016
contribution 0.117 0.108 -0.009
non-nuclear weight 0.210 0.173 -0.037
relative income 1.411 1.457 0.046
total weight 0.296 0.252 -0.044
saving rate 0.376 0.317 -0.059
contribution 0.111 0.080 -0.032
Single-head hhld.:
nuclear weight 0.022 0.028 0.007
relative income 0.856 0.644 -0.212
total weight 0.018 0.018 0.000
saving rate 0.132 0.057 -0.075
contribution 0.002 0.001 -0.001
non-nuclear weight 0.077 0.091 0.014
relative income 1.033 1.004 -0.029
total weight 0.080 0.092 0.012
saving rate 0.340 0.290 -0.050
contribution 0.027 0.027 0.000
Singles weight 0.124 0.178 0.054
relative income 0.463 0.495 0.032
total weight 0.057 0.088 0.031
saving rate 0.214 0.126 -0.088
contribution 0.012 0.011 -0.001
Total saving rate 0.270 0.227 -0.043
Notes: see footnotes to Table II.16.56
III A model of demographic development
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III.1 Introduction
In this section we will describe the basic structure of our model of demographic
development. Official forecasts and population projections usually describe the demographic
evolution as a dynamic process responding to three basic accounting identities: mortality,
fertility and (possibly) net migration.
31 As already explained in Section I, the model
described here is more complex and detailed as our aim is to keep track of the status of
individuals in relation to families and to describe the process of formation of new families,
the dissolution of old ones, and the merging of individuals from different families. Besides
following the three basic steps of population projections, we consider a number of other
events, including the process of divorce and remarriage, new marriages, the movement of
young dependant adults to the unattached single status and the merging of old people into
younger families.
Our basic strategy is to start with a sample of the Italian population, derived from the
1993 Survey of Households Income and Wealth (SHIW) carried out by the Bank of Italy.
This sample is obtained by adjusting the original data in order to match some of the basic
demographic features of the Italian population disclosed by the 1991 Population Census and
applying a re-sampling procedure to obtain a large proportional sample of individuals. The
demographic model can then be applied to this initial adjusted, large, proportional sample of
the Italian population to project it into the future. In so doing we are careful to calibrate the
model to reproduce, as far as possible, the main distinctive features of the population as
described by the available official projections.
III.2 The micro simulation database: which method?
As illustrated in Section II of this paper, the structure of households has a crucial effect
on the behaviour of variables such as income, wealth, saving and consumption. Since our
interest is in creating a model capable of making predictions on these variables, we cannot
avoid tracing how families will evolve in the future.
                                                          
30 The model of demographic development has been developed in collaboration with Luigi Cannari.
31  Official projections for the Italian population are prepared by IRP (Istituto di Ricerche sulla
Popolazione) and Istat (the Italian statistical agency).57
In order to model the demographic transition process starting from a sample of
individuals, two different basic methods have been adopted in the literature: (a) creating
cohorts of families
32 according to a variety of characteristics (age of the head of the
household and spouse, age of children and other dependants, and so on) or (b) working
directly with individual data, i.e., with a sample of individuals grouped into households.
If a relatively small number of characteristics is taken into consideration, method (a) is
likely to be preferable because the number of cohorts will not be very large and the
demographic evolution of cohorts over time can be traced using deterministic methods. For
instance, from time t to time t+1, the weight of the cohort made up of unattached individuals
aged 80 can be reduced according to the probability of death occurring between the ages of
80 and 81. Managing cohorts becomes, however, much more complicated as the number of
characteristics increases because relationships among cohorts have to be taken into account.
For instance, if a child gets married and leaves the original family we should reduce the
weight of his/her original cohort and increase the weight of the cohort made up of couples
with the same age as the child and the latter’s spouse. When considering a large number of
characteristics such as education, labour force participation, sector of activity and so on, the
method of cohorts implies a very complicated scheme to generate the required pattern of
weights of the various cohorts. Another limitation of this method is that any information on
the distribution of economic variables, such as income or wealth, among cohorts and on its
evolution over time is necessarily lost.
For these reasons we use individual data and resort to stochastic methods: individuals
die, get married, divorce, study and participate in the labour force according to given
probabilities. This method is not free of problems either. The variability of estimates tends to
increase when stochastic methods are used; thus, the database must be reasonably large if we
want to obtain precise estimates of relatively rare events. In addition, the sample should be
proportional in order to avoid modifying weights when specific events occur. The first
problem that emerges, in fact, when this strategy is pursued is that observations in survey
samples (and the SHIW is no exception) carry sampling weights, reflecting the number of
individuals (or families) of the total original population represented by each sampled
                                                          
32 This is the method used by A. Ando (1996) and J. P. Cordoba (1995).58
individual (or family). Of course, it would make no sense to marry a woman with a weight of
73 with a man with a weight of 48 without making any correction.
For instance, if a man with a weight equal to w0  marries a woman with a different
weight (say w1, w0 > w1) the new couple should be given a weight equal to w1 and a new
record should be generated (an unmarried male with a weight equal to w0 - w1). Therefore, a
non-proportional sample requires the management of weights, as in the cohort-based method,
and gives rise, in addition, to an increase in the original sample size (owing to the necessary
duplication of some records).
To overcome this problem we have developed a statistical procedure to re-sample the
original survey observations in order to construct a new sample in which all individuals have
the same weight (that is, they will represent a constant fraction of the total population). In the
next section we show how we generate a representative (large) proportional sample starting
from the original (weighted) survey data.
III.3 Setting initial conditions and the construction of a proportional sample
Our simulation model is based on micro data from the 1993 Survey of Italian
Household Income and Wealth (SHIW) carried out by the Bank of Italy. This survey is based
on a non-proportional sample of about 8,000 households (about 25,000 individuals). In order
to avoid the problems highlighted in the previous section, we need to generate a proportional
sample that is large enough to obtain precise estimates of the phenomena under investigation.
Before doing that, however, a preliminary adjustment to the original sample is
necessary. Since we want to be able to obtain estimates of the future population structure that
are as close as possible to the official projections, it is important to ensure that the initial
sample matches, as closely as possible and for a number of basic demographic
characteristics, the corresponding distribution of demographic variables exhibited by the
Italian population. Therefore, we first split the SHIW sample by age, sex and marital status
of the household members and compute the sampling weights of each cell. Then, we match
the weights of cells by age, sex and marital status to the corresponding numbers from the59
1991 Population Census (Table III.1) and adjust the sampling weights accordingly, using an
interactive method.
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To obtain a proportional sample from this original Census-adjusted sample, we then
proceed by applying a simple re-sampling procedure. The basic idea behind this re-sampling
procedure can be illustrated as follows. Each observation in the original sample carries a
weight, called wi, representing the number of elementary household units represented by the
single observation. Our purpose is to draw a sample in which all the elementary units will
have the same probability of being represented. We thus fix this probability at p and proceed
as follows: for any arbitrary p, it is easy to calculate the probability of choosing zero, one,
two, …, r households from the first observation with weight w1. We can indeed plot the
cumulative distribution of r as in Figure III.1 (reported at the end of this section).
We can then randomly draw a number x from the uniform distribution [0,1] and mark it
on the vertical axis of the above chart. Then we can read the corresponding value on the
horizontal axis using the plotted cumulative distribution. This represents the number of
samples that should be drawn from the first observation.
Following the above reasoning for each observation i, we generate a random number xi
according to a binomial distribution with parameters wi and p, where p is constant across
different households. Then each record is replicated xi times. The final sample can then be
considered a proportional one. Its size is, of course, determined by the p parameter. The
choice of p is, to a certain degree, arbitrary but certainly it has to be chosen so that relatively
rare characteristics of individuals and families present in the original data have a non-trivial
probability of being included in the new sample. We have found that this requirement can be
relatively well fulfilled by making a choice of p such that the final sample consists of about
200,000 individuals (about ten times the original data).
III.4 The demographic transition process
Our model of demographic dynamics applies to the Census-adjusted large proportional
sample drawn from the original SHIW data. The status of each individual in a family is
changed from one year to the next according to the following events: death, ageing, birth,
                                                          
33  As the distribution of population by sex, age and marital status shows some discrepancies between the
SHIW sample and the Census data (for instance, the survey underestimates young married women), in some60
divorce and separation, marriage; the movement of young dependant adults to the unattached
single status and the merging of older people into a younger family.
III.4.1  Mortality and ageing
Mortality. Every year each individual in the sample faces the probability of dying (q),
conditional on his/her age and sex. Initial probabilities are taken from mortality tables
estimated by Istat (Italian Mortality Tables, reported in the Annuario Statistico Italiano). In
the simulation, probabilities of dying by age are then updated in line with the Istat (1997)
projections.
34 Table III.2 reports life expectancy at birth and at other selected ages implied by
the mortality rates used in the simulation.
We then generate a random binary variable d, which takes the value 1 with probability
q, and delete all records having d equal to 1. If a married head of household dies, the marital
status of the spouse is changed to widow(er) and she (he) becomes the head of the household.
If an unmarried head of household dies, the oldest adult in the family becomes the head. If
there is no surviving adult in the family, children merge with probability one into a randomly
selected family; the merging is constrained to the average intergenerational age gap.
Ageing. This part of the population dynamics is straightforward and does not require
any discussion: the age of each individual in the sample is increased by one year.
III.4.2  Birth
As in the case of death, we compute the probability of giving birth to a child (b) from
one year to the next for each married woman in the sample and generate a random binary
variable n which takes the value 1 with probability b. Then we select all records with n equal
to 1 and append the newborn babies to the household of the mother. The sex of newborn
babies is imputed according to the corresponding distribution by sex from the 1991 Census.
No changes in the sex distribution of newborns are assumed to occur in the simulation of the
model for future years.
                                                                                                                                                                                  
cases the adjustment to the sampling weights was necessarily rather large.
34  We are grateful to Istat for providing us with their projected probabilities. The future development of
mortality rates is simulated using a four-parameter model based on a logit system for survival rates estimated at
a regional level. The model is then adapted to be consistent with the projections made using an age-period-
cohort model, reporting forecasts by leading causes of death at the national level (see Istat 1997).61
There are, however, some problems with the appropriate birth rates. The birth rate is
given as the overall average for the entire female population of a particular age.
35 In our
simulation, however, to preserve the distribution of family size that we observe in the data
we need the probability of new births ordered by age, marital status and number of children
already present. That is, we have to distinguish married women from unmarried ones and to
take account of the number of children that each married woman already has. As to the first
point, we adjust the overall fertility rate using the ratio of married women to total women in
each age group (Table III.3). As to the second, we follow the method used by Ando (1996).
In Table III.4 we show the distribution of families by the number of children. Let the relative
frequency of the number of children be represented by f0, f1, f2, f3, f4 and f5, and the birth rate
for a woman with no children in any specific year be given by x(1- f0). We then assume that
the birth rate for women with one or more children is given by the values displayed in
Table III.5.
We then determine the value of x for women of specific ages by solving the equation:
b(a)=x[(1- f0)+ (1- f0 - f1)+ (1- f0 - f1- f2)+ (1- f0 - f1 - f2 - f3)+ (1- f0 - f1 - f2 - f3 - f4)]
where b(a) is the birth rate for women of age a, adjusted for married women. The results
produced by this method are given in Table III.3.
A re-proportioning coefficient is finally applied to the computed fertility rates in order
to replicate the number of new births in the base year. In addition, in the base simulation the
ordered fertility rates by age are changed to match the number of new births in the Istat
(1997) projections. The total fertility rate, broken down by order of birth, observed and
forecast in the Istat main variant projection (the middle fertility rate assumption), is reported
in Figure III.2. As can be observed from the figure, the total fertility rate is assumed to
recover somewhat from the present depressed level (from slightly above 1.2 up to 1.45
children per woman) because younger cohorts who have considerably postponed the start of
reproductive life will partially offset the decline at a later age. This partial recovery of the
fertility rate is expected to be concentrated on the first and second order rates. Accordingly,
we limit our adjustment to those two orders and concentrate the increase at relatively old
                                                          
35 In the Istat (1997) projections, however, (cohort-specific) fertility rates by age and order of birth have
been used.62
ages. The resulting distribution of fertility rates by age may, however, be slightly different
from that of the Istat projections.
III.4.3.  Marriage, divorce and separation
Marriage and divorce are complex phenomena that involve choices which – in addition
to the role played by love, attraction or repulsion – are certainly conditioned by a number of
social factors (culture, tradition, religion, etc.) as well as by the characteristics of the
individuals involved (their location, education, social and economic status, etc.). For the time
being, in our model we make the (extremely) simplifying assumption that the only
conditioning factor is the age of the individuals involved, leaving the possibility of
introducing a more detailed description of the phenomena to future work.
36 Moreover, we do
not distinguish between legally married couples and informal couples (nor is a distinction
reported in the original survey). Our main goal, at this stage, is therefore merely to preserve
the age characteristics of the couples and to replicate the frequency of marriages observed in
the Italian population.
Marriage. We estimate the probability of marrying by age, using the 1991 Census data
and reconstructing the number of “new” marriages for each age (shown in Figure  III.2).
Using the (unconditional) probabilities of marrying by age for females we select the
candidate husband in the usual way. We then estimate using the SHIW survey data the
males’ conditional probability by age of marrying a woman of a given age (these are shown
in Table III.6). Using these probabilities, we select the potential spouses from the resulting
age groups.
37 Finally, we randomly match husbands and spouses on a one-to-one basis. The
status of the head of the newly formed household is randomly assigned to males and females
according to the proportions observed in the survey data.
Divorce and separation. Using the 1991 Census tabulations we estimate the probability
of a separation occurring at every age (shown in Figure III.2) and generate the relative binary
variable as in the previous phases. No distinction is made between separation and divorce.
                                                          
36 In particular it would be important to use probabilities of marriage conditional to the wealth levels of
the original families.
37 Ideally, to construct these probabilities one would have to take a series of consecutive census results
and look at the frequency of marriage in a given cohort as it ages. Given the very low frequency of Italian
census data (10 years), however, this method is not applicable. We plan in the future to refine probabilities of
marriage using information from current population surveys.63
After separation or divorce individuals are not allowed to remarry for five years. Children of
a separated couple are assigned to the mother with a very high rate of probability (92% as
estimated by the 1991 legal statistics elaborated by Istat).
III.4.4.  Independent children, merging households and unattached individuals
The movement of young dependant adults to the unattached single status and the
merging of older persons into younger families are somewhat complex phases. Men and
women can choose to live with their parents as adult dependants because they wish to save
and accumulate a substantial amount of wealth by living in their parents’ homes, or for other
economic reasons (for instance, difficulty in finding a job or buying a house). Analogously,
the merging of older persons into younger families can depend on the decision to go into
retirement or on the economic resources of the elderly.
We do not tackle these issues in the present procedure. Adult dependants and older
persons move out of their original families or merge into younger families according to
probabilities that depend only on their age. These probabilities are, for the time being and
given the limited information available, simply calibrated in order to replicate the relative
frequencies (by age) observed in the survey base year.
38 It is likely, however, that these
simplifications fail to lead to marked biases because the proportion of young people living as
singles compared with the total population of young people is relatively small and because,
as we have seen in Section II, a large number of older people live alone. Table III.7 gives the
proportion of unattached individuals compared with the total population by age group.
                                                          
38 In future work we might try to estimate some of these probabilities using the Panel of Istat survey on
the labour force (Istat, Indagine sulla forza lavoro).Section III - Charts and Tables
Figure III.1: Cumulative distribution of r
Figure III.2: Fertility rate by period and order of birth
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Table III.1: Italian population by sex, age and marital status
(source: 1991 Census; absolute values)
Male Female
Age Unmarried Married (1) Separated (2) Widower All Unmarried Married (1) Separated (2) Widow All
0-4 1413955 0 0 0 1413955 1334966 0 0 0 1334966
5-9 1481097 0 0 0 1481097 1404214 0 0 0 1404214
10-14 1728273 2 0 0 1728275 1646365 103 0 0 1646468
15-19 2171772 15088 1514 1807 2190181 2043680 58789 1760 4156 2108385
20-24 2162490 137036 2974 842 2303342 1725194 493254 9993 2603 2231044
25-29 1478981 842357 18919 1968 2342225 902786 1348912 42810 7812 2302320
30-34 640241 1374806 46425 3027 2064499 366350 1588396 75203 14836 2044785
35-39 331906 1499027 65681 4902 1901516 213959 1582390 87103 24866 1908318
40-44 230501 1638588 74215 8575 1951879 163645 1677150 87690 46082 1974567
45-49 167651 1455567 61484 13798 1698500 131348 1459152 71592 74827 1736919
50-54 166963 1538177 54728 25582 1785450 144023 1515118 61795 144431 1865367
55-59 146049 1396485 39197 39538 1621269 148569 1320556 44132 236012 1749269
60-64 134926 1318769 30384 62267 1546346 170663 1161809 35149 375069 1742690
65-69 107585 1119964 21752 89640 1338941 179067 919963 27561 532091 1658682
70-74 59810 651464 11212 82314 804800 123063 473223 14852 494057 1105195
75-79 53129 543078 8066 127021 731294 130467 326729 9411 639642 1106249
>79 45666 380928 5396 222404 654394 166292 183901 6831 943606 1300630
Total 12520995 13911336 441947 683685 27557963 10994651 14109445 575882 3540090 29220068
(1) Net of de facto separated.
(2) De facto separated, legally separated, divorced.Table III.2: Life expectancy by sex at various ages
(source: Annuario Statistico Italiano, for 1994; Istat, 1997 projections for other years)
Males Females
Age: Age:
05 0 6 505 0 6 5
Year
1994 74.3 27.4 15.4 80.7 32.5 19.2
2000 75.9 28.1 16.3 82.3 33.5 20.0
2010 77.1 29.1 17.0 83.5 34.5 20.8
2020 78.3 30.2 17.8 84.7 35.6 21.8
Table III.3: Estimated fertility rates by number of existing children
Percentage of Fertility rate Adjusted fertility rate
Age married females (1) (X1000) Mean Number of existing children
01234 5
15-19 2.8 6.4 229.5 464.2 252.3 70.3 16.5 4.3 0.0
20-24 22.1 51.9 234.7 474.8 258.0 71.9 16.9 4.4 0.0
25-29 58.6 92.9 158.6 320.7 174.3 48.5 11.4 2.9 0.0
30-34 77.7 73.4 94.5 191.1 103.9 28.9 6.8 1.8 0.0
35-39 82.9 30.0 36.2 73.2 39.8 11.1 2.6 0.7 0.0
40-44 84.9 5.4 6.4 12.9 7.0 1.9 0.5 0.1 0.0
45-49 84.0 0.2 0.2 0.5 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
(1) Net of de facto separated.
Table III.4: Families by number of children
(source: 1991 Census; absolute values)
Families






5 or more 104,829 0.7
Total 15,538,335 100.0Table III.5:  Fertility of women with a given number of existing children
Number of
existing children 0 1 2 3 4
Birth rate x(1- f0)x ( 1 -  f 0- f1)x ( 1 -  f 0- f1- f2)x ( 1 -  f 0- f1- f2- f3)x ( 1 -  f 0- f1- f2- f3- f4)
Table III.6: Estimated conditional probability of marriage by age
(estimates based on SHIW data)
Age of Age of husband
wife 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
17 0.03       0.01       -         -         -         -         -        
18 0.04       0.02       -         -         -         -         -        
19 0.05       0.03       0.00       -         -         -         -        
20 0.07       0.04       0.01       0.00       -         -         -        
21 0.12       0.07       0.02       0.00       -         -         -        
22 0.21       0.12       0.03       0.01       -         -         -        
23 0.14       0.11       0.05       0.02       0.00       -         -        
24 0.10       0.12       0.08       0.03       0.01       -         -        
25 0.08       0.12       0.10       0.04       0.01       -         -        
26 0.05       0.12       0.12       0.07       0.03       0.01       -        
27 0.05       0.10       0.13       0.09       0.04       0.01       -        
28 0.04       0.07       0.12       0.11       0.05       0.01       -        
29 0.02       0.05       0.12       0.12       0.07       0.02       -        
30 -         0.02       0.09       0.12       0.08       0.02       -        
31 -         0.01       0.06       0.10       0.08       0.02       -        
32 -         0.01       0.04       0.09       0.08       0.04       0.02      
33 -         0.00       0.02       0.07       0.07       0.04       0.02      
34 -         0.00       0.02       0.04       0.06       0.05       0.04      
35 -         0.00       0.01       0.03       0.06       0.06       0.05      
36 -         -         0.00       0.02       0.07       0.08       0.07      
37 -         -         -         0.02       0.07       0.09       0.09      
38 -         -         -         0.02       0.07       0.09       0.09      
39 -         -         -         0.01       0.06       0.09       0.09      
40 -         -         -         0.00       0.04       0.09       0.11      
41 -         -         -         -         0.03       0.09       0.11      
42 -         -         -         -         0.02       0.07       0.09      
43 -         -         -         -         0.01       0.05       0.07      
44 -         -         -         -         -         0.03       0.05      
45 -         -         -         -         -         0.02       0.04      
46 -         -         -         -         -         0.02       0.04      
47 -         -         -         -         -         0.01       0.02      
48 -         -         -         -         -         0.01       0.02      
Notes: see text in section III.4.3.Table III.7: Total population and unattached individuals
(source: 1991 Census; absolute values)
Age Total population Unattached individuals (b)/(a)
(a) (b) %
<20 13307541 17733 0.13
20-24 4534386 107297 2.37
25-29 4644545 218296 4.70
30-34 4109284 224337 5.46
35-39 3809834 186460 4.89
40-44 3926446 166456 4.24
45-49 3435419 153822 4.48
50-54 3650817 192950 5.29
55-59 3370538 251066 7.45
60-64 3289036 384957 11.70
65-69 2997623 528358 17.63
70-74 1909995 458004 23.98
75-79 1837543 551059 29.99
>79 1955024 659175 33.72
Total 56778031 4099970 7.2269
IV The generation of individual characteristics
IV.1 Introduction
In addition to the process of demographic evolution, to make the model operational we
need to generate those socio-economic characteristics of individuals that are important to
predict their economic behaviour. While the information on variables such as education,
participation in the labour force, and so forth is given in the initial sample, these
characteristics might change over time and, as the population evolves, new individuals will
become able to generate income and make consumption choices. For these individuals we
need to create characteristics such as their education, their willingness to participate in the
labour force, that are necessary to make any prediction of their economic behaviour.
In this section we describe how we generate the relevant characteristics of individuals
which will be used in the next section to determine their (current and lifetime) income,
including their future claims for pension benefits. In doing this we try to take into account as
far as possible the correlation existing among different characteristics, in order to preserve
the proportions of the combination of characteristics of individuals observed in the data, for
each age group and type of individual. This implies, for example, that more highly educated
people will be more likely to participate in the labour force, to work and to have access to a
higher employment status than people with less education. In the same vein, we maintain
different distributions of characteristics across Italian regions, as observed in the actual data.
It must be borne in mind, however, that at the present stage the process of attribution of
characteristics is based on extremely simplified assumptions and does not pretend to
represent a complete model of individual choices. Rather, it should be interpreted as a
sensitive mechanism that generates some key proportions observed in the data (such as
labour force participation or unemployment rates for various types of individuals). This
mechanism also allows to preserve the observed heterogeneity of individual characteristics.
However, we should recognize that this is probably the area of the model that is the most
susceptible to future developments and improvements.
The set of individual characteristics generated by the model consists of: region of
residence, education, labour force participation and unemployment, sector of work and
occupational status. We review them in turn.70
IV.2 Region of residence
In Italy regional differentiation is a very important factor to consider, both from an
economic and a social point of view. We therefore decided to maintain it as a distinguishing
characteristic of individuals. Three broad areas are considered: the North, the Centre and the
South of Italy (administrative regions were assigned to these areas according to the official
(Istat) classification).
In our simulation model region is attributed in a very simple manner. All families are
given the residence of the head of the household, which is then simply inherited by the
children. Similarly, after any demographic event involving the merging of individuals, we
assign the region of the head of the new family to all other members. Therefore, for the time
being, we do not consider the possibility of infra-regional migration of families.
IV.3 Educational levels
Education is one of the most crucial individual characteristics whose importance in
determining individuals’ ability to generate income is well understood. In the model we
distinguish four educational levels (no education, elementary school education, high school
education, university degree). No education (i.e., no elementary school certificate) is
eliminated for new individuals, however, since its frequency among young cohorts is close to
zero (whereas still there is a quite substantial proportion of people in the old cohorts of the
survey data reported as not having studied at all). We do not consider post-college education,
since it is quite a rare phenomenon in Italy.
In assigning an educational level to new individuals we proceed as follows: at age 20
the individual is randomly assigned an educational level for the rest of his/her life or he/she
can keep studying (about one-third of that age group in the initial sample); to determine the
educational level achieved, or whether the individuals go to university, we use probabilities
conditional on the educational level of the head of the household to which those individuals
belong, the region in which they live and their sex. We have estimated these conditional
probabilities from an ordered probit estimate based on the 20-35 age group in the original
survey data. The estimated probabilities are shown in Table IV.1.
People who go to university randomly withdraw from their studies up to the age of 25
at a rate such that the remaining people who graduate at age 25 match the observed71
proportion (by sex) of graduates in the 25-35 age group (slightly above 10% in the survey
data). Conditional on an individual having decided to go to university, therefore, the
educational level or the region of the head of the household ceases to matter in establishing
whether the individual completes his/her university studies.
It is important to note that in the base simulation, the educational level of the whole
society rises for a while as younger cohorts possess higher educational levels, with the result
that their children will also receive higher education, before reaching a steady state. Both the
dependency of the region of residence and of the educational level on parents’ residence and
educational level generates in the simulation an auto-correlation of the evolution of these
characteristics over time.
IV.4 Labour force participation and unemployment
Individuals who have finished their studies will participate in the labour force
randomly, with probabilities that are conditional on whether they are heads of household,
age, sex and education. Probabilities are chosen to match observed proportions of the
different groups in the survey data (which are shown in Table IV.2). In the benchmark
simulation we allow the overall rate of participation among women to increase somewhat
over time. This is consistent with the observation that young female cohorts participate more
than older ones and also takes into account that fact that the participation rate for Italian
women is still substantially lower than in other European countries. The participation rates
by age group for the other groups remain roughly constant. Students do not participate in the
labour force, while graduates participate with probability one. There is no withdrawal from
the labour force except when the individual reaches retirement age.
Given that an individual participates in the labour force, he/she can become
unemployed with probabilities that depend on whether he/she is the head of the household,
age, sex and region, and are different if the individual is a new entrant in the labour force
(much higher probabilities of unemployment) or is already employed. If unemployed, the
individual can find a job with probabilities which depend on the same characteristics. Up to
age 28 (25 for heads of households) the process is a Markov process, with different
probabilities of finding a job for employed and unemployed persons. After that age, the
probability of being unemployed in the next period is the same for the unemployed and the72
employed (but still different for different groups of individuals according to their age, sex
and role in the family). Again, probabilities are chosen to match the observed unemployment
rates for the different groups; in the benchmark simulation, however, they are assumed to
evolve in future years so that the overall unemployment rate reaches a steady state level of
about 8% by the year 2005.
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When the individual reaches retirement age (a choice variable that will be described in
the next Section) he/she retires and becomes a pensioner. In the present version of the model
there is no possibility of returning to work. Furthermore, working while receiving a pension
is not allowed.
It should be noted that the procedure described above entails that no exiting from the
labour force (and thus re-entering) is allowed (before retirement). Moreover, while observed
aggregate proportions (for both labour force participation and unemployment) are broadly
preserved, individual probabilities of entering the labour force or becoming unemployed may
not match accurately the actual individual experiences. These are obvious drawbacks of the
current model that need to be eliminated in future versions.
IV.5 Sector and occupation
Individuals entering the labour force are randomly assigned to one of three possible
sectors (agriculture, public or private non-agriculture) and to one of four possible
occupational statuses (manual worker, clerk, manager or self-employed). Transitional
probabilities for these characteristics depend only on education. We have estimated them
using a multi-probit estimate on the survey data to ensure that the simulation of the model
will maintain the relevant proportions observed in the data. Table IV.3 shows the relevant
transitional probabilities for individuals entering the labour force for the first time.
Previously employed people who are currently unemployed maintain the previous
characteristics when they find a new job. As a worker ages, he/she is subject to a probability
of improving his/her occupational status (for example, from manual worker to clerk and from
clerk to manager). Probabilities have again been calibrated to match the observed distribution
of occupational status by age in the initial sample.
                                                          
39 This is approximately the NAIRU level as estimated in a number of studies on the Italian labour
market.Section IV – Charts and Tables
Table IV.1: Estimated probability of educational level of children at age 20 conditional
on education of the head of the household and region of residence
(ordered probit regression; based on 1987-1989-1991-1993-1995 SHIW)
Education of child at age 20
Males Females
Education of elementary high school university elementary high school university
the head
S o u t h0 . 7 70 . 1 60 . 0 70 . 7 40 . 1 80 . 0 8
None Centre 0.75 0.17 0.08 0.71 0.19 0.10
N o r t h0 . 6 80 . 2 10 . 1 10 . 6 40 . 2 30 . 1 4
S o u t h0 . 4 30 . 2 80 . 2 80 . 3 90 . 2 90 . 3 2
Elementary Centre 0.40 0.29 0.31 0.36 0.29 0.35
N o r t h0 . 3 30 . 2 90 . 3 90 . 2 80 . 2 80 . 4 3
S o u t h0 . 1 40 . 2 30 . 6 30 . 1 20 . 2 10 . 6 7
High-school Centre 0.13 0.22 0.66 0.10 0.20 0.70
N o r t h0 . 0 90 . 1 80 . 7 30 . 0 70 . 1 60 . 7 7
S o u t h0 . 0 50 . 1 30 . 8 20 . 0 40 . 1 10 . 8 5
University Centre 0.04 0.12 0.84 0.03 0.10 0.87
N o r t h0 . 0 30 . 0 90 . 8 80 . 0 20 . 0 70 . 9 1
Table IV.2: Participation and unemployment rates of heads of households and
dependants
(source: 1987-1989-1991-1993-1995 SHIW)
Head of household Non-head
Male Female Male Female
Particip. Unempl. Particip. Unempl. Particip. Unempl. Particip. Unempl.
Age class
<20 0.779            0.241            0.659            -                0.349            0.475            0.323            0.490           
21-25 0.957            0.033            0.819            0.133            0.698            0.278            0.587            0.294           
26-30 0.990            0.022            0.798            0.100            0.864            0.198            0.622            0.169           
31-35 0.996            0.032            0.779            0.077            0.916            0.178            0.576            0.088           
36-40 0.998            0.024            0.806            0.059            0.902            0.128            0.510            0.037           
41-45 0.989            0.019            0.776            0.037            0.905            0.110            0.464            0.043           
46-50 0.961            0.021            0.660            0.035            0.901            0.115            0.371            0.028           
51-55 0.841            0.023            0.419            0.046            0.784            0.147            0.274            0.019           
56-60 0.583            0.033            0.200            0.002            0.576            0.236            0.146            0.019           
60-65 0.268            0.020            0.074            0.019            0.166            0.265            0.054            -               
>65 0.055            0.001            0.010            0.006            0.036            0.048            0.012            -               Table IV.3: Estimated probability of employment status and sector of occupation by
educational level
(ordered probit regression; based on 1987-1989-1991-1993-1995 SHIW)
Elementary High school University
Manual: agriculture 0.032           0.005           0.001          
other sect. 0.535           0.287           0.139          
public 0.021           0.018           0.012          
Clerk: other sect. 0.255           0.304           0.252          
public 0.052           0.091           0.098          
Manager: other sect. 0.020           0.041           0.049          
public 0.005           0.011           0.014          
Self empl.: agriculture 0.006           0.013           0.017          
other sect. 0.073           0.230           0.418          75
V The economic behaviour of households
V. 1 Introduction: the basic framework
A part of our task in this project is to describe the behaviour of households in
allocating resources among consumption in various periods of their lives as their needs
change. We want our description to be capable of matching basic features of our data as
closely as possible, while at the same time being represented by computable algebraic
expressions so that they can be incorporated into our dynamic simulation programs. A model
of a utility maximization subject to dynamic budget constraints can lead to a closed form
decision rule only under very restrictive conditions, and we need to be more flexible in order
to meet our practical needs. It is nevertheless useful to lay out an approximate optimizing
model of household behaviour so that the assumptions needed to arrive at our empirical
formulation are clearly visible. For this purpose, we begin with a fairly general formulation
given by the following:
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Definitions of the variables are as follows. (We adopt the convention that when a variable
carries the age subscript a and time superscript t, the variable represents the current value.
When it carries the age subscript a+i and the time superscript t, the variable represents the76
plans – or expectation if the variable is outside the control of households – of the household
for i
th period ahead made in period t.)
t
a C Consumption of a family whose head is at age a in calendar year t.
t
T C 1 + : Planned bequest at the end of the life of this household.
t
a L : Supply of labour in hours by all members of the household.
t w : The wage rate (net of social security contributions) per hour prevailing in period t.
F: Present and future characteristics of households.
t
a A : Total value of assets acquired in period t when the age of the household is a and
carried over to period t+1.
t
a B : Total value of borrowings incurred in period t and carried over to period t+1.
t








a P : Net transfers (including social security transfers) received in period t measured in
units of consumption goods.
a: The age of the head of the household in period t.
T : The age of the head at the age of death of surviving spouse. That is, if the current age
of the head is 40 and his spouse is 35, and the head expected to survive until he is 80
while his wife is expected to survive until 85, T  is 40+50=90.
Formula (1) is a standard dynamic utility function, while (2) is a period-by-period cash
flow constraint. We adopt the convention that lending and borrowing contracts are all for a
single period. In each period, the sum of consumption, the amount of assets that the
household wishes to carry into the next period, and the amount of debt incurred in the
previous period that must be repaid with interest must be less than or equal to the sum of
earned income, borrowing that the household plans to carry over to the next period, and the
assets that the household has carried over from the previous period with interest.  If the
borrowing and lending rates are the same for each period, then the constraints for all future
periods can be discounted back to the initial period and the constraints (2) can be reduced to
a single constraint in terms of the present value, given by (3) and (4) below.
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represents the (expected) total (life-time) resources of the households
In this study, we work with the formulations (1), (3) and (4) most of the time. This
means that we are ignoring the possibility of liquidity constraints (the inability of borrowing
against future income) on households to finance their consumption expenditures.
The difficulty of dealing with a system like (1), (3) and (4) is largely due to uncertainty.
Even if uncertainty is limited to w and no other variable is random, by the time (3) and (4)
are substituted into (1), U becomes a complex non-linear function of w and it is impossible
to obtain a closed form solution for Cs maximizing the expected value of U unless U is a
special form of exponential function, which does not fit the data.
Furthermore, a moment’s reflection makes it clear that the uncertainty cannot be
limited to w. Members of households cannot be sure of the future values of the interest rates,
future values of gifts and transfers, any more than the future value of the wage rate.  They do
not know the exact timing of the termination date of their family, nor the specific
characteristics that the family will acquire in the future. It is clear, therefore, that the
optimization of the simpler problem (1), (3) and (4) cannot yield a closed form solution, let
alone the dynamic programming problem (1) and (2). For us to proceed with analysis,
therefore, we must resort to a number of heuristic approximations.  We first ask under what
conditions we can obtain a reasonable solution to this problem if there is no uncertainty. If U
is completely separable in Cs and L, and in addition the part of U containing Cs is strictly
homothetic, we can derive the consumption decision rule given by (5).
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where TR(a) is the average TR of households whose head is aged a. We therefore allow the
relative position in the distribution of TR to be introduced as an argument in f (which implies
the assumption that TR for a household can be generated without reference to the
household’s decision on consumption).78
We therefore hypothesize that, faced with the difficulty of solving the above problem,
the households attempt to deal with it by solving a drastically simplified problem so as to
enable them to avoid the worst consequences of uncertainty. Equation (5) is essentially the
form of the consumption function that we have used in our empirical analysis (see Section
V.5 below).
Before turning to the empirical specification of households’ consumption decisions, we
need to be able to construct for each household in our sample, its total expected resources
TR. This requires, inter alia, the evaluation of households lifetime labour income and social
security wealth, which is the topic of the next sections.
V.2 Income and lifetime income profiles of individuals and families
The first problem that occurs when attempting to predict families’ labour income is
whether one should directly predict the labour income of the family as a whole or whether
one should predict individuals’ labour income and aggregate it ex post over the family
members. After a preliminary investigation we have decided to adopt the latter method even
if both methods present advantages and disadvantages.
40 The details of the procedure and the
assumptions needed to reconstruct the families’ total lifetime income are described in the
next sections.
V.2.1 Individual income profiles and lifetime income
                                                          
40  Estimating labour income at the level of the individual has the advantage that one could, at least in
principle, take into account the interactions that exist among members of the family with respect to the decision
to work. However, this might be a difficult task to carry out at the empirical level and actually some authors (see
Ando, 1996) have found that, in some countries, estimating the total family income gave rise to smaller
prediction errors than aggregating predictions for individuals. We have investigated this issue empirically using
the survey data and found: (a) prediction errors of family labour income are relatively large when aggregating
predictions for individuals derived from simple regressions that do not take into account participation decisions
of individuals; (b) the difference between the two methods was very small if participation decisions were taken
into account using a two-stage Heckman procedure. Given these findings and considering, moreover, the
practical need to reconstruct net incomes from estimated gross income, which is more easily accomplished in79
V.2.1.1 The estimate of individual labour income profiles
Tables V.1 and V.2 (at the end of this section) show the basic equations that we use to
predict labour income for individuals in our sample. Estimates are made using all the SHIW
surveys from 1987 to 1995. Individual gross labour income is predicted using a Heckman
two-stage estimate on the survey data.
The first stage is a probit estimate for labour force participation that is consistent with
the generation of labour force characteristics outlined above (see Section IV.4). Here we
consider a number of characteristics of individuals, namely sex, marital status, whether
he/she is the head of the family, the region of residence, the number of other income earners
and the number of children in the family. Cohort dummies are introduced to account for the
secular (positive) trend in the Italian labour force participation, while year dummies account
for the decrease in the labour force in the past few years due to the recession of 1991-93,
which probably increased the number of discouraged workers. All coefficients have plausible
signs.
In the second stage of the estimation procedure, the logarithm of gross labour income
41
is regressed on age, sex, education, region, sector, occupational status and a dummy of
whether he/she is the head of the household (some of these characteristics are interacted with
age and age square terms) and the inverse Mill’s ratio estimated in the first stage.
A well-known problem in estimating the age pattern of earnings using a series of cross-
sectional data is the impossibility (without introducing any restrictions in the specification)
of separating pure age effects from calendar years and cohort-specific effects of productivity
growth. In the first specification that we report in Table V.2 we have simply ignored the
problem and not introduced cohort dummies: in this case cohort effects will be captured by
both age and year dummies. In the second specification we follow the method used by
Deaton and Paxon (1993), imposing the restriction that the calendar year effect is only a
cyclical effect by restricting year dummies to be orthogonal to a time trend, and assuming
that all productivity growth is due either to age or to cohort-specific effects.
                                                                                                                                                                                  
the case of Italy by having information on each family component earner, we have decided to proceed to predict
individuals’ labour incomes. These are then aggregated to obtain the total income of the family.
41 We used labour earnings gross of personal income taxes and inclusive of social security contributions
paid by the employees.80
The explanatory power of both formulations is quite good, with almost half of the total
variance explained. The Mill’s ratio term is always significant, indicating that selection bias
is present. It must be noticed, however, that cohort effects in the second specification take an
unusual pattern indicating lower productivity for younger cohorts. One possible explanation
is that our data set is spread over a period (1987 to 1995) of cyclical downturn, which we are
unable to capture completely with the year dummies. Another plausible possibility is,
however, that the cohort dummies are instead capturing some important features of the
development of the Italian labour market in the recent past: unemployment is highly
concentrated in younger cohorts and new entrants must accept lower wages than their
predecessors. It is clear, however, that cohort-effect estimates over such a short and peculiar
period cannot be taken as an estimate of secular productivity growth. This is why in the
construction of lifetime income and in our simulations we use the first specification and
supplement it with a measure of productivity growth given from outside sources.
In Figure V.1 we show the age profiles of gross labour income implied by the preferred
specification for different types of workers and for different educational levels. In most cases
earnings appear to peak between age 45 and 50. The importance of education for achieving
high income levels in a shorter time is apparent.
42
An alternative specification based on a linear first order auto-regression estimated on
the (gross) income earning histories given in the SHIW panel  (about 4,000 rotating
households) is shown in Table V.3. The regressors are the same as those used in the cross-
section estimate. The implied age profile of labour earnings is very similar to that found
using the previous specification. The effects of some characteristics, such as education, are
also quantitatively similar. The degree of income persistency over time is also relatively
high, with a first-order auto-regressive coefficient of about 0.7. The panel estimate has the
advantage of permitting a dynamic specification of the income-generating process and,
therefore, a better representation of the evolution of earnings over the life of individuals. As
                                                          
42 The logarithmic specification of our income equation yields the best linear unbiased estimates of the
slope coefficients and it is therefore a correct specification if the main focus of study is to obtain estimates of
elasticity terms. However, as Kennedy (1983) points out, the estimate of the intercept term in the logarithmic
specification is biased and, therefore, if one wants to use the equation to make predictions of the dependant
variable in level (especially for out-of-sample predictions, as in our case), one must take the magnitude of the
bias into consideration. We thus compute the bias, which sometimes resulted in an under-prediction as high as
20% (with an average for all individuals of 16%), and adjust for it in the simulation of the model.81
these estimates are still preliminary, however, they are not used in the simulations of the
model shown in this paper.
The regression model predicts gross labour income. From this, net income is
reconstructed by applying legal provisions on personal income taxes and tax credits. As
explained in the Appendix to this study, the method takes account of the main features of
Italian tax legislation as well as the survey information on the structure of the family
(whether the spouse works, the number of young dependants in the family, etc.) when
computing family-related tax credits. It also takes account of tax evasion for some groups of
workers thus generating an aggregate labour tax receipt that is consistent with the total actual
receipts of the government in the base year.
V.2.1.2 The prediction of lifetime individual labour income
We can use the previous estimates to generate a measure for expected lifetime
individual labour income. We proceed as follows.
First, suppose that the distribution of characteristics x years from the current period
faced by an individual aged a whose current characteristics are Fa denoted by Fa+x is given as
fa,x(Fa+x| Fa, a). Then, let y(F,a)=waLa denote the current predicted income from our equation
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g x y(Fa+x, a+x) fa,x(Fa+x| Fa, a) dFa+x (4)
where g is the expected productivity growth.
43
Lifetime individual gross labour income is then defined as:

















where Sa,x is the survival probability from age a to age x (consistent with the mortality rates
used in Section 2), τ  is the age of retirement ρ  the subjective discount rate of the individual.
When attempting to reconstruct net lifetime income from the gross income of the
individual a serious problem is that one needs a prediction of the expected evolution of the
                                                          
43 Note that, in principle, F should include all the right-hand side variables of the equations in Tables V.1
and V.2. For the time being we have taken into consideration only the distribution by age of the occupational
status of the individuals (that is, the probability by age of a white collar worker becoming a manager, and so on)82
tax rates and credits in the future. On the basis of the observation that the average effective
tax rate usually tends to remain stable over the long run (which is certainly the horizon of our
simulations), we adopt the following simplification. The absolute level of tax brackets
corresponding to a given tax rate is increased every year by the rate of productivity growth.
The average effective tax rate for each individual therefore only changes if his/her income
growth differs from the growth of productivity (and thus the average effective rate for the
whole society changes only if the distribution of income changes, which is not an
unreasonable assumption). More complex is the treatment of tax credits related to the
structure of the family, which obviously changes over the life cycle. For the time being, they
are assumed to remain a constant proportion (depending on the structure of each family) of
gross labour income over the life cycle.
V.2.1.3 The prediction of family income and lifetime income
As we have already said, current family labour income is simply computed as the sum
of predicted incomes of all income earners in the family. More complex is the prediction of
families’ lifetime income since it requires an assessment of the time horizon applying to the
family’s decisions. While this is a very familiar problem in the theoretical literature, in the
empirical literature the issue is either ignored or is the object of extreme assumptions. In the
absence of more detailed information, we define (net) family lifetime labour income as the
sum of the net lifetime income of the head of the household and the spouse, plus that of other
family components over 40 years of age, plus the income of younger components computed
over as many years as they are expected to remain with the family. That is, we consider
family components (other than the head of the household and the spouse) over 40 to be
permanent components of the family, while account is taken of the fact that working children
may leave the family. We compute the expected number of years of permanence in the
family consistently with the demographic part of the model, using the probabilities of
marriage and of becoming independent described in Section III. While this is clearly an
approximation that can be improved if any extra information becomes available, we find, as
                                                                                                                                                                                  
while considering all other characteristics time invariant. This is, of course, a major simplification that can be
improved in future versions of the model.83
we will show later, that the resulting pattern by age of the ratio of consumption over total
resources constructed in this way appears to be very plausible.
44
V.3 The estimate of social security wealth
V.3.1 The computation of workers’ social security wealth
In the period covered by our micro data, the Italian social security system incorporated
a number of different schemes covering different types of workers. Moreover, two major
reforms were introduced (in 1992 and 1995).
45 This has forced us to compute the social
security wealth for the individuals in our sample in line with the major schemes and
according to legal provisions for the different cohorts of workers and for each of the survey
years.
Individual social security wealth is computed in a similar manner to Jappelli (1995)
and Visco and Rossi (1995) for the pre-reform system and to Peracchi, Rossi and Venturini
(1996) for the post-reform system. Individuals covered by the old regimes who fall totally or
partially under the new social security regime are recognized according to legal provisions.
Their social security wealth is computed taking account of the different schemes for the
broad groups that we include in the model (workers in the agricultural sector, public
employees, private employees and the self-employed). For the retirement age we make use of
the survey data on expected retirement age described in the next Section; however, we use
legal provisions when the expected retirement age turns out to be less than the minimum age
legally required. Since we use net (of contributions) lifetime income to reconstruct families’
total lifetime resources, social security wealth (relevant for consumption decisions) is
computed on a gross basis as the sum of future benefits, appropriately discounted by
subjective discount rate and survival probabilities.
                                                          
44 If, for example, we do not consider at least part of the future income of working children, a large part
of families in the middle-age groups show very implausible values of the ratio of consumption over total
resources. We will return to this issue in Section V.5.
45 For a detailed description of the Italian social security system until the 1993 reform, see G. Cazzola
(1993) and INPS (1993). Institutional details of the Italian 1995 pension reform are provided in Banca d’Italia
(1995), Peracchi and Rossi (1995), Peracchi, Rossi and Venturini (1995), and Brugiavini (1997). On the
problems affecting the system of public pensions before the reform and the attempts to streamline the system
that were made throughout the first half of the 1990s, see Castellino (1976 and 1994, respectively).84
Specifically, let us define  (,,) P at τ as the social security benefits that an individual
whose age is a in calendar year t expects to receive when he/she retires at age τ  in calendar
year  ) ( a t − + τ .



















+   
=    ++ 	
    (6)
where Sa,n is the survival probability from age a to age n, r the subjective discount rate, gp the
rate of growth of pensions during retirement and T  the maximum possible age (in the
computation we set it to be 105).
In the following we describe how we compute expected social security benefits of
individuals in our sample for the different regimes (before and after the reforms) and for the
different categories of workers.
V.3.1.1 The pre-1992 system and the 1992 reform
The pre-1992 system and the system after the 1992 reform were defined-benefit
systems. Benefits were computed as a proportion (the replacement ratio) of a reference
earning at retirement. This proportion was computed by adding 0.02 for each year of paid
contributions up to a maximum of 0.8 (0.94 for civil servants). The reference earning at
retirement age was computed on the basis of the last five years’ earnings prior to retirement
(extended to the whole working life by the 1992 reform). Pensions were indexed to current
earnings growth before the 1992 reform and to the rate of inflation thereafter.
Let  ) , ( t a y  be the actual labour income of an individual whose age is a in calendar year
t. It is best to interpret “t” as the year in which the survey is conducted and  ) , ( t a y  as the
income generated by the income equation in the model.
For this individual, income at age a + x is
gx e t x a y x t x a y ) , ( ) , ( + = + + (7)
where g again denotes the rate of growth of productivity.85
Under the pre-1992 scheme a reference income at retirement age,  p y , of an individual
whose age is a and who expects to retire at age τ is computed on the basis of his/her earnings
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After 1992, the reference income at retirement is computed on the basis of the average
earnings for the whole working life of the individuals, i.e.:
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Benefits for private dependant workers are then defined by
[] ) ( , ) ( 02 . 0 ) , , ( a t y L t a B p − + − = τ τ τ τ             (10)
where L is the age at which contributions began,
or       [] ) ( , 8 . 0 a t y p − + = τ τ           (11)
whichever is smaller. For public dependant workers, (11) must be replaced by:
[] ) ( , 94 . 0 ) , , ( a t y t a B p − + = τ τ τ           (12)
As mentioned, in the actual computation of benefits the retirement age is set equal to
the expected retirement age as declared by individuals in the Bank of Italy’s surveys.
However, when this is less than the legal required retirement, we do apply the law provision.
Therefore, in the computation τ  = max (expected retirement age, legal age), where legal age =
min (old age, legal years of contribution). Table V.4 gives the minimum age of eligibility for
old-age pension and the minimum number of years of contributions to be paid before a
person becomes eligible for a seniority pension.
As regards the rate of growth of productivity, of pension benefits and the discount rate
we set:
g  = 2%; gp = 2% (0% after the 1992 reform); ρ  = 2%.86
V.3.1.2 The 1995 reform
The 1995 reform changed the Italian social security system into a defined-contributions
system. Each year, paid contributions are capitalized up to the age of retirement using a
capitalization rate equal to a five-year moving average of GDP growth in that year. Pension
benefit flows are then computed by applying a conversion factor (the transformation rate) to
the total amount of (capitalized) contributions.
We first define:
[] [] ,( ) ,( ) C L tL a c y L tL a +− = ⋅ +−                 (13)
[]
() ,( ) ( , )
Lag yLt L a yLt e
− +− = ⋅           (14)
where c is the contribution rate applicable to the individual.
(13) and (14) define the initial contribution for an individual whose current age a at
year t is a<L and start working at age L in year t+(L-a).
Once that individual starts to work, he/she cumulates contributions by the following
recursive formula:
[] [ ] () [] 11 1 11 * C α ,t (α a)C α,t (α a) g c y α ,t (α a) t α a ++− + = +− + + ⋅ ++− + +−                        (15)
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where  j a t g − − + α  is the actual rate of growth of GDP in year  . j a t − − + α
Benefits at retirement age are then given by:
[] ) ( , ) ( a t C B − + = τ τ τ λ           (16)
where  ) (τ λ  is the conversion factor (or transformation rate) that transforms the accumulated
contribution into an annual benefit amount taking into account the life expectancy of the
beneficiary at the retirement age τ . This conversion factor is given in the form of a table for
males and females at various ages of retirement. It is related to life expectancy and87
incorporates a discount rate of 1.5%.
46 Table V.5 shows the legal transformation coefficients
as well as the life expectancy of the insured person and spouse at the age of retirement. The
law states that the coefficients must be reviewed every 10 years and changed accordingly to
the observed changes in mortality rates. The contribution rate, c, is currently 33% for
employees, 20% for self-employed (who actually contribute 15%). In computing  the social
security wealth the rate of growth of pension benefits, gp is set to be equal to 0, while τ  can
be between 57 and 65.
The individuals in our sample are assumed to be under the old (pre-95) regime, or
partially or totally under the new social security regime according to the following rules:
-  New  regime: individuals who started to work after 1993 (post-1995 formula)
-  Old regime: individuals with 18 or more years of contributions in 1995 (pre-1992 or
1992 formula)
-  Partially in the new regime: individuals with fewer than years of contributions in 1995
(pre-1992 or 1992 formula for years of contributions up to 1995 and new post-1995
regime for years of contributions after 1995)
We also consider two aspects of the legal provisions that regulate the transition to the
new regime. First, the minimum legal age of retirement evolves in the simulation according
to Table V.6. Second, the contribution rate paid by the self-employed (on their declared
income) is increased by 0.2 per year starting in 1999, from 15.8% to 19% in 2014. The rate
used for the computation of pension benefits of the self-employed remains fixed at 20%.
V.3.2. The social security wealth of pensioners, survivor’s pensions and aggregation by
family members
Social security wealth for current pensioners in the sample is simply computed by
keeping the current observed net pension constant in real terms for the remaining life
expectancy of the pensioner.
The Italian social security system provides a pension for survivors. This is a fraction of
the pension benefits of the deceased worker or pensioner, which is paid to the surviving
                                                          
46 Actually, the coefficient is expressed as the inverse of the factor of actualization inclusive of the
hypothesis of the pension to the survivor, assuming a three-year difference in age between husband and wife
and taking into account the probability of divorce.88
partner in accordance with the law. In the simulation model the survivor is given a fraction
that takes legal provisions into account.
47
It should be noted that, ideally, the benefit paid to the survivor should enter the formula
for the computation of the social security wealth of workers (equation 6 above), which would
be augmented by the expected value of the future benefits left to the survivor. Hence for
married couples a joint likelihood of death of the worker and survival of the partner should
be computed for each future year, and social security wealth should incorporate the expected
benefits of the survivors according to the legal provisions outlined above.
48 In the present
version of the model we ignore this issue, which should be tackled in future developments of
the model.
Finally, the family total social security wealth is simply defined as the sum of the social
security wealth of the head of the household and the spouse.
V.3.3.  Social security wealth before and after the reforms
In Table V.7 we show the level (at 1995 prices) of gross social security wealth,
computed using the parameters indicated above, for different cohorts of workers using all the
survey data from 1989 to 1995 (data re-proportioned to the National Accounts). The average
per capita gross social security wealth of the Italian family sector amounted to 394 million
lire (about 13.7 times the net labour earnings in our sample). After the reforms of 1993 and
1995 the amount was reduced to 324 million lire (about 11.2 times the average net labour
earnings). This remarkable reduction was clearly unequally distributed among the different
cohorts of workers: for older cohorts the impact was essentially due only to the abolition of
the indexation of pensions to salary growth, while younger cohorts also suffered the effects
of the change in the computation of benefits. The total loss of cohorts of workers born in the
1960s reaches almost 25%.
                                                          
47 In particular, the survivor is granted 60% of the pension benefit of the deceased person (insured
pensioner or worker). This fraction is incremented by a further 20% for each dependant child, up to a maximum
of 100%. The benefit paid to the survivor is reduced by 25% if he/she receives an income that is more than
three times the minimum pension benefit. This reduction increases to 40% or to 50% respectively if the income
of the survivor is greater than four or five times the minimum pension.
48 Venturini (1998) computes the social security wealth for individuals in the BSIW survey following this
procedure.89
V.4 The decision to retire
V.4.1 Introduction
The choice of retirement age of working individuals is a key variable in our model
since it is crucial in determining individuals’ lifetime income and pension benefit claims and
therefore their saving behaviour throughout their life. In this section we will try to give an
appropriate representation of this choice by determining demographic factors and economic
incentives that affect the decision to retire.
Over the past few decades, in Italy there have been large differences in individual
retirement decisions and an increasing disappearance of older people from the labour force.
Participation rates dropped between 1958 and 1994 from 90% to 70% in the 50-60 age group
and from 60% to 30% in the 60-64 age group. Recent studies document the close link
between retirement decision and the economic incentives to retire provided by the various
social security schemes.
49 First of all, the public social security schemes provide virtually all
retirement income, since pension funds and private annuities play only a very marginal role
in Italy. Second, replacement rates have been, on average, very high. Third, the existence of
provisions for early retirement, with no actuarial penalty, greatly distort choices in favour of
early retirement. Therefore, the reform of the social security system undertaken in recent
years and summarized in the previous section is very likely to have considerable impact on
individual choices. It is therefore crucial for our purposes to be able to quantify possible
responses and endogenize retirement decisions in our model.
The issues outlined above can be explored in some detail by looking at the information
contained in the micro data of the SHIW.
Information on the planned retirement age of workers in the labour force is available in
the SHIW survey data for 1989 for all people in the labour force. In Table V.8 we tabulate
the distribution of the planned retirement age for various groups of individuals. Several
spikes in the distribution can be observed for all the groups considered: at age 55, at age 60,
and at age 65.
50 The first peak corresponds to the normal retirement age for women (before
1992) in the private sector and to recipients of early-retirement provisions; the second spike
                                                          
49 See Brugiavini (1997) for a comprehensive discussion of this topic for Italy.
50 It is noticeable that the planned retirement age for the various groups matches fairly closely the
distribution of the retirement age observed from labour force statistics and is consistent with the hazard function
of the labour force estimated from panel data (see Brugiavini, op cit.).90
corresponds to the normal retirement age for males in the private sector. The last peak at age
65 occurs because, even when retirement is not mandatory, there is virtually no possibility
for dependant workers to work beyond the age of 65. A large variance in planned individual
decisions can also be observed. Women expect to work shorter years than men (they have
more favourable early retirement provisions, as we saw in the previous paragraph); self-
employed people and managers in the private sector expect to retire later than the other
groups (there is a non-negligible proportion of self-employed people who plan to retire after
the age of 65); public employees plan to retire relatively earlier than other workers.
In Table V.9 we tabulate the average planned age of retirement for different age groups
and for different years. A clear pattern can be seen in the figures: individuals up to age 45
tend to raise their planned age of retirement after 1993, probably in response to the decrease
in expected pension benefits because of the reform. Older workers (less affected by the
reforms, as explained above) instead revise their plans downwards, possibly prompted by the
fear of further future interventions affecting early-retirement provisions.
As a first measure of economic incentives for retirement induced by the social security
system, in Table V.10 we compute the internal rate of return (IRR) of the social security
system for different pension schemes. This is the rate that equalizes, in expected value terms,
the flow of benefits and the flow of contributions paid. The IRR depends on all the
institutional parameters of the different social security schemes described above, on the
projected rate of growth of salaries in the various groups, and on the expected retirement age.
Since before the reform the value of benefits was unrelated to the life expectancy of the
individual, the IRR is also clearly a function of the age at which people started to work, with
early starts enjoying larger benefits. We have computed the IRR for a fixed number of years
of activity (37 years), assuming a productivity growth of 2% per annum. Clearly, a large
variety of individual rates of return existed before the 1995 reform. After the 1995 reform the
IRR tends to be equal to the rate of growth of GDP for everyone, as explained before. This,
in turn, suggests that a likely effect of the reform is, coeteris paribus, to increase the age of
retirement, since the IRRs of the previous schemes were, on average, well above any forecast
rate of trend GDP growth (while also reducing the variance of individual choices).
A second measure of economic incentives is tabulated in Table V.11, in which
replacement rates and the tax/subsidy rate of the social security system are reported for a91
typical worker in the private sector who started to work at the age of 20. The social security
tax/subsidy rate is computed as the ratio of the absolute change in the present value (at the
year of retirement) of net social security wealth from working one extra year and the net
potential income (including social security contributions) from working one extra year. This
measure can be interpreted as an implicit tax in terms of social security entitlement loss on
an additional year of work via social security entitlements. Even if this is a rough
computation (we are not considering benefits paid to the survivor or the personal income tax
structure, and we are assuming that complete earning histories exist)
51 the loss, in terms of
foregone benefits, of working any extra years above the required minimum is apparent.
V.4.2 Regression analysis of retirement decisions
We develop two possible alternative methods of modelling the retirement behaviour of
individuals. A first solution uses a measure of the expected age of retirement available in our
original survey data and estimates a behavioural equation calculated on the basis of the cross-
sectional sample. The information on the expected age of retirement embodies individual
preferences and can help to identify the relevant behavioural response. In calculating this
reduced-form behavioural equation, we can take advantage of the large variability of
individual situations existing in our data, both in a cross-section dimension (large number of
different social security schemes) and across time (because of the reforms that have taken
place in recent years, as described in the previous section).
We also report the preliminary results of an alternative approach based on the estimate
of a hazard model of retirement (of the kind first used by Diamond and Hausmann, 1984) for
older workers, using the panel dimension of our survey data. This method has the advantage
that information affecting individual decisions can be updated in a natural way as time
elapses.
52
                                                          
51 Brugiavini, op cit., presents a careful computation of the social security implicit tax/subsidy for the
Italian private sector, taking into account, in a variety of different cases, the personal income tax structure and
pensions paid to the survivor. The figures are close to those presented here.
52 Stock and Wise (1988) show that the hazard model has a natural interpretation in terms of utility
maximization and represents a particular (restricted) case of the more general option value model.92
V.4.2.1 Estimates based on information on the expected age of retirement
The regression analysis is presented in Table V.12, where we show a number of
alternative specifications of individual retirement decisions. The first column of the table
presents a set of estimates of the (log of) planned retirement income against “age invariant”
characteristics, in which we also include dummies for occupational status and sector of
work.
53 Year dummies after 1992 (the year of the first reform) are negative, probably
capturing an effect of anticipation of retirement by older workers driven by the fear of further
restrictions to early-retirement provisions. Coefficients on cohort dummies present a hump-
shaped pattern. This reflects the secular trend of a declining age of retirement in Italy up to
the generation born in 1945-50; the reversal of the shape also captures the fact that the age at
which people start to work has increased regularly for younger cohorts. Education is clearly
important: a worker with a degree will retire, other things being equal, two years later than a
worker with no degree. The self-employed tend to work longer, while workers in the public
sector work fewer years.
The second column of the table introduces (the log of) the IRR in the regression as a
measure of the economic incentives provided by the various schemes. There is a clear
improvement in the fit of the equation. The estimated elasticity with respect to the IRR of 3.5
implies that a one-percentage-point reduction in the IRR (or GDP growth under the new
regime) will induce, coeteris paribus, an increase in the retirement age of about 2.5 years in
the sample average.
As an alternative measure of economic incentives, in the last column we use (the log
of) the ratio of expected social security wealth of working up to age 60 to normal earnings,
computed for each individual in our sample according to the rules described in the previous
paragraph. Compared with the IRR, this measure has the advantage of being forward-
looking, reflecting expectations of individuals about future earnings, future pension benefits
and life expectancy. The coefficient turns out to be significant and with the expected
negative sign.
54 The implied elasticity of the age 60 social security wealth is, however,
                                                          
53 Implicitly, we are considering groups in the population to be exogenously determined so that
membership of a group can be interpreted as an instrument (control). This assumption is not necessarily true,
however.
54 It is interesting to note that the coefficient of the self-employed dummy reverses its sign. This reflects
the fact that although this group usually has a very high IRR, it also has a very low ratio of social security93
somewhat smaller compared with that found using the IRR. A one-percentage-point
reduction in the IRR implies, on average, a reduction in the ratio of social security wealth to
normal earnings of slightly less than 20%, inducing an average increase in the planned
retirement age of 0.8 years.
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In the simulation model we use this last specification to attribute the retirement age to
all new entrants in the labour force.
It has to be recognized, however, that both economic incentives and personal
characteristics can vary with age and can affect the decision to take retirement or induce
people to revise their plans. For example, a sudden drop in (expected) income might reduce
the economic incentive to work as opposed to the decision to retire. The latter decision is
also likely to be a joint decision within the family if other family members (partners) are
working; each member’s decision will therefore be a function of the relevant variables
affecting the others. Changes in family composition might also exert important effects. For
example, the presence of young dependants in the family can lead the ageing head of the
household to postpone his/her retirement. Table V.13 shows the existence in our sample of a
clear positive correlation between the planned age of retirement and the number of young
dependants present in the family. The correlation increases when we restrict our attention to
adult young dependants (over 18 years of age). The presence of young dependants can, in
fact, lead parents either to accumulate more wealth during their working life, to retire later,
or both. Clearly, the response will rest more heavily on the retirement decision when the
difference in age between parents and children is relatively high and the children were, at
least partially, unexpected, or when unforeseen and uninsurable risk such as unemployment
affects particularly young individuals (as in the case of Italy).
In order to allow people to revise their plans in our simulation model in response to
changing economic and demographic conditions, we produce a second set of equations that
include some of these age-variant characteristics, restricting our sample to people in the
labour force aged over 50. The results are shown in Table  V.14. We introduce in the
                                                                                                                                                                                  
wealth over income because a large part of self-employment income is not reported to the fiscal authorities as a
result of tax evasion (see the Appendix). Therefore, social security wealth is relatively unimportant for this
group.
55 This sizeable difference in estimated elasticity might be attributable to the fact that the social security
wealth measure is more uncertain, especially for young people; the difference tends to disappear when the
sample is restricted to older people who are closer to retirement (see below).94
regression the (log of) real family wealth, a dummy for marital status (1 = married), dummies
for the number of young dependants in the family interacted with the age of the head of the
household, dummies for the number of income earners (in addition to the head of the
household) and an inverse Mill’s ratio term (from a probit estimate of the probability of
being in the labour force for this group) to correct for a self-selectivity bias. The real wealth
of a family emerges with a significant (but quite small) negative coefficient. The sign is not
clear a priori, as the variable is evidently endogenous because individuals who plan to retire
early might very well accumulate greater wealth.
56 Dummies for the number of income
earners in the family show the expected negative sign and are statistically significant. The
presence of young dependants in the family appears to increase the planned retirement age
and the effect is more marked the greater the difference in age between the head and the
dependant, confirming the analysis of the raw data above even if the effect is somewhat
smaller than might have been expected on that basis alone.
Measures of incentives provided by the social security system are significant and have
the expected negative sign, as in the set of regressions above. It is to be noted that the ratio of
expected social security wealth (at age 60) over income (see column 4 of Table V.14) now
presents an elasticity of -0.16 (about three times that estimated across the whole sample),
which is now comparable with that given by the IRR measure. In addition, the fit of the
equation is clearly improved when using this measure of incentives, underlining the
importance of introducing forward-looking variables into the specification. Finally, we have
added, in the regression for husbands and wives, their respective expected social security
wealth as a ratio of total family income among the arguments of their planned retirement age
specification. While the coefficients emerge with the expected (negative) sign, their effect
seems to be minor.
                                                          
56 See the discussion in Diamond and Hausmann (1984) on this point. To account for the possible
endogeneity of wealth we re-estimated the equation using an instrumental variable type of estimator. When this
is done, the sign of the estimated coefficient turns positive, meaning that the estimation is capturing essentially
the “reverse causation” from early retirement to higher saving and missing the effect of wealth on retirement. In
addition, other coefficients of the regression pick up fairly unplausible values. This somewhat unsatisfactory
result might, of course, be due to the well-known fact that it is very hard to find appropriate instruments for
wealth accumulation.95
In the simulation model we choose to use the specification in column 3 to allow people
to revise their planned retirement age when they become older (over 50) and up to the
minimum required retirement age (which will be 57 under the new system).
V.4.2.2 A hazard model of retirement estimated on panel data
The second alternative is to model the choice of retirement age using the framework of
the continuous time hazard model.
57 In contrast to the regression analysis based on the
expected age of retirement, in the hazard formulation we follow individuals as they age,
using the panel dimension of our survey data, and observe their actual retirement behaviour.
This framework allows information affecting the retirement decision to be updated as time
passes. In particular, it allows the marginal incentive to retire provided by the social security
system to be taken into account. Here we describe some preliminary results from this
method.
Let the instantaneous hazard rate of retirement for an individual who has not yet
retired, θ t, be expressed as a function of age, a set of time varying variables be Zt, and a set of
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The hazard model of retirement is estimated on the panel of the SHIW for the years
from 1989 to 1995. We select people in the labour force aged 50 or over. After some
cleaning up of the data, the final sample contains 1,219 subjects (all observed over at least
two consecutive years), of whom 351 actually retire in the period under observation. The
time-varying vector Zt in (17) contains economic variables aimed at capturing the economic
incentive to start retirement: the ratio of social security wealth to permanent income
(SSWY), the ratio of accumulated assets to permanent income (WY), and the value of
postponing retirement by one year as a ratio of the next year’s income (VWY). The
numerator of this variable (borrowed from the option value model) represents the monetary
value of postponing retirement by one year, were a person to work for an extra year and then
retire (evaluated at the beginning of the period t):
                                                          
57 See Hausmann and Wise (1985), Diamond and Wise (1984) and a large body of subsequent literature. Stock and
Wise (1988) have shown that the hazard model has a natural interpretation in terms of utility maximization and represents a
particular (restricted) case of the more general option value model.96
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where β  = (1/(1+ρ )), k is a parameter indicating the relative weight given to earnings while
working with respect to earnings while in retirement and other variables as defined above.
The value of the expected change in social security wealth from age 50 to 68 for the average
of the panel and for some specific categories of individuals is shown in Table V.15. The
figures are comparable to those given by Brugiavini (1997) and suggest that the loss in social
security benefits becomes substantial as people reach their late 50s.
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The results of the estimates of the hazard model of retirement are given in Table V.16.
Age is expressed as age minus 49. All variables present the expected signs and are generally
statistically significant. A higher ratio of social security wealth to permanent income
increases the probability of retirement, while an increase in the gain from working an extra
year prolongs work. The effect of the ratio of social security wealth to permanent income is
substantial but less marked than that found using the previous method: a decline of 10% in
the ratio would imply an increase in the expected age of retirement of approximately half a
year at age 60.
59 However, the results imply that an increase of 10% in the value of
postponing retirement would increase the expected age of retirement by only about one
month. Other variables have qualitatively the same effects as found in the previous analysis
based on the expected retirement age.
We estimate the hazard model using different values of k. The likelihood reaches a
maximum for k=1.3, but is substantially flat in the range from 1 to 1.5.
V.5 The consumption and saving behaviour of households
V.5.1 Age pattern of the ratio of households’ consumption to total resources
Before coming to our empirical specification of the rule of consumption behaviour, we
need to see whether our reconstruction of total resources for the households in our sample is
                                                          
58 However, since the SHIW provides only the age of the start of the individuals’ working life the estimates might
overstate the average loss due to social security provisions, since they do not take account of the possibility of gaps in the
working life of individuals.
59 The calculation is based on the fact that if 
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 then the expected age of retirement τ  is given by
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plausible or not. For this purpose, we reconstruct the ratio of C(a)/TR(a) for each age and for
various family-type definitions. The results are shown in Figures  V.2 and V.3. An
implication of the life-cycle hypothesis and of the solution of the problem presented in (1)-
(4) at the beginning of this Section is that, on the basis of standard preference assumptions,
this ratio should be smooth and well-behaved over age. As we can see from Figure V.2, this
seems in fact to be the case for our reconstructed average ratio for all groups of families: it
increases steadily up to about age 70 and increases rapidly thereafter. We can see that the
value of the ratio seems to be large, just rising from below 0.2 at age 20 (when life
expectancy is around 55) to 0.9 at age 80 (when life expectancy is around 10).
The pattern of the ratio of consumption to total resources over age is also reasonably
well-behaved for different groups of families (Figure V.3), even if the use of cross-section
data can be misleading in this respect, since a single household can belong to different
groups of families over its lifetime. With this word of caution, some differences emerge in
the pattern of different groups, particularly after age 55. A much lower value of the ratio is
noticeable for non-nuclear families (both couples and single-head families), especially
around age 50 to 65. This might be surprising as those families have, on average, a larger
number of components than other families. After some investigation we can explain this fact
by the presence of more income earners in those families compared with the other groups,
and their concentration in families whose head is aged between 50 and 65. Because in our
formulation young working children contribute with part of their lifetime income to the total
resources available to the families, the total resources for these groups are relatively high,
while the presence of economies of scales means that consumption is proportionally lower.
60
Singles present a much steeper pattern of the ratio of consumption over total resources
after age 50 than other families, probably reflecting the absence of economies of scale in
consumption and/or the absence of incentives to accumulate wealth for inter-vivos transfers
of bequests to children. Single-head families present the noisiest pattern, probably because of
the large number of in and out movements for this group.
Another feature of the data worth noting is the pattern of the ratio of consumption over
total resources for families in the same age group, along the distribution of total resources for
                                                          
60  In the regression analysis below, we investigate further the issue of what is the relevant horizon for
decisions in families where several generations coexist.98
the same age group. As shown in Table V.17, the ratio clearly tends to decrease as we move
towards the top of the distribution. This fact is very often found in micro data (but very often
left unexplained). It might be due to a relative income effect of the Duesenberry (1952) type
(or to a “catching up with the Jones’ effect). Or more simply, it might reflect the fact that
poorer households are on a kink in the optimal solution to their maximization problem and it
is impossible for them to leave a bequest, while richer households can leave their planned
bequests. We have investigated this matter and tried to quantify this effect in the estimation
of our consumption rule.
V.5.2 Empirical estimates of the consumption rule
We can now turn to the empirical specification of the consumption rule described in
equation (5) in Section V.1. After some investigation we find that the specification that could
satisfactorily describe the behaviour of all families in our sample is of the kind:
/( , , ) ( ) ( )( ) ac c CT R i F a f a b F D F =+            (19)
where fc(a) is an increasing function of age (which we approximate by a spline in age), Dc(F)
is a set of one-zero dummies indicating the presence or the absence of a characteristic
represented by one component of F, and b(F) are coefficients.
The results of some alternative estimates of (19) are reported in Table V.18.
Overall, the explanatory power of the equations is satisfactory, with around 40% of the
total variance explained by the regression. Coefficients generally have the expected sign and
are significant. The constant (estimated at around 0.045) represents the ratio of consumption
over total resources of a nuclear couple without children whose head is aged 20. The age
spline fits the average pattern of the C(a)/TR(a) ratio over age fairly well (see Figure V.4),
even if some of its terms are not statistically significant.
Some features of the estimated equation merit a more careful interpretation. Dummies
for the number of children have the expected pattern for families whose head is relatively
young (up to 45 years), with each extra child contributing a decreasing amount of additional
consumption, indicating the presence of economies of scale in the number of children.
However, surprisingly we find that this pattern is reversed as the head of the family becomes
older (this feature is captured by interacting the dummies for the number of children with the
age of the head; the resulting terms are strongly significant in the regression). A possible99
explanation, already mentioned, may be that after age 50 the heads of families with young
children tend to expect to retire much later than people with no children or with relatively
older children (this was confirmed by our estimations of the determinants of the retirement
age). Delaying retirement owing to the presence of young children in families in which the
head is relatively old tends, according to our estimates, to increase the total resources
available to the family by more than the increase in consumption due to the presence of
children, the net result being a decrease in the ratio of consumption over total resources. We
believe that this effect, which might be due to the need to accumulate resources to invest in
children’s education (which is likely to increase as the children grow), is probably important
in the current Italian context where younger generations have considerably postponed the
start of reproductive life (see Section II).
The effect of the presence of additional adults in the family is twofold. On the one
hand, they certainly make an important contribution to the total consumption of the family;
on the other hand, they might also contribute in a significant manner to its total resources,
tending, therefore, to reduce the C(a)/TR(a) ratio. We are able to separate these effects by
introducing dummies for the number of income earners in the family along with dummies for
the presence of adult members. Having done that, the effect of additional adults in the family
looks very plausible.
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We introduce a set of additional dummies related to the family structure. We have
already documented in Section II that, other things being equal, single persons living alone
have a higher consumption-income ratio than similar individuals living with other families
(e.g. parents); this feature is confirmed by our estimates. In addition, as we have already
described, non-nuclear families (single-head or parent families) tend to have, ceteris paribus,
a lower consumption over total resources ratio. As we have already argued, in addition to the
combined effect of the presence of more income earners in these types of families and the
effect of economies of scale on consumption, this result might very well be due to the fact
                                                          
61 The strong negative effect on the ratio of consumption to total resources exerted by each additional
income earner might be related to the fact that families with more income earners are relatively richer; and thus
related to the observation, clearly present in our data and documented in the introduction, that richer families
tend to save more. This presumption is confirmed by the fact that when we introduce a variable capturing the
distributional effect (the variable dr in the second column of Table V.18, which will be explained below) the
negative effect produced by the number of income earner dummies is substantially reduced and implies a net
reduction in the C(a)/TR(a) ratio of the family for any additional working adult.100
that the time horizon for these kinds of families implicitly assumed so far (that is, that of the
head of the family) is in fact incorrectly chosen. Their saving behaviour might simply reflect
the fact that there are younger people accumulating wealth while living within the original
family. Since, of course, in the data we cannot distinguish individual behaviours for
consumption and wealth accumulation within a family, it is hard to give a definite answer to
the problem. However, we perform a different set of estimates, in which we redefine the age
of the head of the family as a weighted average of the ages of all income earners (using their
relative incomes as weights). This modification does not appear to make any substantial
improvement in the explanatory power of the equation.
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We perform a number of experiments to try to capture a “distributional effect” (rich
families save more) in saving behaviour. We divide the sample by age group and compute
for each observation in a given age group a spline of the form:
dr(i,a) = 0 if TR(i,a) <= TRp(a)
dr(i,a) = (TR(i,a)-TRp(a))/TR(i,a) if TR(i,a) > TRp(a)
where TRp(a) is the value of the p
th percentile in the distribution of TR of the age class a.
We tried different percentiles as threshold values. In column 2 of Table V.18 the
dummy dr is constructed using the 50
th percentile as the threshold value. The coefficient is
strongly significant and the improvement in the explanatory power of the equation is
remarkable. The implied pattern of the propensity to consume (out of total resources) by total
resource percentiles for households of various age groups is depicted in Figure V.5. It is
noticeable that the estimated profile tends to become steeper for older (heads of) households.
Columns 3, 4 and 5 of Table V.18 report the results of estimates where the current
disposable income of families is added to the basic equation as an explanatory variable,
consistently with the literature on capital market imperfections and the presence of
households with liquidity constraints. This has been shown to be important in Italy since
                                                          
62 We also try to investigate the case in which we define the head of the household as the individual
earning the highest income. In some cases this means making a substantial change to the age pattern of the ratio
of consumption to total resources for non-nuclear families because in such families the younger people often
earn more than their parents. Again, we do not find strong evidence of an improvement in the explanatory
performance of our consumption equation. The problem might be due to the fact that households that are
reclassified as younger usually have much higher income-wealth ratios than the average for their age groups,
creating a potential problem in the opposite direction to the original one.101
capital markets are less developed (especially for credit to consumption) compared with
other developed countries.
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In column 3, the introduction of current disposable income (as a ratio of total
resources) improves the fit of the equation; its size is extremely large (0.77), while the
constant term (that is, the propensity to consume as a proportion of total resources becomes
very small and not statistically significant). This result, however, might just reflect the
possible endogeneity of current disposable income. In column 4 we use all the arguments
present in the labour income equation plus variables relating to the value of houses owned
used as instrumental variables for current disposable income (for renters we use the value of
the rent). The equation now changes dramatically and the coefficient of disposable income
assumes an implausible size (about 1.2), clearly an indication of the endogeneity of current
income. In the last column we introduce the current disposable income variable only for
those households that are most likely to be liquidity constrained, defined, quite arbitrarily, as
households (with a head under 60 years of age) reporting a particularly low asset over current
income ratio (we have tried different threshold values; the estimation reported is for
households with a ratio of 0.15 or less).
64 The resulting estimate is quite satisfactory, with a
coefficient on current income of 0.3.
However, given the uncertainty and the arbitrary assumption involved, we have
decided not to use a specification of the consumption equation that includes the current
income variable in the simulation set of the model presented here, which uses instead the
specification in column 2 of Table V.18.
V.6 The evolution of total wealth
V.6.1 Families’ saving and the next period initial wealth
The model is finally “closed” with the computation of families’ saving and their next
period initial wealth. Families’ saving is computed as the difference between (predicted)
disposable income and consumption. Disposable income is computed as the sum of labour
income, transfers (pensions and unemployment benefits) and interest income (computed by
                                                          
63 See Guiso, Jappelli and Terlizzese (1994) and Nicoletti-Altimari and Thomson (1995).
64 See Hayashi (1985) and Zeldes (1989).102
applying a constant interest rate to total initial wealth). Finally, next period initial wealth is
computed simply as the sum of the current period initial wealth and saving.
V.6.2 Transfers of wealth between households
Our demographic process gives rise to the creation of new households and to the
dissolution of others, and this process necessarily entails a change in the net worth of the
original and resulting households. While the main reason for changes in the net wealth of a
given household in our model comes from the accumulation of assets resulting from savings
as described in the previous section, we cannot avoid tackling the issue of the transfer of
wealth between households that occurs after some demographic events. This is necessary
both because we need to ensure consistency in the process governing the evolution of wealth
for the society as a whole and because we want to maintain a plausible distribution of wealth
by age and within the same age groups across households.
However, we must recognize that very little information exists, in the survey or in
outside sources, on bequests and, even more, on inter-vivos transfers between households.
While we admit that the whole issue deserves a much more careful analysis, for the time
being we make use of simple rules of thumb, leaving a more rigorous strategy for future
research. The simple rules given below represent parameters of the model that can be
changed when new or better information becomes available.
The demographic events that give rise to a transfer of wealth in our model are: (a) the
death of the head of the household (bequests); (b) marriage; (c) divorce; (d) young
dependants becoming independent; (e) the merging of different households.
V.6.2.1  Bequests
Since our empirical consumption decision rule does not necessarily imply that people
consume all their resources during their lifetime we must handle the issue of bequests from
older to younger generations.
We conventionally attach the wealth of every family to the family head, so that we
have to tackle the issue of bequest only after the death of the head. When this event occurs
we distinguish two cases: there are other persons in the family or the deceased was alone.103
In the first case, when a new head of the family can be identified we simply transfer the
whole wealth to the new head; if no head is present, that is, there are only children under age
18, then we merge them with a different family (see Section  III.4.4) and apply the rule
governing transfers when different families merge, as explained below.
In the second case, if there are no other persons in the family, and since we do not
know whether there are children living away from home or who they are in the original
sample, we need to apply a more complex mechanism. We pool the wealth of all deceased
individuals of a given age and redistribute it to other families according to the distribution of
potential children that the female spouse could have had with the average risk of fertility
during her childbearing years. That is, assuming average fertility for the female spouse (if the
deceased was a male we infer the age of the potential spouse by applying the average age
gap), we obtain the average number and the ages of potential children. We then allocate the
bequests proportionally to all the heads of households in those age groups.
This method, and especially the first step where we do not recognize that, even if there
are other persons in the family, there might be other relatives living away from home, clearly
forces a more equal distribution of wealth within cohorts than that observed in the data and
implies an asymmetric treatment of children who leave the household before the death of the
head. To partially overcome this problem we assign a (quite substantial, as described below)
proportion of wealth of the original family to individuals who leave the households to marry
or to become independent. (Alternatively, we could have allocated part of the bequest outside
the family in the first case, following the same method used in the second).
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V.6.2.2  Wealth transfers to marrying people
In the case of two singles living alone before marrying, the wealth of the resulting
family will simply be the sum of the wealth of the two original families. When, however, one
or both of them comes from another family we do not know what their wealth is (since in the
survey wealth is assigned to the household and not to individual members). Moreover, we all
                                                          
65 Another interesting possibility would be to simulate the model for a long period, say 100 years,
keeping track of all the relations among the families so as to be able to identify the children living away from
home when somebody dies, and then apply legal provisions for bequest to allocate wealth. While this might be
an important application of the model in order to study, for example, the distributive consequences of different
schemes or legal provisions for bequest, it has the inconvenient feature that it would imply a modification of all
the initial demographic conditions of the sample, which are crucial for the goals of the present study.104
know from casual observation that there are substantial transfers of wealth from relatives (or
friends) on occasions such as marriage. We then proceed as follows: we attribute a
proportion equal to 1/3 of the original family’s wealth to children and assign to the marrying
person a part proportional to the number of children present in the family (that is, if there are,
say, two children, the marrying children will receive 1/6 of the total wealth of the family).
The wealth of the new family formed by marriage is simply the sum of the wealth of the two
marrying individuals.
V.6.2.3  Wealth transfers to children leaving home
The formation of single households does not necessarily imply a transfer of wealth
from the original family to the new one. However, when we observe the net worth of young
individuals living alone we note that their holding of wealth is non-trivial even if their
savings are quite low. This means that some degree of wealth transfer takes place at this
stage (not necessarily in cash). We use here the same rule that we used for marriage (i.e., a
proportion of the wealth of the original family equal to 1/3 times the inverse of the number of
children). While this amount may appear relatively large, we adopt it to offset the
asymmetric treatment of children who leave their family before the death of the head and
who do not directly receive bequests from the original family.
V.6.2.4  Wealth transfers after divorce
Here we distinguish between the case in which there are children present in the family
and when there are none. If there are no children present, each spouse is assumed to keep 1/2
of the family wealth. If there are children present, two thirds of the wealth is given to the
parent to whom the children are assigned, and the remaining 1/3 to the new single household.
V.6.2.5  Wealth of merging households
This is the case of old people merging with younger households or young unattached
children merging with older households after their parents’ death. The wealth of the new
household thus formed is simply the sum of the wealth of the two original households.Section V - Charts  and Tables
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age 70Table V.1: Probit equation for labour force participation
(1987-1989-1991-1993-1995 SHIW data)







no. earners: 2  1.52 0.017
no. earners: 3 or more 1.89 0.021
no. children: 1 0.18 0.021
no. children: 2 0.25 0.024














No. of observations 67150
Pseudo R2 0.46
Notes:  Variables are dummies set equal to 1 when the characteristic is satisfied.
c1-c9 are 5 years successive cohort dummies: c1: born between 1920 and 1924; c2: born between 1925 and 1929; etc.Table V.2: Labour income forecast equation
(dependant variable: log of labour income)
(Cross-section estimates; robust standard errors)
w/o cohorts dummies with cohort dummies
Variable Coefficient Std. error Coefficient Std. error Variable Coefficient Std. error
d89 0.035 0.0077
d91 0.132 0.0078 0.116 0.0049 c1 0.114 0.0169
d93 -0.001 0.0096 -0.002 0.006 c2 0.149 0.0207
d95 -0.073 0.0097 -0.054 0.0044 c3 0.161 0.0245
elementary 0.305 0.0273 0.307 0.0274 c4 0.182 0.0277
high school 0.466 0.0281 0.466 0.0282 c5 0.2 0.0301
university -0.629 0.1905 -0.733 0.1926 c6 0.2 0.0324
clerk 0.184 0.0078 0.185 0.0078 c7 0.213 0.0354
manager 0.057 0.1601 0.032 0.1602 c8 0.243 0.0406
self-employed 0.562 0.1203 0.525 0.1212 c9 0.279 0.0508
private sector 0.058 0.1085 0.071 0.1092
centre 0.144 0.0082 0.144 0.0082
north 0.259 0.0075 0.26 0.0076
male -0.239 0.0951 -0.205 0.0959
head 1.153 0.1018 0.939 0.1114
part-time -0.273 0.0239 -0.275 0.0238
Mill's ratio -0.049 0.0047 -0.05 0.0048
age 0.052 0.0062 0.035 0.0073
university (*) 0.049 0.0089 0.054 0.009
manager (*) 0.013 0.0078 0.015 0.0078
self-employed (*) 0.016 0.0059 0.018 0.006
public (*) 0.013 0.002 0.013 0.002
private sector (*) 0.011 0.0057 0.01 0.0058
male (*) 0.026 0.0052 0.024 0.0052
head (*) -0.045 0.0054 -0.034 0.0059
age squared -0.001 0.0001 -0.0004 0.00009
university (**) -0.0004 0.0001 -0.0004 0.0001
manager (**) -0.0001 0.0001 -0.0001 0.00009
self-employed (**) -0.0001 0.0001 -0.0002 0.00007
public (**) -0.00005 0.00004 -0.0001 0.00004
private sector (**) -0.00007 0.00007 -0.0001 0.00007
male (**) -0.0002 0.00007 -0.0002 0.00007
head (**) 0.0004 0.00007 0.0003 0.00007
constant 8.012 0.1178 8.288 0.1329
No. of observations 43412 43412
R-squared 0.44 0.44
(*) interacted with age; (**) interacted with age squared.
(^) years dummies are constrained to be orthogonal to a time trend.
 Notes: Variables are dummies set equal to 1 when the characteristic is satisfied. c1-c9 are cohort dummies, see Table V.1.Table V.3: Labour income forecast equation
  (Panel regression; dependent variable: logarithm of labor income)
Variable Coefficient Standard error
Elementary 0.3326 0.0469
High school 0.4735 0.0482
College degree -0.3220 0.2840
Clerk 0.1979 0.0159
Manager 0.4437 0.3073
Self employed 0.6029 0.1630








College degree 0.0369 0.0132
Manager -0.0057 0.0148
Self employed 0.0032 0.0080
Public sector 0.0122 0.0033
Private sector 0.0181 0.0095
Male 0.0268 0.0082
Head of household -0.0319 0.0086
Age squared -0.0002 0.0001
Interacted with age squared:
College degree -0.0003 0.0002
Manager 0.0001 0.0002
Self employed -0.0001 0.0001
Public sector -0.0001 0.0001
Private sector -0.0002 0.0001
Male -0.0003 0.0001
Head of household 0.0003 0.0001
Constant 8.6846 0.2096
Autoregressive term 0.6601 0.1262
SEE 0.45
No of observations 13469
Notes: Variables are dummies set equal to 1 when the characteristic is satisfied.Table V.4: Minimum age of retirement or minimum years of contributions
Old age Years of
contributions
M           F M               F
Private employees 60          55 35             35
Public employees 65          65 20             20
Self-employed 65          60 35             35
Table V.5: Coefficients of transformation
Age Life expectancy Lambda
Insured Partner %
57 20.76 28.28 4.72
58 19.97 27.41 4.86
59 19.19 26.52 5.006
60 18.42 25.64 5.163
61 17.68 24.76 5.334
62 16.94 23.88 5.514
63 16.22 23.01 5.706
64 15.52 22.13 5.901
65 14.84 21.27 6.136
Table V.6: Evolution of age and years of seniority for pension entitlement
Dependant workers
Age with 35 years of contributions Years of seniority
Year Private Public
1996 52 52 36
1997 53 53 36
1998 54 53 36
1999 55 53 37
2000 56 54 37
2001 57 55 37
2002 57 55 37
2003 57 56 37
2004 57 57 38
2005 57 57 38
2006 57 57 38
2007 57 57 39
2008 57 57 40
Self-employed
From 1998 40 58Table V.7: Average expected gross social security wealth by cohort
(estimates based on (source: 1987-1989-1991-1993-1995 SHIW data at 1995 prices)
Old regime New regime
Year of birth: (*) (**)
pre-1922 215306 195167 195167
1923-1927 364685 323578 323578
1928-1932 352332 308367 308367
1933-1937 386984 334267 334256
1938-1942 411455 351795 351723
1943-1947 429143 364345 364016
1948-1952 431808 365946 363981
1953-1957 418030 354710 346051
1958-1962 407254 346497 322530
1963-1967 377644 321495 288588
1968-1972 351894 300103 269938
1973-1977 299923 256727 243015
pre-1922 100 90.65 90.65
1923-1927 100 88.73 88.73
1928-1932 100 87.52 87.52
1933-1937 100 86.38 86.37
1938-1942 100 85.50 85.48
1943-1947 100 84.90 84.82
1948-1952 100 84.75 84.29
1953-1957 100 84.85 82.78
1958-1962 100 85.08 79.20
1963-1967 100 85.13 76.42
1968-1972 100 85.28 76.71
1973-1977 100 85.60 81.03
(*) After the abolition of the indexation mechanism.
(**) Final effect of the reforms.
 Notes: See text in Section V.3.Table V.8: Distribution of planned age of retirement by various characteristics
(source: 1987-1989-1991-1993-1995 SHIW)
Planned age of Whole labour force Males Females
retirement Obs. Per cent Cum. % Obs. Per cent Cum. % Obs. Per cent Cum. %
<40 154 0.43 0.43 39 0.17 0.17 115 0.91 0.91
41-45 267 0.75 1.19 107 0.47 0.64 160 1.26 2.17
46-50 1958 5.52 6.7 920 4.03 4.67 1038 8.2 10.37
51-53 1000 2.82 9.52 733 3.21 7.88 267 2.11 12.48
54-55 4665 13.14 22.66 2145 9.39 17.27 2520 19.91 32.39
56 519 1.46 24.12 326 1.43 18.7 193 1.52 33.91
57 734 2.07 26.19 380 1.66 20.36 354 2.8 36.71
58 866 2.44 28.63 471 2.06 22.42 395 3.12 39.83
59 561 1.58 30.21 352 1.54 23.96 209 1.65 41.48
60 12585 35.45 65.66 7652 33.5 57.46 4933 38.97 80.44
61 538 1.52 67.17 395 1.73 59.19 143 1.13 81.57
62 623 1.75 68.93 450 1.97 61.16 173 1.37 82.94
63 474 1.34 70.26 257 1.13 62.29 217 1.71 84.65
64 352 0.99 71.26 209 0.92 63.2 143 1.13 85.78
65 9155 25.79 97.05 7492 32.8 96.01 1663 13.14 98.92
66-68 496 1.4 98.44 442 1.94 97.94 54 0.43 99.34
69-71 513 1.45 99.89 437 1.91 99.86 76 0.6 99.94
72-75 40 0.11 100 33 0.14 100 7 0.06 100
Total 35500 100 22840 100 12660 100
Private sector Public sector
Planned age of Manual worker Clerk Manager Self-employed
retirement Obs. Per cent Obs. Per cent Obs. Per cent Obs. Per cent Obs. Per cent
<40 29 0.27 51 0.79 6 0.32 24 0.26 44 0.61
41-45 33 0.31 72 1.11 10 0.54 35 0.38 117 1.63
46-50 695 6.48 406 6.26 81 4.39 297 3.21 479 6.65
51-53 480 4.48 174 2.68 43 2.33 116 1.26 187 2.6
54-55 1751 16.32 1132 17.46 238 12.89 625 6.76 918 12.75
56 156 1.45 109 1.68 27 1.46 52 0.56 175 2.43
57 215 2 160 2.47 52 2.82 97 1.05 210 2.92
58 271 2.53 184 2.84 45 2.44 114 1.23 252 3.5
59 205 1.91 107 1.65 36 1.95 97 1.05 116 1.61
60 4233 39.46 2433 37.53 625 33.84 2945 31.87 2348 32.62
61 140 1.31 54 0.83 22 1.19 235 2.54 87 1.21
62 106 0.99 61 0.94 28 1.52 302 3.27 126 1.75
63 40 0.37 22 0.34 13 0.7 326 3.53 73 1.01
64 13 0.12 14 0.22 2 0.11 285 3.08 38 0.53
65 2280 21.26 1442 22.24 577 31.24 2988 32.33 1866 25.92
66-68 21 0.2 26 0.4 6 0.32 385 4.17 58 0.81
69-71 57 0.53 36 0.56 35 1.89 287 3.11 98 1.36
72-75 1 0.01 0 0 1 0.05 32 0.35 6 0.08
Total 10726 100 6483 100 1847 100 9242 100 7198 100Table V.9: Planned age of retirement by age and survey years
(source: 1987-1989-1991-1993-1995 SHIW)
Planned age of retirement
Age class 1989 1991 1993 1995
<20 59.05 59.62 60.13 60.89
21-25 59.06 59.92 59.92 61.08
26-30 59.27 59.85 59.74 60.64
31-35 59.31 59.68 59.73 60.69
36-40 59.29 59.58 59.14 60.01
41-45 59.02 59.38 59.23 59.27
46-50 59.65 59.60 58.90 58.92
51-55 60.50 60.85 60.55 59.71
56-60 62.08 62.54 61.86 61.40
61-65 64.61 64.83 64.80 63.46
66-70 63.79 63.74 65.88 65.48
Table V.10: Internal rate of return of the social security system
(after 37 years of activity assuming 2% productivity growth)
Age of start Employees Self-employed
of activity Males Females Males Females
before Amato 17 3.22 3.65 5.75 6.15
reform 20 2.91 3.35 5.55 5.92
25 2.25 2.95 5.11 5.61
after Amato  17 2.45 2.91 5.15 5.45
reform (*) 20 2.15 2.75 4.95 5.25
25 1.55 2.25 4.53 4.95
after Amato  17 1.95 2.42 4.65 4.95
reform (**) 20 1.65 2.15 4.42 4.75
25 1.05 1.73 4.05 4.45
(*) with more than 18 years of SS contributions in 1993.
(**) with less than 18 years of SS contributions in 1993.
Notes:  Our computation. The internal rate of return of the social security system is the rate that equalizes, in expected value
terms, the flow of benefits and the flow of contribution paid. See text in Section V.3 and V.4.Table V.11: Replacement rate and tax/subsidy ratios














  pre - 1992 55 0.70 - 0.70 -
56 0.72 0.362 0.72 0.262
57 0.74 0.394 0.74 0.274
58 0.76 0.433 0.76 0.309
59 0.78 0.472 0.78 0.347
60 0.80 0.625 0.80 0.381
61 0.80 0.754 0.80 0.753
62 0.80 0.814 0.80 0.768
63 0.80 0.830 0.80 0.785
64 0.80 0.842 0.80 0.796
65 0.80 0.852 0.80 0.809
 post - 1992 55 0.60 - 0.60 -
56 0.62 0.317 0.62 0.026
57 0.64 0.347 0.64 0.253
58 0.65 0.376 0.65 0.280
59 0.67 0.406 0.67 0.306
60 0.68 0.594 0.68 0.330
61 0.68 0.650 0.68 0.600
62 0.68 0.667 0.68 0.614
63 0.68 0.683 0.68 0.631
64 0.68 0.693 0.68 0.641
65 0.68 0.707 0.68 0.651
(*) Computed with respect to the last year of earnings.
 Notes: See text in Section V.4.Table V.12: Age of retirement equation: “age invariant” characteristics
(estimates based on 1987-1989-1991-1993-1995 SHIW)
Col.1 Col. 2 Col. 3
Variable Coefficient Std. error Coefficient Std. error Coefficient Std. error
d91 0.008 0.0009 0.008 0.0009 0.007 0.0009
d93 0.004 0.0009 -0.028 0.0014 -0.030 0.0014
d95 0.010 0.0009 -0.020 0.0014 -0.023 0.0014
c0 -0.012 0.0012 -0.011 0.0012 -0.011 0.0012
c1 -0.021 0.0012 -0.021 0.0013 -0.016 0.0013
c2 -0.028 0.0014 -0.026 0.0014 -0.018 0.0015
c3 -0.034 0.0015 -0.028 0.0015 -0.020 0.0016
c4 -0.037 0.0015 -0.030 0.0015 -0.023 0.0016
c5 -0.038 0.0016 -0.031 0.0016 -0.028 0.0016
c6 -0.024 0.0015 -0.017 0.0015 -0.020 0.0015
c7 -0.001 0.0016 0.004 0.0016 -0.005 0.0017
c8 0.027 0.0019 0.031 0.0019 0.015 0.0022
c9 0.046 0.0031 0.050 0.0031 0.032 0.0033
elementary -0.001 0.0024 -0.002 0.0024 -0.002 0.0024
high school 0.019 0.0025 0.009 0.0025 0.009 0.0025
university 0.046 0.0027 0.028 0.0027 0.028 0.0027
clerk -0.002 0.0009 -0.004 0.0009 -0.004 0.0009
manager 0.000 0.0016 -0.004 0.0015 -0.004 0.0015
self-employed 0.025 0.0009 0.111 0.0030 0.112 0.0030
public -0.011 0.0018 -0.014 0.0018 -0.015 0.0018
private sector 0.002 0.0015 0.001 0.0015 0.000 0.0015
centre -0.020 0.0009 -0.017 0.0008 -0.011 0.0009
north -0.042 0.0007 -0.038 0.0007 -0.031 0.0008
male 0.036 0.0007 0.022 0.0009 0.030 0.0010
head -0.008 0.0009 -0.007 0.0009 0.005 0.0012
TIR -3.451 0.1148 -3.481 0.1147
ssw60
Mill's ratio -0.017 0.0011
constant 4.102 0.0029 4.216 0.0049 4.227 0.0049
No. of observations 41059 41059 41059
R-squared 0.232 0.25 0.254
Notes:  Variables are dummies set equal to 1 when the characteristic is satisfied. c1-c9 are cohort dummies, see table V.1.
TIR is the social security system internal rate of return for the individual considered; ssw60 is the expected social security
wealth of the individual computed at age 60 (see text in Section V.4).Table V.13: Retirement and the presence of young dependants in the household
(source: 1987-1989-1991-1993-1995 SHIW)
Planned age of retirement
No. young deps. 1989 1991 1993 1995
All 0 60.91 61.02 60.00 59.83
1 60.77 61.06 60.76 60.68
2 60.35 62.67 62.05 61.92
3> 63.08 64.11 62.17 61.85
North 0 60.27 60.13 58.77 58.72
1 59.85 59.57 59.42 59.59
2 59.85 59.57 59.42 59.59
3> 65.00 62.53 56.00 59.71
Centre 0 61.39 61.21 60.19 60.37
1 60.94 61.36 60.89 60.22
2 60.71 62.86 60.62 61.55
3> 59.91 65.00 63.12 64.52
South 0 62.05 62.42 62.15 61.42
1 61.62 62.55 62.13 62.03
2 61.99 62.87 62.67 62.75
3> 63.47 64.15 63.06 61.59
Percentage of pensioners
No. young deps. 1989 1991 1993 1995
All 0 39.84 42.38 45.71 43.31
1 26.00 26.29 30.83 33.78
2 22.15 28.06 29.06 28.48
3> 27.80 32.37 20.27 33.81
North 0 42.25 44.17 50.96 47.49
1 22.41 24.90 28.61 37.30
2 9.43 21.78 29.56 29.13
3> 0.00 0.00 0.00 22.55
Centre 0 34.87 39.27 37.18 40.90
1 18.30 21.17 20.34 28.00
2 16.48 40.09 20.86 21.42
3> 19.30 0.00 0.00 0.00
South 0 37.79 41.52 40.50 36.33
1 31.97 29.88 38.15 34.00
2 29.53 27.68 31.29 30.78
3> 29.03 34.45 25.41 39.45Table V.14: Age of retirement equation: “age variant” characteristics
(estimates based on 1987-1989-1991-1993-1995 SHIW)
Col.1 Col. 2 (*) Col. 3 Col. 4
Variable Coefficient Std. error Coefficient Std. error Coefficient Std. error Coefficient Std. error
d91 0.014 0.002 0.001 0.005 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.0031
d93 -0.011 0.003 -0.057 0.015 -0.019 0.003 -0.035 0.0047
d95 -0.006 0.004 -0.045 0.014 -0.017 0.004 -0.038 0.0060
c4 -0.094 0.013 -0.010 0.036 -0.085 0.014 -0.072 0.0238
c5 -0.085 0.012 -0.016 0.030 -0.075 0.013 -0.070 0.0212
c6 -0.060 0.010 -0.009 0.024 -0.049 0.011 -0.049 0.0187
c7 -0.029 0.009 0.004 0.018 -0.017 0.010 -0.020 0.0169
c8 0.005 0.008 0.025 0.015 0.020 0.008 0.014 0.0155
c9 0.028 0.008 0.034 0.014 0.039 0.008 0.035 0.0161
elementary 0.004 0.003 -0.023 0.011 -0.004 0.003 -0.006 0.0065
high school 0.018 0.004 -0.029 0.016 0.008 0.003 0.009 0.0069
university 0.035 0.005 -0.039 0.024 0.017 0.004 0.017 0.0072
clerk -0.002 0.002 -0.032 0.010 -0.005 0.002 -0.009 0.0030
manager 0.006 0.003 -0.039 0.014 -0.002 0.002 -0.005 0.0039
self-employed 0.141 0.006 0.111 0.015 -0.075 0.004 -0.086 0.0066
public 0.011 0.003 0.030 0.008 0.006 0.003 0.000 0.0044
private sector 0.011 0.003 0.029 0.007 -0.002 0.002 -0.006 0.0037
centre -0.012 0.002 -0.029 0.006 -0.013 0.002 -0.014 0.0027
north -0.025 0.002 -0.051 0.008 -0.028 0.001 -0.030 0.0023
male 0.006 0.005 0.001 0.010 -0.032 0.005 -0.011 0.0073
head -0.011 0.003 -0.002 0.007 -0.010 0.003 -0.033 0.0248
TIR -3.706 0.249 -5.807 0.808
ssw60 -0.157 0.005 -0.169 0.0086
log family wealth -0.002 0.001 0.090 0.027 -0.001 0.000 -0.002 0.0008
married -0.006 0.002 -0.016 0.005 -0.007 0.002 -0.013 0.0191
young dep.:1(*) 0.00002 0.00003 -0.00004 0.00006 0.00002 0.00003 0.00001 0.00007
young dep.:2(*) 0.00007 0.00004 0.00007 0.00008 0.00008 0.00004 0.00018 0.00010
young dep.:3(*) 0.00014 0.00006 0.00032 0.00013 0.00012 0.00005 0.00008 0.00015
young dep.:4(*) 0.00038 0.00009 0.00110 0.00029 0.00036 0.00009 0.00074 0.00024
no. of earners:1 -0.013 0.002 -0.008 0.005 -0.010 0.002 -0.019 0.0070
no. of earners:2 -0.014 0.003 0.008 0.009 -0.011 0.003 -0.021 0.0073
Mill's ratio 0.018 0.006 0.009 0.012 0.016 0.006 0.005 0.0090
ssw60 head -0.001 0.0021
ssw60 wife -0.004 0.0022
Constant 4.381 0.018 4.045 0.104 4.574 0.017 4.656 0.0314
No. of observations 11036 11036 10556 10566
R-squared 0.298 . 0.343 0.347
(*) Instrumental variable estimates.
 Notes: Variables are dummies set equal to 1 when the characteristic is satisfied. c1-c9 are cohort dummies, see table V.1.
TIR is the social security system internal rate of return for the individual considered; ssw60 is the expected social security
wealth of the individual computed at age 60 (see text in Section V.4).Table V.15: Increment in SS wealth by postponing retirement by one year
(estimates based on 1987-1989-1991-1993-1995 SHIW; thousands of 1995 lire)
Age All Males Females Non-self-empl. Self-empl.
53 8298 8560 7577 8028 9037
54 4380 3902 5946 3359 7516
55 1184 -68 4480 -905 7480
56 596 248 2066 -1036 4743
57 -3476 -4393 -557 -5743 2401
58 -7175 -8168 -3022 -6464 -8541
59 -9153 -10963 -4406 -8402 -10765
60 -9594 -10893 -3936 -8685 -11287
61 -12371 -14736 -5736 -12182 -12636
62 -12485 -13867 -4562 -11438 -13896
63 -13231 -15482 -7135 -13629 -12786
64 -15522 -16114 -10113 -16754 -14021
65 -17296 -18703 -11668 -21617 -13950
66 -17522 -18006 -12555 -19290 -15500
67 -18273 -20241 -9840 -29772 -14014
68 -15123 -16505 -9596 -17712 -13829
No. of obs. 2698 2085 613 1826 872
Notes: See text in section V.4.
Table V.16: Hazard model of retirement
Specification
Variable k=1 k=1.3 k=1.5
SS Wealth 1.62 1.59 1.59
(0.14) (0.14) (0.15)
Dgain -0.34 -0.24 -0.11
(0.12) (0.08) (0.04)
Assets 0.13 0.12 0.13
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
High school -0.45 -0.44 -0.46
(0.12) (0.13) (0.13)
College -0.83 -0.82 -0.84
(0.21) (0.21) (0.21)
Dependents 0.23 0.23 0.23
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
Earners -0.16 -0.16 -0.16
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
Sex 0.20 0.18 0.20
(0.17) (0.17) (0.17)
Head -0.25 -0.24 -0.25
(0.19) (0.19) (0.19)
Age parameter p 3.41 3.39 3.41
(0.11) (0.12) (0.12)
Constant -13.50 -13.38 -13.41
(0.61) (0.62) (0.63)
Log likelihood -413.02 -412.93 -414.05
No. of subjects 1219 1219 1219
No. of failures 351 351 351
No. of observations 2835 2835 2835
Notes: See text in sections V.4. Dgain: increment in SS wealth from postponing retirement by one year.Table V.17: Consumption to total resources ratio by age and total resource percentiles
(source: 1987-1989-1991-1993-1995 SHIW)
Total resource Age
percentiles <30 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 70-84 >84
 0-20 0.039 0.038 0.047 0.059 0.082 0.181 0.292
20-40 0.025 0.029 0.041 0.050 0.068 0.111 0.163
40-60 0.022 0.027 0.036 0.048 0.059 0.086 0.111
60-80 0.021 0.026 0.035 0.044 0.050 0.066 0.077
 80-100 0.021 0.024 0.036 0.043 0.039 0.043 0.054
Table V.18: Consumption equation
(estimates based on 1987-1989-1991-1993-1995 SHIW)
C o l .  1C o l .  2C o l .  3C o l .  4C o l .  5
Variable Coefficient Std. error Coefficient Std. error Coefficient Std. error Coefficient Std. error Coefficient Std. error
constant 0.0550 0.0148 0.0315 0.0129 0.0236 0.0094 -0.0001 0.0063 0.0550 0.0148
age1 -0.0069 0.0034 -0.0044 0.0030 -0.0034 0.0022 0.0000 0.0001 -0.0071 0.0034
age1q 0.0004 0.0002 0.0003 0.0002 0.0002 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.0004 0.0002
age2 0.0002 0.0003 -0.0001 0.0003 -0.0005 0.0002 -0.0011 0.0003 0.0001 0.0004
age2q 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000
age3 0.0008 0.0002 0.0009 0.0002 0.0001 0.0002 -0.0005 0.0002 0.0008 0.0002
ag3q 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
age4 0.0015 0.0002 0.0008 0.0002 0.0004 0.0002 -0.0007 0.0002 0.0015 0.0002
age4q -0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0000
age5 0.0009 0.0003 0.0006 0.0002 0.0005 0.0002 0.0000 0.0002 0.0009 0.0003
age5q 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
age5 0.0035 0.0008 0.0021 0.0005 0.0012 0.0004 -0.0017 0.0004 0.0034 0.0007
age5q 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001
no. children: 1 0.0031 0.0006 0.0020 0.0005 0.0014 0.0004 -0.0003 0.0006 0.0030 0.0006
no. children: 2 0.0052 0.0006 0.0026 0.0006 0.0036 0.0004 0.0019 0.0006 0.0052 0.0006
no. children: 3 0.0058 0.0011 0.0018 0.0010 0.0035 0.0007 0.0014 0.0011 0.0058 0.0011
no. children: 4 0.0125 0.0029 0.0071 0.0025 0.0081 0.0017 0.0043 0.0014 0.0123 0.0029
no. children: 1 (*) -0.0002 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 -0.0002 0.0000
no. children: 2 (*) -0.0003 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 -0.0003 0.0000
no. children: 3 (*) -0.0003 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0003 0.0001
no. children: 4 (*) -0.0009 0.0001 -0.0005 0.0001 -0.0003 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 -0.0008 0.0001
nfert -0.0025 0.0009 -0.0029 0.0008 -0.0016 0.0006 -0.0009 0.0008 -0.0023 0.0009
no. earners: 2  -0.0069 0.0003 -0.0015 0.0004 -0.0064 0.0002 -0.0059 0.0004 -0.0069 0.0003
no. earners: 3 or more -0.0105 0.0006 -0.0025 0.0006 -0.0101 0.0004 -0.0098 0.0006 -0.0105 0.0006
no. of adults: 1 0.0018 0.0010 0.0064 0.0008 -0.0009 0.0006 -0.0034 0.0008 0.0018 0.0010
no. of adults: 2 -0.0001 0.0015 0.0106 0.0012 -0.0023 0.0009 -0.0039 0.0013 0.0000 0.0015
no. of adults: 3 0.0009 0.0017 0.0128 0.0014 -0.0030 0.0010 -0.0063 0.0015 0.0010 0.0017
no. of adults: 4 0.0008 0.0019 0.0135 0.0016 -0.0054 0.0014 -0.0106 0.0023 0.0003 0.0019
single -0.0086 0.0018 0.0111 0.0015 -0.0044 0.0013 -0.0006 0.0016 -0.0081 0.0018
non-nucl. single-head 0.0251 0.0017 0.0053 0.0013 0.0085 0.0015 -0.0073 0.0019 0.0246 0.0017
non-nucl. couple 0.0284 0.0016 0.0004 0.0013 0.0123 0.0015 -0.0032 0.0019 0.0281 0.0016
single (**) 0.0003 0.0000 -0.0004 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0003 0.0000
non-nucl. single-head (**) -0.0007 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0002 0.0000 0.0002 0.0000 -0.0007 0.0000
non-nucl. couple (**) -0.0007 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0003 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 -0.0007 0.0000
d89 -0.0027 0.0004 -0.0014 0.0004 0.0016 0.0004 0.0056 0.0005 -0.0024 0.0004
d91 -0.0019 0.0004 -0.0003 0.0004 0.0012 0.0003 0.0040 0.0005 -0.0016 0.0004
d93 -0.0004 0.0004 0.0008 0.0004 0.0038 0.0004 0.0078 0.0006 -0.0001 0.0004





ydc 0.7542 0.0471 1.4656 0.0650 0.3282 0.01533
No. of observations 40233 40222 40233 40573 40233
R-squared 0.2945 0.5059 0.779 0.3397 0.3046
Notes to Table V.18: Variables are dummies set equal to 1 when the characteristic is satisfied.
Age1-age5: spline in age constructed as follows:
defines age = age –19 and the vector a’= (11,19,31,45,57,81) corresponding to ages: 30,38,50,64 and 100). Then:
age1 = sage if sage ≤  a(1)
age1 = 0 if sage > a(1)
age2 = 0 if sage ≤  a(1)122
age2 = sage-a(1) if a(2) ≤ sage≤ a(1)
age2 = a(2)-a(1) if sage>a(2)
…..
age6 = 0 if sage≤ a(5)
age6 = sage-a(5) if sage>a(5)
age1q.. age6q are age1…age6 multiplied by age.
nfert: dummy equal to 1 if the spouse or the female head is of fertile age.
dr1, dr1a = distributional dummies; ydc: current disposable income: see text in Section V.5.123
VI The simulation of the complete model
VI.1 Introduction
In this section we offer some examples of how the micro simulation model of the
Italian household sector, as developed in the previous sections, can be used to analyze some
important issues regarding the Italian economy. The examples focus on the effects of
demographic developments, of changes in the rate of productivity growth and of changes in
social security provisions on the evolution of the aggregate saving rate. By simulating the
micro model under a number of alternative assumptions regarding the evolution of fertility
and mortality rates, productivity growth and other parameters of the model, we can also
gather useful insights into the properties of the micro model.
Quite obviously, we recognize that the results of the simulations have to be considered
with caution because of the enormous uncertainty surrounding the many assumptions needed
to simulate the micro model and because there is still ample room to improve some features
of the model which are not completely satisfactory, as we discussed in the previous sections.
Nevertheless, the exercise shows the usefulness of the model as a tool that allows the
analysis to move from individual households’ behaviour to the aggregate implications (and
vice versa) and permits the study of a number of problems that could not possibly be
analyzed in a framework of identical representative agents or by using standard
macroeconomic models.
VI.2 The demographic evolution of the Italian population and the aggregate saving rate
We have performed a number of simulations of the complete model, all covering the
period 1993-2100 to study the effects of changing demographic conditions on the evolution
of the aggregate Italian households’ saving rate. Our benchmark simulation assumes an
evolution of fertility and mortality rates equal to the main variant of recent official forecasts,
which predicts a substantial decline in the total population by 2050 and a dramatic decline
thereafter, as well as a rate of growth of labour productivity of 2% per year, i.e.,
approximately equal to the average labour productivity growth in Italy over the past 30 years.
We analyze the evolution of the aggregate saving rate generated by the model under these
assumptions, disentangling the contribution made by the various groups (family types)
composing the total population.124
We find that according to the hypothesis adopted in this benchmark simulation the
aggregate saving rate generated by the simulation model would remain at a relatively high
level, and actually increase slightly in the course of the simulation, notwithstanding the
substantial increase in the proportion of the elderly population. Various factors are behind
this result. First, as we have seen and as known in the literature, a feature of the Italian data
we use is that the pattern of the saving rate is quite flat at old ages. Second, the marked
reduction in the number of children per household increases household savings according to
our estimated consumption equation. Third, the (assumed) decline in the unemployment rate
and the consequent increase in the number of adult dependants contributing to family income
also impact positively on household savings. Finally (and especially) the gradual decline in
expected social security wealth with respect to the disposable income of households as the
effects of the 1995 reform start to come into play is compensated by an increased
accumulation of private assets by households. We discuss in some detail the relative
contributions of these factors and the reliability of the assumptions behind them. The results
clearly depend on a number of assumptions that are subject to a great deal of uncertainty. We
therefore carry out a number of alternative simulations using different assumptions on
parameters governing the demographic development of the population and on a number of
other key parameters of the model in order to assess the sensitivity of results and gain a
better understanding of the interaction between the various features of the model.
VI.2.1 The benchmark simulation
VI.2.1.1 Basic assumptions
We start by looking at changes in the demographic structure of the Italian population
between 1993 and 2100 in the benchmark simulation. The main hypothesis underlying the
projections with respect to fertility and mortality are consistent with those of the Istat (1997)
main variant middle-fertility scenario up to 2050. As in Istat’s projections, we have kept
mortality rates and fertility rates constant as from 2020. The set of assumptions regarding the
demographic processes that we consider are briefly summarized below (see Section III for
further details on other demographic parameters):
fertility: total fertility rate in 1995: 1.217
total fertility rate in 2020: 1.45125
mortality: life expectancy at birth in 1995: males: 74.3; females: 80.7
 life expectancy at birth in 2020: males: 78.3; females: 84.7
marriage, divorce, independent children and merging of households: observed
probabilities by age in years 1991-1995
Other important assumptions for the benchmark simulation are as follows. The rate of
labour productivity growth is set at 2% per year and the subjective discount rate is assumed
to be to equal to the market interest rate at 3% per year. The aggregate unemployment rate is
assumed to decline slowly, reaching about 8% of the labour force in 2003, from an actual
12% in 1995. Participation rates for all male age groups are kept constant. The female
participation rate is assumed to increase somewhat over the simulation period, from about
48% in 1995 to about 52% in 2030 for females aged between 20 and 60, and remain
approximately constant thereafter. Educational levels are assumed to evolve according to the
process described in Section IV, which implies that the education of children is strongly
correlated with that of their parents. Since at the start of the simulation period younger
generations are, on average, better educated than older generations, the process implies that
the overall educational level of the society rises over time. Transitional probabilities
regarding the sector of occupation and the employment status are kept constant throughout
the simulation period.
VI.2.1.2 The evolution of the main characteristics of the population
Since our demographic model has been calibrated to insure that the age and sex
distribution conforms quite closely to the one generated by the projections of Istat (1996),
this aspect of our results is not new and is summarized in Figure VI.1.
The total population is projected to reach its peak around the year 2005, thereafter
slowly declining up to 2020 to about 55.5 million. The decline then accelerates during the
following years: the total population falls to 48 million in 2050 and to 25 million by 2100,
less than half of the population of a century earlier. The rate of decline reaches a maximum
(around 1.4%) a little after 2050 and then recovers slightly to stabilize at about 1% at the end
of the simulation period. Whether such a prolonged period of declining population is
sustainable is, of course, questionable. However, as we have already mentioned, even the
most optimistic projections of the Italian population indicate a prolonged period of decline in126
total population, so that it is instructive for analytical purposes to fully explore its
consequences. We will analyze alternative scenarios in the following sections.
Quite naturally, the consequences of this pattern for the age structure of the population
are fairly dramatic. They are summarized for broad age groups in Figure VI.2. The
population aged less than 20 declines from 22.9% of the total in 1993 to 17.9% in 2050,
while that aged between 20 and 64 declines from 62.1% to 49.6% during the same period.
Correspondingly, those aged 65 or over rise from 15.0% in 1993 to 23.9% in 2020, reaching
about one third of the total population by 2050. This pattern is slightly reversed at the end of
the simulation period, as a response to the mild reduction in the rate of decline of the
population after the overshooting around the middle of the century.
Details of the evolution of family structures are reported in Tables VI.1 to VI.4.
Besides reflecting the assumptions with regard to fertility and mortality rates, the evolution
of family types also reflects the assumptions adopted in the benchmark simulation with
regard to the other major demographic processes (marriage, divorce, etc.). The most
distinctive patterns are as follows. We observe a decline in the share of the population living
in traditional (couple-headed) families, a strong decline in the number of young dependants,
and an increase in the proportion of people living alone, especially in the extreme (very
young and very old) age groups. Traditional families decrease from 55% of the total number
of households in 1993 to 46% in 2050, while singles increase from about 13% to 24% during
the same period. The main consequence of the decline in the number of dependants and of
the increase in the proportion of the population living alone is the continuous shrinking of
the average size of households, from about 2.9 members per family in 1994 to 2.5 in 2050.
It is important to observe the consequences of these patterns for the structure of the
population by activity. Figure VI.3 shows that the proportions of the population in the labour
force and of the non-active population decline steadily until the first half of the 21
st century,
while the proportion of pensioners rises from around 22% to about 32% of the total
population during the same period. The participation rate by age over the simulation period is
depicted in Figure VI.4. The total participation rate between the ages of 20 and 70 actually
increases slightly (from about 58% in 1993 to 61% in 2050) mainly as a consequence of our
assumption of an increase in the participation of the female population. The participation rate
declines somewhat for young individuals because of the postponement of the age at which127
they start work caused by the increase in the number of people going to university, which, in
turn, is a consequence of our modelling of the education process (a positive correlation
between the education of parents and their children, see Section IV.3). However, there is a
remarkable increase in the participation rate of people aged 51-60 and 61-70. The increase in
the 51-60 age group is almost immediate and is mainly the consequence of the abolition of
the early-retirement provisions that we discussed in Section  V.3. The increase in the
participation rate in the group aged 61-70 is more gradual and is related to the (estimated)
behavioural response of workers to the social security system becoming less and less
generous.
VI.2.1.3 The evolution of the aggregate saving rate: interpreting the results
Figure VI.5 shows the evolution of the aggregate saving rate over the entire simulation
period in our benchmark simulation. The breakdown of the result by age groups and different
family types is shown in Tables VI.5 to VI.8, while Table VI.9 reports the pattern of some
selected aggregate variables over the simulation period. Figure VI.5 shows that the aggregate
saving rate, from a level of about 10 per cent, initially increases quite significantly (by about
4 percentage points) up to around 2030. It then gradually declines by about 2 percentage
points in the subsequent 20 years and thereafter remains basically stationary at around 12 per
cent. Underlying this pattern are a number of factors, acting in different directions. We will
enumerate the most important of them.
As shown in the detailed tables (from VI.5 to VI.8), with the notable exception of
singles all family types contribute to the initial increase in the aggregate saving rate in the
simulation. This is the result of different patterns across age groups. While in fact the saving
rate of elderly households (over 60) is gradually reduced and the elderly groups increase their
weight in the society because of the low birth rate, this process is more than compensated by
a significant increase in the saving rate of younger households, in particular those in middle-
age groups (40 to 60), whose weight, in terms of total resources, is substantial. The latter
phenomenon mostly reflects the following three factors: (i)  the marked reduction in the
number of children per household; (ii) the decline in the unemployment rate (especially for
young individuals) and the consequent increase in the number of adult dependants128
contributing to family income; and (iii) the gradual decline in expected social security wealth
with respect to disposable income as the effects of the 1995 reform start to come into play.
The magnitude of the first effect (the reduction in the number of children per
household) depends on the size of the estimated coefficients in the consumption equation
used here and is, as we have already explained in Section V.5, larger for households that
have children relatively early in life. The second effect (the decline in the unemployment
rate) affects non-nuclear households (families or single-headed) in which different
generations contribute to the total disposable income. For these households disposable
income increases proportionally more than consumption when a young unemployed
dependent starts to work and earn, according to our model. Admittedly, it might very well be
that this effect is overestimated: first of all, it must be recalled that in the model young adult
dependants contribute their full income to the current disposable income of the family, but
they contribute to its expected lifetime resources only the (income of the) years during which
they are expected to remain in the family. Therefore current disposable income rises
proportionally more than households’ total resources and therefore automatically the family’s
saving rate is increased (on this point, see the discussion in Section V.5). Second, it is likely
that the decline in the unemployment rate of young individuals may increase the likelihood
of the young leaving the family to form a new household (this potential effect is not taken
into account in the current version of the model). This implies that we might underestimate
the process of formation of households by young persons living alone (who do not save at
all) and, therefore, overestimate the aggregate saving rate. We will tackle this issue in
Section  VI.2.4, where we report the results of different assumptions on the evolution of
young single households.
Starting at around 2020, the third effect, i.e. the decline in the social security wealth,
becomes gradually the dominant factor underlying the increase in the saving rate. An
increasing share of the population falls under the new social security scheme and the faster
decline in the population (reflected in a slower growth of aggregate income) starts to have a
marked effect on the computation of future benefits. In order to clearly understand the
mechanism involved, let us recall that under the new rules the system is basically a
contribution-based pay-as-you-go system with a rate of return equal to the GDP rate of
growth. Under this system, contributions are paid every year as a fixed percentage of129
earnings and then capitalized up to the retirement age using an interest rate equal to a five-
year moving average of the GDP rate of growth.
66 At the age of retirement, therefore, the
social security wealth of an individual with respect to his income will depend on the GDP
rate of growth throughout the whole of his working life, and the ratio will be lower, the lower
the GDP rate of growth. The latter is given, of course, by the sum of the rate of growth of per
capita productivity (fixed at 2% per year in this benchmark simulation) and the rate of
growth of the labour force. If we compare two different steady state rates of growth of the
population, the ratio of social security wealth to income at retirement will differ only by a
scale factor. If, however, the rate of decline in the population (and the labour force)
increases, the ratio will keep decreasing. Moreover, since the effect is spread over the whole
working life of each cohort of workers, every shock to the rate of growth of the population
will exert its effect for a very long time. Figure VI.6 shows that the rate of growth of social
security wealth is, from 2010, lower than that of the total disposable income for virtually the
whole simulation period, only coming very close right at the end. As a consequence, the ratio
of social security wealth over income falls dramatically from around 7 in 2020 to 5 around
2070, stabilizing at the end of the simulation period at slightly below 5 (see Figure VI.7).
Our consumption and retirement decision rules, described in Section V, imply that families
will partly compensate for this decline both by accumulating more wealth and partly by
retiring later. The increase in the asset-to-income ratio over the simulation period from 6 to
around 8 is therefore the consequence not only of the ageing of the population (increase in
the weight of older people who hold more assets), but also of the increase in the
accumulation of assets at younger ages in order to compensate for the decline in foreseen
pension provisions.
To explore this intuition on the basis of the household consumption rule that we have
adopted in this study (see Section V.5) we note that, abstracting from the influence of a
number of household-specific factors, in essence this can be written as:
C y A SSW ty t a t st =++ α α α (1)
where we have defined yt as disposable income excluding social security benefits and
contributions. It must also be true that for the aggregate:
                                                          
66 Computed starting with the year in which contributions are paid and including the four preceding
years.130
A A y SSB C tt t tt −= + − − 1 (2)
where  SSB b SSW tt =⋅  are gross benefits from social security (which can be defined as a
fraction b of the total social security wealth to facilitate the analysis).















































where g is the rate of growth of the economy. Equation (3) implies that the rate of growth of
assets can be split into a regular growth rate and a correction term for the deviation of the
asset income ratio from its steady state value, indicated by the second term of the formula in
the square brackets. Clearly, for individual households, not only does the rate of growth of
income change over time as its members age, but also the relevant coefficients of the
consumption rule will slowly change with age so that equation (3) must be viewed as a crude
(and aggregate) approximation to families’ accumulation behaviour. Nevertheless, this
stylized characterization of consumption behaviour is indicative of the property that, for all
households, the larger the net worth to income ratio, the lower the saving-income ratio.
If we further assume that SSWt = (1+g) SSWt-1 and that α a=α s (as is indeed assumed in
our empirical consumption rule) then we can rewrite (3) as:






































where ′ =⋅ − bb g y () / ( ) 1 α , implying that in the steady state:
A SSW













Equation (5) shows that in the steady state the ratio of total accrued savings – including
accumulated assets and social security wealth – to disposable income (including labour
income and social security benefits) is a constant independent of the level of assets or social
security wealth. In other words, our consumption rule implies that any decline in the social
security wealth as a ratio of disposable income will be offset by an increase in the ratio of
accumulated assets to income, which is acquired by generating higher savings.131
The results reported above depend heavily, therefore, on the evolution of households’
social security wealth, which is, in turn, a consequence of the design of the social security
system and of a number of assumptions that have an impact on it.
Figure VI.8 describes the rate of growth of aggregate contributions and pensions over
the forecast horizon. Following the assumptions made with regard to the rate of growth of
the population, productivity, the labour force and the evolution of aggregate employment and
unemployment, the system generates relatively large fluctuations of the social security
deficit. Clearly the government’s attempt to offset these fluctuations by means of, say,
changes in taxation applicable to the current labour force may affect households’ disposable
income and saving behaviour in different ways over the simulation period. We ignore these
possible responses in the benchmark simulation. Moreover, the results depend crucially on
our assumption that households perceived all of their estimated social security wealth as ‘true
wealth’ in the period (early 1990s) over which we estimate our consumption equation. While
this assumption is not rejected in the estimation, it is clear that a lot of uncertainty surrounds
it, especially considering the significant changes that the Italian social security underwent in
those years. Given the important impact of the evolution of the social security system on our
results, the results of a set of simulations which are based on different assumptions are
reported below in Section VI.2.4.3.
VI.2.2 Variant simulations
We perform a number of additional simulations under a variety of different
assumptions. Tables VI.10 to VI.13 report some summary statistics of the aggregate results,
which are discussed below.
VI.2.2.1 A high fertility scenario
In the high-fertility variant simulation, we follow Istat’s (1997) high variant scenario
assumes a gradual recovery of fertility rates up to 1.85 children per woman in 2020. In order
to keep the distribution of the number of children per woman as close as possible to that of132
the Istat projections, we also increase marriage rates somewhat with respect to the
benchmark simulation.
67
Figure VI.10 shows the total population in the benchmark middle fertility scenario and
in the high fertility scenario. The analysis of the detailed results for the high fertility scenario
(not shown here to save space) reveals the following.
Increases in fertility rates do not have a very large effect in the medium run since the
main demographic changes foreseen for Italy in the next 30 years are already under way and
because the recovery in fertility rates is gradual. The aggregate saving rate (see Figure VI.11)
remains just slightly under that generated in the benchmark simulation, primarily because the
first effect of the rise in fertility is to increase the number of children per household, and this
tends to increase consumption, other things being equal. The effect of the larger number of
children is partly mitigated by the fact that we somewhat increase marriage rates in this
simulation: this tends to increase the weight of nuclear households compared with singles in
the young age classes, which has a positive effect on savings. Over a longer time horizon the
increase in the weight of the working-age population relative to the benchmark case (see
Figure V.12) leads to a higher saving rate, as expected. This effect is partly mitigated by the
smaller decline in the social security wealth over income ratio in this case than in the
benchmark case (shown in Figure VI.13), in turn a consequence of the higher rate of income
growth in the high fertility scenario.
VI.2.2.2 The effects of changes in the rate of productivity growth
A productivity slowdown can exert dramatic effects on the aggregate saving rate. In the
extreme case that we report in Table VI.11 the productivity growth is set so as to generate a
rate of growth of total income close to zero. This case serves also to illustrate the internal
consistency of the model, since it must be true that the saving rate approaches zero when the
total income growth approaches zero (for a discussion of this feature, see Ando, 1996). In the
simulation of our model the aggregate saving rate declines steadily, reaching about 3% at the
end of the simulation horizon in 2100. The reduction in the aggregate saving rate is,
however, very slow because the decline in social security wealth relative to income due to
                                                          
67 This reflects the fact that, as the model is set up at the moment, only married women can have children.
It should be recalled that we make no distinction between marriage and cohabitation in our model.133
the decline in income growth still induces a higher accumulation of wealth over the entire
period. In terms of equation (3) above, this implies that the system is gradually approaching
its steady state asset to income ratio (and the saving rate declining to zero) although the
steady state value has not yet been reached, given the fact that social security wealth is still
declining (relative to total assets) at the end of the simulation.
VI.2.2.3 The effects of alternative assumptions regarding the social security system
Since the effect produced by the social security system affects our results in such a
significant manner, we perform another set of simulations to evaluate the sensitivity of
results with respect to some key parameters that govern the response of individuals with
respect to the social security system.
The uncertainty regarding both the measure of social security wealth (i.e., the actual
measure perceived by households) and the parameters governing behavioural responses to it
(that are estimated during a period of substantial changes in the system) lead us to perform a
simulation in which parameters of the saving choices are re-estimated, assuming that
households actually perceive only half of the estimated measure of social security wealth as
real assets during the estimation period. That is, we impose a value of α s=(1/2)*α a in
equation (2) above. In this case, the counteracting effect on the saving rate produced by the
social security system in the simulation that we describe above is far smaller than in the
benchmark case. At the end of the simulation horizon, the aggregate saving rate is lower by 2
percentage points than in the benchmark as shown in Table VI.12. In terms of the analysis























That is, the steady state value for the total accumulated saving (including social
security wealth) to disposable income is smaller than in the benchmark case (as can be seen
easily by comparing equation (6) with equation (5) above), implying a lower (steady state)
saving rate.
In a final simulation, we change the rules regulating retirement and the determination
of benefits upon retirement. Firstly, we gradually increase the minimum age requirement134
from 57, as requested under the current rules, to 60 in 2003 and to 62 from 2020 onwards.
Secondly, we eliminate the late retirement penalty that is still present in the social security
system (for retirement after age 65) under the new rules.
68 In this case, two counteracting
effects come into play in the model. On the one hand, since people work longer, the need to
accumulate assets for retirement is reduced, which has a negative effect on savings. On the
other hand, the share of the working population increases and this exerts a positive effect on
saving. The net effect is that the saving rate throughout the simulation is only marginally
lower than in the benchmark simulation (see Table VI.13).
                                                          
68 We simply compute the actuarially fair benefits for individuals that retire after age 65, using the same
formulae adopted for retirement at earlier ages.Section VI – Charts and Tables
Figure VI.1: Benchmark simulation: evolution of total population
(in thousands)
Figure VI.2: Benchmark simulation: age composition of the population
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65>Figure VI.3: Benchmark simulation: composition of population by activity
(fraction of total population)
Figure VI.4: Benchmark simulation: labour force participation by age






























2100Figure VI.5: Benchmark simulation: evolution of the aggregate saving rate
(as a percentage of households’ disposable income)





























SS wealthFigure VI.7: Benchmark simulation: net worth, SS wealth and total resources over
disposable income ratio
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Figure VI.10: Aggregate saving rate in the benchmark and high fertility scenarios
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Benchmark
High fertilityFigure VI.11: Age composition of the population in the benchmark and high fertility
scenarios





























SSW/Y high fert.Table VI.1: Benchmark simulation: demographic structure by age and family type





1 Per cent 
2 Nuclear Non-nuclear Nuclear Non-nuclear
<31 11,698 (0.4251) 0.0612 0.0022 0.0000 0.0085 0.0070 0.9211
31-40 3,889 (0.1413) 0.7117 0.0374 0.0009 0.0283 0.0238 0.1978
41-50 3,723 (0.1353) 0.7139 0.1981 0.0034 0.0286 0.0107 0.0454
51-60 3,453 (0.1255) 0.4480 0.4416 0.0125 0.0365 0.0144 0.0470
61-70 2,836 (0.1031) 0.5005 0.3778 0.0024 0.0341 0.0256 0.0595
71-80 1,402 (0.0509) 0.5949 0.1505 0.0091 0.0636 0.0837 0.0982
>80 518 (0.0188) 0.6040 0.0327 0.0000 0.0107 0.0874 0.2653





1 Per cent 
2 Nuclear Non-nuclear Nuclear Non-nuclear
<31 11,411 (0.3876) 0.1361 0.0048 0.0011 0.0051 0.0041 0.8487
31-40 4,108 (0.1395) 0.7572 0.0630 0.0343 0.0208 0.0073 0.1173
41-50 3,931 (0.1335) 0.5554 0.2946 0.0383 0.0556 0.0142 0.0420
51-60 3,605 (0.1225) 0.3728 0.4199 0.0300 0.0844 0.0298 0.0630
61-70 3,321 (0.1128) 0.3984 0.1953 0.0262 0.0870 0.1826 0.1103
71-80 2,037 (0.0692) 0.3139 0.0436 0.0202 0.0601 0.3252 0.2370
>80 1,030 (0.0350) 0.0954 0.0092 0.0399 0.0377 0.3301 0.4877










(1) Thousands of individuals, scaled to match the population; (2) % of total male (female) population;
(3) Expressed as % of male (female) population in the age class.






1 Per cent 
2 Nuclear Non-nuclear Nuclear Non-nuclear
<31 8,556 (0.3390) 0.0602 0.0002 0.0003 0.0003 0.0044 0.9347
31-40 2,758 (0.1093) 0.6156 0.0002 0.0025 0.0048 0.0705 0.3063
41-50 3,703 (0.1467) 0.6969 0.0315 0.0060 0.0124 0.0910 0.1623
51-60 3,604 (0.1428) 0.5137 0.1942 0.0085 0.0338 0.1127 0.1370
61-70 2,922 (0.1157) 0.5633 0.2404 0.0085 0.0425 0.0725 0.0730
71-80 2,396 (0.0949) 0.6138 0.1683 0.0101 0.0433 0.0919 0.0726
>80 1,303 (0.0516) 0.4592 0.1283 0.0196 0.0773 0.1664 0.1492





1 Per cent 
2 Nuclear Non-nuclear Nuclear Non-nuclear
<31 7,988 (0.2926) 0.1072 0.0002 0.0025 0.0003 0.0047 0.8851
31-40 2,586 (0.0947) 0.8262 0.0016 0.0259 0.0050 0.0420 0.0993
41-50 3,743 (0.1371) 0.6517 0.0679 0.0312 0.0204 0.0839 0.1450
51-60 3,973 (0.1455) 0.4442 0.2260 0.0295 0.0606 0.1077 0.1321
61-70 3,522 (0.1290) 0.4794 0.1570 0.0236 0.0879 0.1595 0.0925
71-80 3,101 (0.1136) 0.3741 0.0976 0.0293 0.1150 0.2225 0.1615
>80 2,385 (0.0874) 0.1313 0.0327 0.0540 0.1237 0.2973 0.3610















1 Per cent 
2 Nuclear Non-nuclear Nuclear Non-nuclear
<31 6,334 (0.3269) 0.0623 0.0006 0.0000 0.0003 0.0036 0.9331
31-40 2,277 (0.1175) 0.6017 0.0041 0.0028 0.0048 0.0739 0.3127
41-50 2,507 (0.1294) 0.6747 0.0370 0.0047 0.0192 0.0968 0.1677
51-60 1,731 (0.0893) 0.4569 0.1902 0.0056 0.0587 0.1254 0.1632
61-70 2,028 (0.1047) 0.4834 0.1942 0.0075 0.0471 0.1345 0.1333
71-80 2,714 (0.1401) 0.5309 0.1256 0.0167 0.0237 0.1558 0.1473
>80 1,784 (0.0921) 0.4064 0.0638 0.0331 0.0465 0.2187 0.2315





1 Per cent 
2 Nuclear Non-nuclear Nuclear Non-nuclear
<31 6,011 (0.2839) 0.1099 0.0015 0.0024 0.0006 0.0066 0.8790
31-40 2,124 (0.1003) 0.7703 0.0043 0.0253 0.0057 0.0664 0.1279
41-50 2,386 (0.1127) 0.6070 0.0589 0.0300 0.0285 0.1080 0.1676
51-60 1,704 (0.0804) 0.4350 0.2447 0.0297 0.0912 0.1103 0.0891
61-70 2,356 (0.1112) 0.5055 0.1683 0.0213 0.0919 0.1475 0.0655
71-80 3,421 (0.1616) 0.3664 0.0732 0.0335 0.0667 0.2698 0.1905
>80 3,175 (0.1499) 0.1460 0.0194 0.0569 0.0688 0.3354 0.3735









Notes: See notes to Table VI.1.






1 Per cent 
2 Nuclear Non-nuclear Nuclear Non-nuclear
<31 3,970 (0.3380) 0.0686 0.0010 0.0003 0.0002 0.0061 0.9237
31-40 1,303 (0.1109) 0.5617 0.0111 0.0013 0.0066 0.0799 0.3394
41-50 1,264 (0.1077) 0.6496 0.0487 0.0046 0.0151 0.1014 0.1805
51-60 1,404 (0.1195) 0.4679 0.2116 0.0085 0.0419 0.1186 0.1515
61-70 1,514 (0.1289) 0.4581 0.2229 0.0090 0.0429 0.1463 0.1208
71-80 1,276 (0.1087) 0.5125 0.1248 0.0167 0.0270 0.1761 0.1429
>80 1,013 (0.0863) 0.3769 0.0737 0.0260 0.0457 0.2347 0.2429





1 Per cent 
2 Nuclear Non-nuclear Nuclear Non-nuclear
<31 3,683 (0.2889) 0.1160 0.0020 0.0028 0.0006 0.0121 0.8665
31-40 1,286 (0.1009) 0.6438 0.0123 0.0233 0.0101 0.0826 0.2278
41-50 1,222 (0.0958) 0.6504 0.0847 0.0311 0.0236 0.1131 0.0970
51-60 1,508 (0.1183) 0.4103 0.2480 0.0300 0.0665 0.1414 0.1038
61-70 1,732 (0.1359) 0.3949 0.1607 0.0244 0.0875 0.2128 0.1197
71-80 1,532 (0.1202) 0.3954 0.0808 0.0295 0.0676 0.2706 0.1561
>80 1,785 (0.1400) 0.1418 0.0257 0.0679 0.0927 0.3355 0.3364









Notes: See notes to Table VI.1.Table VI.5: Consumption and net worth income ratio for detailed demographic groups
(benchmark simulation: middle fertility; 2% productivity growth; year 1993 – actual)
Category Weight (*) Income (**) Cons / Inc Assets/Inc Lflabour/Inc Ssw/Inc Trf/Inc
All people
18,744,647 61,047.6 0.903 6.003 11.403 7.914 25.320
Nuclear families, totals 0.5470 62,844.6 0.938 6.018 13.203 8.230 27.451
by age groups: <31 0.7038 50,014.0 1.064 3.031 35.278 8.784 47.093
31-40 0.8193 62,745.7 1.010 4.582 22.690 8.241 35.513
41-50 0.6569 72,149.0 0.950 5.562 12.309 8.181 26.052
51-60 0.4061 74,327.4 0.843 7.268 5.950 7.964 21.182
61-70 0.3935 55,902.7 0.877 8.175 1.792 9.056 19.023
71-80 0.4014 42,844.3 0.890 8.769 0.344 7.815 16.929
>80 0.3617 44,336.8 0.769 9.316 0.065 5.372 14.753
Non-nuclear families, totals 0.1992 84,269.1 0.819 5.761 9.067 6.784 21.612
by age groups: <31 0.0295 59,774.3 0.892 4.665 22.522 9.815 37.002
31-40 0.0448 63,965.9 0.964 4.172 19.646 10.433 34.252
41-50 0.1953 74,551.3 0.916 4.721 11.978 7.709 24.407
51-60 0.4008 92,283.3 0.818 5.564 8.091 6.292 19.948
61-70 0.2861 81,655.1 0.779 6.878 7.566 6.562 21.007
71-80 0.0917 95,393.2 0.615 6.422 7.643 6.310 20.375
>80 0.0250 69,061.9 0.721 4.917 4.276 8.457 17.650
Nuclear single-head, totals 0.0352 32,746.8 1.092 7.458 10.365 11.993 29.816
by age groups: <31 0.0109 33,934.5 1.259 4.405 35.795 9.087 49.286
31-40 0.0424 21,813.7 1.557 3.605 25.500 14.983 44.088
41-50 0.0413 37,972.1 1.060 4.800 10.799 11.551 27.150
51-60 0.0396 39,434.6 1.104 9.013 5.488 12.009 26.510
61-70 0.0260 31,322.4 0.921 15.497 7.828 12.018 35.343
71-80 0.0261 30,317.0 0.827 7.722 3.813 11.422 22.958
>80 0.0535 31,857.4 0.728 4.727 0.000 8.394 13.121
Non-nuclear single-head, totals 0.0933 57,651.4 0.835 5.628 10.811 8.135 24.574
by age groups: <31 0.1404 84,376.3 0.745 6.452 13.221 7.695 27.368
31-40 0.0575 62,247.8 0.934 5.205 21.055 9.019 35.280
41-50 0.0823 51,495.8 0.876 4.196 11.687 8.909 24.792
51-60 0.1124 59,365.7 0.846 5.233 7.181 7.455 19.869
61-70 0.1066 51,686.0 0.846 5.317 8.369 8.379 22.065
71-80 0.1026 52,721.6 0.753 8.152 9.448 8.158 25.757
>80 0.0579 46,363.6 0.701 8.676 3.580 5.409 17.665
 Single, totals 0.1253 26,780.4 0.999 7.161 5.941 8.580 21.681
by age groups: <31 0.1154 34,705.1 1.069 8.182 34.552 7.044 49.778
31-40 0.0360 46,276.4 1.177 4.312 26.303 7.259 37.873
41-50 0.0242 37,183.4 1.019 5.345 15.010 9.746 30.102
51-60 0.0411 37,901.8 0.940 7.393 2.271 10.832 20.496
61-70 0.1878 23,529.2 1.029 7.067 0.139 11.625 18.831
71-80 0.3782 24,154.7 0.940 7.737 0.013 7.646 15.396
>80 0.5020 21,845.5 0.954 8.031 0.000 4.511 12.542
(*)  Total number of families. Numbers for family types are expressed as fractions of the total. Numbers for age groups within family type
are expressed as fractions of the total number of families for the age group in question in the population. (**) In 1995 thousand lire.Table VI.6: Consumption and net worth income ratio for detailed demographic groups
(benchmark simulation: middle fertility; 2% productivity growth; year 2020)
Category Weight (*) Income (**) Cons / Inc Assets/Inc Lflabour/Inc Ssw/Inc Trf/Inc
All people
20,916,511 89,301.7 0.883 5.984 10.747 7.023 23.753
Nuclear families, totals 0.5119 88,633.7 0.921 4.717 13.174 7.258 25.148
by age groups: <31 0.8201 78,030.5 1.092 2.909 37.846 7.651 48.406
31-40 0.7726 93,592.2 0.990 2.429 26.209 6.696 35.333
41-50 0.6769 110,366.8 0.857 2.841 14.712 6.372 23.925
51-60 0.4414 113,535.6 0.769 4.753 8.154 7.285 20.192
61-70 0.4240 70,867.4 0.951 8.047 1.627 9.988 19.661
71-80 0.4319 50,166.6 1.247 11.129 0.408 8.358 19.895
>80 0.2605 45,356.8 1.149 10.833 0.202 4.798 15.832
Non-nuclear families, totals 0.1658 135,879.6 0.798 5.828 9.524 6.491 21.843
by age groups: <31 0.0434 150,802.3 0.744 6.205 22.348 7.198 35.750
31-40 0.0810 133,191.9 0.904 6.702 17.343 8.399 32.444
41-50 0.1295 128,130.5 0.902 5.001 12.335 7.703 25.039
51-60 0.2715 153,492.8 0.781 4.857 8.596 5.834 19.287
61-70 0.2421 122,508.2 0.799 6.379 8.646 6.765 21.790
71-80 0.1261 126,198.6 0.680 7.171 7.995 6.108 21.273
>80 0.0738 135,354.9 0.796 9.133 5.550 5.443 20.126
Nuclear single-head, totals 0.0363 55,087.3 0.976 9.357 7.536 9.282 26.174
by age groups: <31 0.0325 47,586.6 1.097 2.822 30.403 7.003 40.227
31-40 0.0317 46,205.8 0.958 2.981 20.267 7.687 30.935
41-50 0.0346 60,827.5 0.941 4.376 11.100 9.460 24.936
51-60 0.0337 64,083.9 1.023 7.010 6.939 10.506 24.455
61-70 0.0275 47,852.7 0.833 13.911 4.141 13.349 31.401
71-80 0.0342 49,888.0 1.032 14.179 3.601 9.000 26.781
>80 0.0696 55,551.5 0.998 14.241 1.471 6.404 22.116
Non-nuclear single-head, totals 0.0863 106,136.2 0.756 8.555 7.332 6.711 22.598
by age groups: <31 0.0069 125,391.1 0.662 6.858 15.712 7.262 29.832
31-40 0.0113 98,484.2 0.768 7.330 14.328 8.433 30.090
41-50 0.0304 92,293.0 0.864 6.950 10.014 8.100 25.064
51-60 0.0826 108,101.4 0.869 7.391 8.062 6.454 21.906
61-70 0.1106 95,364.7 0.845 8.704 7.830 7.611 24.145
71-80 0.1370 100,694.9 0.700 8.854 7.977 7.359 24.190
>80 0.1786 127,017.3 0.624 9.506 4.697 5.168 19.370
Single, totals 0.1996 51,293.6 0.993 8.982 6.365 6.986 22.334
by age groups: <31 0.0970 42,485.2 1.219 3.360 40.771 8.588 52.719
31-40 0.1032 65,468.0 1.193 1.721 25.941 6.191 33.852
41-50 0.1286 65,411.0 0.876 3.864 13.930 6.308 24.102
51-60 0.1707 71,033.5 0.905 7.233 6.715 6.862 20.811
61-70 0.1957 46,840.7 0.978 12.512 0.322 10.443 23.278
71-80 0.2708 40,972.2 1.095 12.172 0.001 7.849 20.023
>80 0.4176 38,228.5 1.036 13.232 0.015 3.626 16.873
(*)  Total number of families. Numbers for family types are expressed as fractions of the total. Numbers for age groups within family type
are expressed as fractions of the total number of families for the age group in question in the population. (**) In 1995 thousand lire.Table VI.7: Consumption and net worth income ratio for detailed demographic groups
(benchmark simulation: middle fertility; 2% productivity growth; year 2050)
Category Weight (*) Income (**) Cons / Inc Assets/Inc Lflabour/Inc Ssw/Inc Trf/Inc
All people
17,310,800 163,315.6 0.874 7.254 10.049 5.450 22.753
Nuclear families, totals 0.4585 159,463.6 0.922 5.518 13.203 5.708 24.429
by age groups: <31 0.8420 149,121.0 1.033 3.154 35.845 6.374 45.373
31-40 0.7666 177,895.5 0.944 3.043 24.992 5.473 33.508
41-50 0.6126 209,771.6 0.825 3.514 14.657 4.821 22.992
51-60 0.3303 208,876.6 0.768 5.323 9.025 5.182 19.530
61-70 0.3783 159,954.4 0.857 8.140 2.407 6.881 17.429
71-80 0.4185 95,046.8 1.248 11.422 0.491 7.722 19.635
>80 0.2608 79,318.1 1.177 10.877 0.245 5.021 16.144
Non-nuclear families, totals 0.1835 265,056.1 0.787 7.082 8.978 5.095 21.154
by age groups: <31 0.0408 303,750.8 0.662 6.934 19.737 5.485 32.156
31-40 0.0817 272,632.6 0.844 7.070 16.537 6.112 29.719
41-50 0.1951 251,798.4 0.894 6.963 11.553 5.837 24.352
51-60 0.4187 293,906.5 0.793 6.569 8.170 4.560 19.299
61-70 0.2940 252,611.9 0.746 7.478 7.204 5.203 19.885
71-80 0.1084 233,917.7 0.673 7.571 8.171 5.200 20.942
>80 0.0406 239,817.4 0.781 9.024 6.305 4.436 19.765
Nuclear single-head, totals 0.0395 97,610.3 0.977 12.171 5.638 6.706 24.516
by age groups: <31 0.0286 69,924.1 1.082 4.081 28.783 6.262 39.126
31-40 0.0309 88,472.8 0.951 3.874 19.479 6.692 30.044
41-50 0.0280 98,790.1 0.949 5.475 11.742 7.281 24.498
51-60 0.0234 112,298.7 1.073 9.162 7.599 8.215 24.976
61-70 0.0233 94,539.5 0.815 14.301 5.494 9.494 29.290
71-80 0.0439 98,006.0 0.963 15.865 2.390 7.369 25.624
>80 0.0849 98,111.9 1.012 14.597 0.976 4.920 20.492
Non-nuclear single-head, totals 0.0755 205,742.2 0.732 9.438 7.197 5.172 21.807
by age groups: <31 0.0106 253,340.4 0.593 6.801 13.531 4.387 24.719
31-40 0.0118 206,408.1 0.701 8.214 12.595 6.278 27.086
41-50 0.0390 177,869.1 0.846 9.604 8.879 6.244 24.727
51-60 0.0997 204,074.9 0.872 9.310 6.949 5.129 21.388
61-70 0.1110 193,919.3 0.808 9.466 7.561 5.539 22.566
71-80 0.0803 198,414.0 0.674 9.118 9.136 5.936 24.190
>80 0.1067 236,313.8 0.584 9.855 4.518 3.901 18.274
 Single, totals 0.2430 91,227.7 0.989 10.970 4.766 5.356 21.092
by age groups: <31 0.0779 77,592.5 1.188 4.555 37.578 7.668 49.802
31-40 0.1090 120,783.9 1.138 2.352 24.703 5.237 32.292
41-50 0.1254 128,171.6 0.823 4.886 13.731 4.439 23.057
51-60 0.1280 137,644.1 0.901 8.330 7.473 4.424 20.228
61-70 0.1934 106,222.6 0.896 12.203 1.359 7.203 20.765
71-80 0.3490 79,054.8 1.070 14.838 0.005 6.782 21.625
>80 0.5071 72,035.7 1.032 12.833 0.000 3.726 16.559
(*)  Total number of families. Numbers for family types are expressed as fractions of the total. Numbers for age groups within family type
are expressed as fractions of the total number of families for the age group in question in the population. (**) In 1995 thousand lire.Table VI.8: Consumption and net worth income ratio for detailed demographic groups
(benchmark simulation: middle fertility; 2% productivity growth; year 2100)
Category Weight (*) Income (**) Cons / Inc Assets/Inc Lflabour/Inc Ssw/Inc Trf/Inc
All people
10,451,872 479,137.7 0.873 8.800 9.002 4.687 22.489
Nuclear families, totals 0.4513 470,399.7 0.902 7.078 11.524 4.937 23.539
by age groups: <31 0.8243 405,401.4 0.951 4.181 32.166 5.543 41.890
31-40 0.7196 505,428.1 0.889 4.317 22.581 4.800 31.698
41-50 0.6153 600,104.8 0.798 4.786 12.999 4.305 22.090
51-60 0.3916 585,027.1 0.760 6.511 8.331 4.456 19.298
61-70 0.3634 507,090.7 0.837 9.121 2.674 5.593 17.389
71-80 0.4186 284,791.8 1.384 15.218 0.388 6.542 22.148
>80 0.2461 205,518.3 1.439 13.818 0.369 4.315 18.503
Non-nuclear families, totals 0.1911 761,701.5 0.781 8.210 8.537 4.335 21.082
by age groups: <31 0.0421 808,018.5 0.623 7.409 17.398 5.044 29.851
31-40 0.1205 761,524.9 0.832 8.593 15.110 5.359 29.062
41-50 0.2104 709,246.9 0.912 9.375 10.271 5.135 24.781
51-60 0.3498 811,130.5 0.774 6.934 8.198 3.780 18.912
61-70 0.2739 761,157.1 0.737 8.230 7.095 4.396 19.721
71-80 0.1169 705,148.5 0.700 10.202 6.955 4.343 21.500
>80 0.0445 687,555.3 0.836 10.348 5.717 3.849 19.914
Nuclear single-head, totals 0.0396 271,539.0 1.039 14.008 5.311 6.065 25.384
by age groups: <31 0.0300 200,115.4 1.081 6.160 27.340 5.551 39.052
31-40 0.0276 258,952.6 0.889 5.393 19.974 4.989 30.356
41-50 0.0294 301,385.9 0.967 7.550 9.655 7.045 24.251
51-60 0.0301 288,743.2 1.118 11.477 6.328 7.513 25.318
61-70 0.0260 298,655.7 0.782 16.740 3.423 7.627 27.790
71-80 0.0388 298,811.7 1.017 19.830 1.918 5.961 27.708
>80 0.0893 241,799.9 1.192 15.537 1.201 4.642 21.380
Non-nuclear single-head, totals 0.0763 597,134.0 0.748 11.291 6.244 4.332 21.867
by age groups: <31 0.0079 662,832.4 0.566 10.233 9.805 4.323 24.360
31-40 0.0189 570,302.2 0.741 10.867 11.309 5.667 27.844
41-50 0.0322 510,796.6 0.856 12.341 7.912 5.690 25.943
51-60 0.0836 572,506.8 0.874 10.218 7.379 4.164 21.761
61-70 0.1008 561,046.0 0.814 11.716 6.186 4.645 22.547
71-80 0.0803 563,132.2 0.720 12.286 7.638 4.824 24.748
>80 0.1281 696,040.4 0.617 10.954 4.104 3.583 18.641
 Single, totals 0.2417 268,824.6 1.045 13.137 4.353 4.679 22.169
by age groups: <31 0.0957 207,981.6 1.107 3.580 36.494 6.692 46.767
31-40 0.1134 340,715.8 1.072 3.761 21.808 4.592 30.162
41-50 0.1128 371,087.0 0.831 6.346 12.653 4.060 23.059
51-60 0.1449 380,627.5 0.891 10.013 6.458 4.001 20.472
61-70 0.2359 314,894.1 0.893 14.707 1.480 5.660 21.846
71-80 0.3454 243,888.8 1.178 18.546 0.009 5.696 24.251
>80 0.4921 190,570.0 1.255 14.482 0.000 3.353 17.836
(*)  Total number of families. Numbers for family types are expressed as fractions of the total. Numbers for age groups within family type
are expressed as fractions of the total number of families for the age group in question in the population. (**) In 1995 thousand lire.Table VI.9: Benchmark simulation: aggregate results
(benchmark simulation: middle fertility; 2% productivity growth)




Life time labour 
income / income 
ratio
Social security 
wealth / income 
ratio
Total resources / 
income ratio
% Growth of 
aggregate 
income
1993 18,744,647 0.903 6.003 11.403 7.914 25.320
1994 18,911,179 0.900 6.056 11.540 7.764 25.360 1.382
2000 19,876,236 0.905 5.893 11.983 7.723 25.599 2.664
2020 20,916,511 0.883 5.984 10.747 7.023 23.753 1.808
2050 17,310,800 0.874 7.254 10.049 5.450 22.753 1.166
2070 13,879,948 0.871 8.012 9.689 5.062 22.764 1.375
2090 11,547,102 0.876 8.550 9.192 4.795 22.536 0.991
2100 10,451,872 0.873 8.800 9.002 4.687 22.489 1.168
(*) Total number of families.
Table VI.10: High fertility scenario: aggregate results
(2% productivity growth)




Life time labour 
income / income 
ratio
Social security 
wealth / income 
ratio
Total resources / 
income ratio
% Growth of 
aggregate 
income
1993 18,744,647 0.903 6.003 11.401 7.915 25.318
2020 21,321,741 0.886 5.963 11.021 7.140 24.124 1.860
2050 19,411,333 0.880 6.419 11.073 5.917 23.409 1.733
2100 16,124,254 0.858 7.033 10.348 5.511 22.892 1.775
(*) Total number of families.
Table VI.11: Zero growth rate scenario: aggregate results
(middle fertility; zero growth rate of aggregate income)




Life time labour 
income / income 
ratio
Social security 




% Growth of 
aggregate 
income
1993 18,744,647 0.903 6.003 11.188 7.999 25.190
2020 20,877,931 0.925 7.475 9.846 6.932 24.252 0.018
2050 17,462,622 0.939 9.144 9.598 5.296 24.038 0.195
2100 10,574,273 0.967 11.118 8.963 4.559 24.640 0.031
(*) Total number of families.Table VI.12: Reduced perceived social security wealth: aggregate results
(middle fertility; 2% productivity growth)




Life time labour 
income / income 
ratio
Social security 
wealth / income 
ratio
Total resources / 
income ratio
% Growth of 
aggregate 
income
1993 18,744,647 0.903 6.003 11.401 7.914 25.317
2020 20,864,608 0.887 2.243 10.817 7.057 20.118 1.806
2050 17,335,780 0.889 4.135 10.094 5.525 19.754 1.376
2100 10,462,141 0.893 5.551 9.292 4.831 19.675 1.114
(*) Total number of families.
Table VI.13: Late retirement: aggregate results
(middle fertility; 2% productivity growth)




Life time labour 
income / income 
ratio
Social security 




% Growth of 
aggregate 
income
1993 18,744,647 0.903 6.003 11.401 7.915 25.318
2020 20,844,902 0.885 5.972 10.799 7.052 23.823 1.830
2050 17,423,209 0.874 7.134 10.036 5.561 22.731 1.424
2100 10,521,260 0.875 8.661 9.106 4.847 22.613 1.160
(*) Total number of families.Appendix
A.1 The Bank of Italy Survey of Households’ Income and Wealth
The basic source of data for this work is represented by the Survey of Household
Income and Wealth (SHIW), which is a household survey sponsored by the Bank of Italy. Its
main purpose is to collect information concerning the economic behaviour of Italian
households at the micro economic level. In particular, data on households’ composition,
consumption, income and wealth are collected.
69 The SHIW has been run on a yearly basis
from 1965 to 1987 and every other year since 1987 until now. Up to 1987, the number of
participant households in a typical year was around 4000. The number was doubled starting
in 1987 when a number of other improvements has made the survey more reliable and rich in
information.
A.1.1 The survey unit
The unit of observation is the family, which is defined to include all persons residing in
the same dwelling who are related by blood, marriage or affection. Persons living in nursing
homes, prisons or military installations are not included. On the basis of this definition only
one unit is recorded when two or more nuclear families, as registered at the registry offices,
are linked by family ties and live together. This explains why the survey-based estimate of
average family size tends to exceed the estimate based on official records.
A.1.2 The sampling procedure
Sampling is carried out in two stages: the first consists in the selection of
municipalities and the second in selecting the families. Up to 1986 the number of participant
                                                          
69 In particular, the SHIW is basically the only reliable source for the analysis of household income and
wealth in Italy, data on which are not available in the Italian survey of consumer expenditure run by Istat, the
Italian public statistical agency. The latter, however, does provide more detailed statistics on household
consumption expenditures.150
households in a typical year was around 4000 and was selected from the Electoral Register.
70
The sampling procedure was entirely revised in 1986 and brought into line with that used by
Istat in its survey of the labour force. Municipalities are now divided into 51 strata, defined
by 17 regions and 3 classes of population size: over 40,000 thousands, 20,000-40,000
thousands, less than 20,000 inhabitants. The number of families was doubled and the
selection made from the General Registry Office’s lists.
71 The average number of participant
households is about 8,000. Starting in 1989 a small panel was introduced (about 15 per cent
of the total number of families). The panel was gradually increased to 40 per cent in
subsequent years.
A.1.3 The realization of the survey, response rate and processing of results
The survey is contracted out to a private company which provides professionally
trained interviewers. Data are collected in personal interviews in the first months of a year
and refer to family budgets of the previous calendar years. Questions concerning the whole
family are answered by the head of the family, identified as the person who is mainly
responsible for economic decisions in the family, while questions on individuals’ incomes
are answered by each member, if present. For both responding and non-responding families
interviewers are asked to complete a section of the questionnaire on the family’s
characteristics. Non-responding families are replaced with other families with similar
characteristics.
The response rate is around 50 per cent in a typical year (there was a large drop in the
1989 survey when the response rate fell to 23.3 per cent). On the basis of the characteristics
of all families contacted it seems that the response rate is inversely correlated with income
and wealth (Cannari and D’Alessio, 1992), leading probably to an underestimation of the
mean and dispersion of incomes.
Questionnaires go through several checking procedures. These include re-contacting
the interviewers incomplete or wrong questionnaires and automatic controls to eliminate
coding and computation errors. Typically, about 95 per cent of the questionnaires are used.
                                                          
70 As noted by Brandolini and Cannari (1994), the sample design implied an oversampling of large
families. Also, up to 1984 the first stage-stage sample was not random but selected on the basis of convenience
in the collection of data (availability of professional interviewers in the area).
71 This is the registry office’s list maintained by municipalities.151
A.1.4 The information collected
The survey collects data on all the important social and demographic characteristics of
household members: sex, age, relationship to the head of the family are collected for each
member, while education, professional status and economic sector of activity are collected
for all income recipients.
The information on incomes of family members is very detailed. The revision of the
survey structure carried out in 1986 made the definitions closer to those used to compile the
national accounts by introducing the distinction between receipts in income account and
transfers in capital accounts (such as inheritances, lottery wins, etc.), by recording receipts
and disbursements in the year they are due, and by distinguishing income from private non-
corporate enterprises and that from quasi-corporate enterprises, including imputed rent, in the
definition of income. All income is recorded net of taxes and social security contributions
and no information on taxation is collected. Net income receipts are collected for each
income earner of the family, divided by type of income (dependent work, self-employment,
pension benefits and other transfers, interest income, property income).
Consumer expenditure is divided into durable and non-durable components: further
disaggregation is not available. Expenditures on non-durable consumption include food,
entertainment, education, clothes, medical expenses, housing repairs and rent (imputed for
home-owners). Durable consumption is the sum of expenditures on vehicles, furniture,
appliances and art objects.
Data on holdings of financial assets have been collected in a systematic way only
starting with the 1987 survey. Detailed information on households’ real estate and on
mortgages is available in each survey.
A.2 The comparison of the SHIW with the National Accounts
A careful comparison of the survey data with the National Accounts data on income
and consumption for the Households and Individual Firms sector was performed
 72 to assess
                                                          
72 This is the institutional sector that most closely matches the sort of data collected in the surveys.
Individual firms are defined as firms employing less than 15 people.152
the comparability between the two sources of data for each survey from 1987 to 1995.
73
Below we give the details of the methodology used.
A.2.1 The sampling weights
The computation of average families’ income and consumption has been carried out
using the sampling weights of the SHIW historical archive data set (D’Alessio and Gallo,
1998). These are reconstructed starting from the original survey weights with iterative
methods in order to match the distributions of some social and demographic characteristics
of the population as recorded in official statistics. In particular, the distribution by age, sex,
regional residence, dimension of municipalities of residence and economic activity of the
population has been brought into line with the corresponding distribution obtained by Istat in
its current population surveys and labour force statistics. This choice was made mainly
because the proportion of self-employed individuals is severely underestimated by original
survey data with respect to labour force statistics. Also, the new weights should enhance the
comparability of survey data over time.
A.2.2 The total population and the number of families
An important source of difficulties in making the comparison between the survey data
and the National Accounts is the uncertainty regarding the size and the distribution of the
Italian population. The survey does not provide an independent measure of the total
population because the basic unit is a de facto family, which might differ from the unit
recorded at the registry offices (see above). To compute the total number of families we have
divided the total resident population by the average family size estimated by the survey. The
total resident population is taken from Istat official statistics, except for the years 1987 and
1989 for which we have used a revised series of the Bank of Italy.
74 Estimates of the total
number of Italian families are reported in Table A.1.
                                                          
73 A similar exercise for the SHIW was carried out by Brandolini (1993) and Brandolini and Cannari
(1994) for the SHIW up to 1989. Even if the methodologies differ in some respects, the results for the 1987 and
1989 surveys are qualitatively very similar to those obtained here.
74 This is because official statistics present a negative jump of 1 million persons in 1991 (when the last
Census was taken), due probably to the inaccuracy of the measures of the current population surveys carried out
between the two censuses. The Bank of Italy measure simply re-scales the official series by smoothly
subtracting this one million persons in the period 1981-1991.153
A.2.3 The construction of gross income
The original SHIW data only report net after-tax incomes received by households and
their members. For a number of important tasks in our model, however, we need to estimate
gross income and to dispose of a fairly detailed description of the structure of personal taxes
for the Italian household sector. Moreover, an estimate of gross income (and personal taxes)
is needed to perform a comparison of the survey data with the National Accounts as the latter
only provides gross pre-tax incomes and personal taxes are not broken down by income
categories.
We have therefore reconstructed gross incomes of all labour income recipients in the
surveys (dependent workers, pensioners and self-employed incomes), starting from the net
incomes given by the survey and applying the legal provisions prevailing during each survey
year and taking into account tax credits and deductions by job status and family
composition.
75
 Given the structure of the Italian personal income tax schedule – a progressive levy
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where Sj is the lower bound of the j-th income bracket.
By initially deducting tax credits from the net income declared by the survey unit we
implicitly assume that tax credits are not distinguished from wages and salaries by the
respondent when answering the survey questionnaire.
We have considered two types of tax credit: tax credits for work-related expenses and
tax credits for dependent relatives. The former is actually a fixed amount (unrelated to work
expenses) that is scaled according to the effective working period. The latter are credits154
granted to the dependent relative (spouse or child) of the taxpayer. To qualify as a dependent
the relative has to have an income below a prescribed ceiling. Credits have been computed
differentiating for family structures (married couple and single parents)
We have not considered, for the time being, family allowances, that is the cash
transfers to the families of employees and pensioners that vary directly with the number of
members in the family and inversely with gross household income. We will consider this
type of tax credit in future extensions of the model as it introduces some extra computational
burden. Admittedly, its exclusion might imply some upward bias in the computation of
personal taxes.
It should be noted that, according to the law, tax credits cannot be greater than gross
tax liabilities. When this happens, tax credits are put at a level which results in net tax
liabilities equal to zero.
Finally, we have also reconstructed gross interest incomes by applying the relevant tax
rates on the different sources of interest (public bonds, deposits, etc.), applying the tax rates
prevailing in each survey year.
The implicit average tax rates that we get for the various sources of income are quite
plausible: considering, for example, the 1995 Survey, we have an average tax rate of 19% for
dependent workers, 16.7% for pensioners, 22% for interest incomes, 24% for self-employed.
As we shall explain below, in the final data used for the model we have adjusted the net,
gross incomes and taxes of the original survey data to match the corresponding aggregates
given by the National Accounts. This implies an estimate and the attribution of tax evasion.
As a result of this procedure, the effective average tax rate on self-employment income is
substantially reduced.
The taxable labour income Y in equation (1) represents the basis on which the social
security contribution rates for employees (both those paid by the employee and by the
employer) and self-employed have been applied in order to compute the gross labour
incomes and contribution receipts necessary to model the Italian social security system.
                                                                                                                                                                                  
75 The methodology adopted here follows closely, but with less detail, Di Biase et al. (1995)
“ITAXMOD: A Microsimulation Model of the Italian Personal Income Tax and of Social Security155
A.2.4 The imputation of direct personal taxes to different sources of income
As already mentioned in the National Accounts gross incomes and direct taxes are not
broken down by type of income. Therefore, some arbitrary criterion of imputation of taxes
has to be adopted to be able to compare the NA data with the survey data broken down by
income categories. One possibility (followed, for example, in Brandolini and Cannari, 1993)
is to simply assign each type of income a proportional share of direct taxes. We have
followed a different procedure, which is described below.
We have first estimated the aggregate direct taxes for the total of the population
implied by the survey data using the procedure described in the previous section to compute
taxes on the income of payroll workers, self-employed, transfers and interests receipts.
However, the estimate of aggregate direct taxes for these income sources largely
overestimates the total amount of direct taxes given in the National Accounts aggregates,
76
even if we are not yet considering any taxes on the other income sources: capital and rent.
This is in some sense natural since the average tax rate, according to National Accounts
figures, on the total gross income of families is only about 13%, well below the average tax
rates estimated by applying legal provisions on the survey observations. The main problem
here, besides measurement errors, is clearly tax evasion, a particularly significant
phenomenon in Italy.
In the light of these findings and in the absence of further information we have decided
to proceed in the following way.
77 Firstly, we have kept unchanged the average tax rates
estimated on survey data for payroll workers, pensioners, and interest receipts (not for self-
employed income). Secondly, we have applied the estimated average tax rates for the above
income types on the corresponding gross figures of the National Accounts and computed the
total tax revenues from these incomes and the corresponding net figures. By subtracting the
tax revenues computed in this way from the total amount of personal taxes in the National
Accounts we get an estimate of taxes to be split among self-employed income, rent and
capital. This procedure therefore amounts to assuming that tax evasion is concentrated in
these sources of income. We then split this total amount of residual taxes proportionally for
                                                                                                                                                                                  
Contributions”, ISPE Documenti di Lavoro No. 16.
76 For 1995 the overestimation is of the order of 60 trillion lire.
77 For a thorough analysis and for alternative methodologies for quantifying tax evasion in Italy, see
Cannari, Ceriani and D’Alessio (1997).156
the three sources of income. The resulting average tax rate is pretty small: 6.8% in 1995 and
it varies (quite randomly) in the range from 3% to 10% in the surveys from 1987 to 1995.
Table A.2 shows the results from this procedure. Column 2 represents, for 1995
income types recognized in the NA Household Sector, net of social security contributions,
depreciation and transfers in kind, that is the income base on which personal taxes are
collected. Column 3 represents the effective average rate of personal income tax implied by
statutory provisions using the size distribution and the characteristics of families as reported
in the SHIW. As already mentioned, we accept this calculation for payroll workers’ income,
transfer payments and for interest income, but not for other types of income. Since the NA
report that the ratio of total personal income tax on all income to the income base is 13.8, our
procedure implies that for any incomes other than those of payroll workers, transfer
payments and interest, the effective average rate is only 6.8%.
A.2.5 The definition of variables
Besides the problem stemming from direct taxes one has to consider the additional
complication that definitions of variables in the survey do not always coincide with those
used to compile the National Accounts. It is therefore necessary to make some adjustment so
that the two sources become comparable. Below we report the National Accounts income
definitions used and indicate the variables from survey data to which they have been
compared. Definitions for the latter variables and their exact relation to the questions
contained in the questionnaire of the survey are provided in Banca d’Italia (1995),
Supplementi al Bollettino Statistico, “I bilanci delle famiglie Italiane nell’anno 1993”, p. 28.
Definitions refer to pre-tax incomes while the comparison has been made by netting each of
the following aggregates by imputed direct taxes to each type of income computed as
explained above.
Wages and salaries: compensation of employees minus actual and net imputed social
security contributions (contributions paid by the self-employed are deducted from actual
contributions); compared with survey variable: YL.
Self-employment income: gross operating surplus of sole proprietorships with fewer
than 20 employees, net of depreciation of physical assets and interest payments on loans,157
minus contributions paid by the self-employed (for this last variable, source: R.G.S.E.P.,
various issues); compared with survey variable: YM
Rents: rents from land and royalties plus operating surplus of consumer households
(which is essentially an estimate of imputed rents for owner-occupied houses). Compared
with survey variable: YCR2+YCR3
Capital income: dividends and other receipts from corporate enterprises plus
withdrawals from corporate and quasi-corporate enterprises (by construction net of
consumption of net fixed capital); compared with survey variable: YCR1.
Interest: interest on bank deposit, post-office deposits and government bonds, minus
interests on mortgages; compared with survey variable: YCF
Transfers: social security and assistance benefits net of benefits in kind (for this last
variable, source: R.G.S.E.P.); compared with survey variable YT.
A.2.6 The results of the comparison
Using the definitions above, average household (gross and net) incomes and taxes (for
the six different categories) and average household consumption were multiplied by the total
number of Italian families.
Table A.3 shows the result of our comparison for net income and consumption. We
find that NA income is underestimated by 25 to 33 per cent by survey data (depending on the
survey) while the underestimation of consumption expenditures ranges between 35 and 40
per cent. The larger underestimation of consumption with respect to disposable income is
probably to be expected, since the survey questionnaires are very detailed in recording
income while questions on consumption expenditures refer only to broad aggregates.
78 All
income types are underestimated, the only exception being rents. The underestimation of
income is particularly severe in some categories, particularly for the income of self-employed
workers, interest receipts and capital income. One can also notice a tendency towards an
increase in underestimation over the years for all categories except transfers. As reported by
Brandolini and Cannari  (1994), the evidence conforms to the experience of other countries,
                                                          
78 Part of the underestimation, however, might be due to differences in definitions that have not been
corrected: consumption from own production, which is not recorded in the SHIW; and consumption of
valuables which is included in savings in the SHIW and in consumption in the NA.158
both in terms of the level of the overall underestimation and in terms of categories of income
for which the discrepancies are largest.
A.3 Re-proportioning to the National Accounts
A.3.1 Income, consumption and savings
Since the main purpose of our analysis is to give a description of the behaviour of
families so to gain insights into the aggregate behaviour of the Italian household sector, we
have decided to take the extreme position of re-proportioning the survey data on income and
consumption to exactly match the corresponding NA figures for the household sector. We
have therefore re-proportioned the survey data (wages and salaries, self-employed income,
capital income, rent, interest and transfers) gross, net incomes and taxes for all types of
income considered above to the corresponding NA figures. This has been done simply by
multiplying, for all individuals in the survey, the income of each type by its re-proportioning
coefficient (in the case of net incomes: the reciprocal of coefficients given in Table A.3
divided by 100).
Since we wanted to maintain the distribution of saving rates across households as close
as possible to that observed in the original survey, the consumption expenditures of each
family have been re-proportioned to the NA figure taking into account the coefficient used
for re-proportioning the income of that family. That is, defining θ i = ydi
*
 / ydi , where ydi is
the i-th family’s disposable income from the original survey data and ydi
* is its disposable
income re-proportioned to the NA, we have computed θ T using:
Cc Ti
i
i =  θθ         (A.3)
where  C is aggregate household consumption expenditure as reported in the National
Accounts and ci is the consumption expenditure of family i. The re-proportioned
consumption of each family is then simply computed as
c
*
i = θ T θ i cI           (A.4)
A.3.2 Other adjustments159
No strictly comparable data exist for real wealth in the official National Accounts.
Table A.4. presents the comparison between the survey real estate wealth estimate and an
estimate of housing wealth obtained at the Bank of Italy on the basis of National Accounts
data and various other sources (see Brandolini, 1996). The survey estimate ranges between
85% and 100% of the national aggregate figure. However, since some information in
constructing the national aggregate is in fact taken from the SHIW itself (houses prices per
square meter) this cannot be considered an independent measure. Given the uncertainty
surrounding this area, we have made no adjustments for the level of reported real wealth.
We have adopted the adjustment for the level of financial wealth of the SHIW, which
severely underestimates the corresponding figures of Flow of Funds tables drawn up by
Cannari and D’Alessio (1993). This is a non-proportional adjustment obtained by matching
the survey data, for a series of defining characteristics of households, to data on clients of the
banking system. The data were first corrected to impute financial assets to households
reporting only the holding and not the amount. They were then adjusted for non-reporting
and under-reporting by comparing the SHIW figures with the estimates derived from a
survey carried out by Banca Nazionale del Lavoro (BNL) on a sample of its customers. This
sample is not representative of the Italian population but provides more reliable information,
probably owing to the greater trust that customers are likely to place in their own bank.  The
adjustment brings the total value of financial wealth held by the households in the survey to
between 70 and 90 per cent (depending on the survey years) of the corresponding figures of
the Flow of Funds of the financial National Accounts. The comparison is shown in Table
A.5. Using this reconstructed level of financial assets we have corrected disposable income
for the effect of inflation (“Hicksian correction”).
A.3.3 The age profile of the average propensity to consume after re-proportioning
The final effect on the average propensity to consume of all the adjustments adopted
can be gathered in Table A.6, where we have pooled all the surveys between 1987 and 1995.
The adjustment to the National Accounts increases the average propensity to consume by 9
percentage points (because consumption is more underestimated than income, as we have
seen), while the adjustment for inflation increases it by 6.3 points. It is important to note that
with the adjustment for inflation to disposable income the saving rate across age becomes160
more hump-shaped: since older households have more financial assets the inflation
adjustment is larger for them.Appendix – Charts and Tables
Table A.1.  Estimate of the total number of Italian families
(source: Istat and SHIW, various years)
1987 1989 1991 1993 1995
Total population 56,049 56,012 56,778 56,960 57,333
Average family size 3.004 2.89 2.895 2.899 2.882
Number of families 18,658 19,381 19,612 19,648 19,893
Table A.2.  Imputation of direct taxes to the different sources of income
(million lire; year 1995)
Income category: Gross income (*) Tax rate Tax
Wages and salaries 456215 19.0 86658.0
Interest 157733 18.8 29672.0
Transfers 318777 15.7 50134.0
Self-employed 368943 6.8 24954.0
Capital 26872 6.8 1818.0
Rent 148210 6.8 10024.0
Total 1476750 13.8 203260.0
(*) As reported by the NA total Households Sector with the adjustments described in the text.
Table A.3.  Comparison of SHIW and National Accounts: income and consumption
( percentage ratio of survey to NA figures)
1987 1989 1991 1993 1995
Consumption 66.1 65.9 62.8 60.6 60.0
Disposable income 75.2 75.5 68.5 68.1 67.3
of which:
Wages and salaries 90.0 92.0 85.4 87.2 89.2
Self-employed 56.3 57.3 48.4 43.7 35.2
Rent 118.7 122.6 110.9 116.0 109.1
Capital 28.1 13.3 3.2 14.4 9.5
Interest 65.6 42.5 25.6 21.7 22.3
Transfers 68.0 71.1 71.6 70.2 79.0Table A.4.  Comparison of SHIW and National Accounts: (*)
                    real estate and financial wealth
(percentage ratio of survey to NA figures)
1987 1989 1991 1993 1995
WF 86.2 84.3 83.6 89.5 100
AF 39.4 27.4 20.3 21.1 22.5
AFN 41.9 50.1 41.5 44.5 48.9
AFNN 64.8 74.2 79.4 81.7 88.2
(*) Survey estimate of households' real estates is compared with the
     Bank of Italy estimate of households holdings of houses and land  
     based on official Istat data.
WF:  real estate wealth.
AF : financial assets as reported in the survey.
AFN: financial assets adjusted for non-reporting.
AFNN: financial assets adjusted for non-reporting and under-reporting.
Table A.5.  Comparison between original survey data and survey data adjusted to NA
(1987-1989-1991-1993-1995 BI survey data at 1995 prices)
Original  Adjusted to NA
survey data
C/Y C/Y C/Y* A/Y* W/Y*
Totals: 0.742 0.834 0.898 1.776 5.191
by age groups:
<30 0.816 0.996 1.023 0.628 3.461
31-40 0.785 0.947 0.980 0.813 3.670
41-50 0.756 0.880 0.926 1.200 4.675
51-60 0.716 0.803 0.863 1.727 5.457
61-70 0.702 0.732 0.822 2.842 6.496
71-80 0.723 0.726 0.838 3.558 7.076
>80 0.733 0.690 0.820 4.358 7.500
Legend: C: total consumption expenditures.
Y: total disposable income.
Y*: inflation-adjusted total disposable income.
A: total financial assets (adj. for non-reporting and under-reporting).
W: total assets (adj. for non-reporting and under-reporting).References
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